When International Indicators Disrupt Party Competition: How Standardized School Tests and Preferences Affect Parties’ Issue Emphasis

2020 ◽  
pp. 231-253
Author(s):  
Thomas Artmann Kristensen
2021 ◽  
pp. 25-42
Author(s):  
Emiliano Grossman ◽  
Isabelle Guinaudeau

This chapter presents a general theoretical framework to analyse party competition and its effects on policymaking. There are two perspectives: that parties still matter for policymaking despite signs of decline and that parties are driven by instrumental considerations and will do what it takes to get elected. This chapter adopts an intermediary perspective, arguing that campaign priorities not only reflect partisan preferences, but also respond to rival parties’ campaigns. This leads to an important common ground across different parties regarding their issue emphasis, i.e. the ‘tunnel’ of attention. Moving away from the heart of the tunnel is possible, but potentially costly. Post election, the victorious party will deliver on its programme priorities not least because of the pressure of junior coalition partners and the opposition. The tunnel of attention thus constrains party competition, but triggers mandate implementation.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenzo De Sio ◽  
Andrea De Angelis ◽  
Vincenzo Emanuele

The issue yield model introduced a theory of the herestethic use of policy issues as strategic resources in multidimensional party competition. We extend the model by systematically addressing the specificities of issue yield dynamics in multiparty systems, with special regard to parties’ issue yield rankings (relative position) and issue yield heterogeneity (differentiation) on each issue. Second, we introduce a novel research design for original data collection that allows for a more systematic testing of the model, by featuring (a) a large number of policy issues, (b) the use of Twitter content for coding parties’ issue emphasis, and (c) an appropriate time sequence for measuring issue yield configurations and issue emphasis. We finally present findings from a pilot implementation of such design, performed on the occasion of the 2014 European Parliament election in Italy. Findings confirm the soundness of the design and provide support for the newly introduced hypotheses about multiparty competition.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 640-650 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Braun ◽  
Hermann Schmitt

Political parties increasingly operate at multiple political levels. Nevertheless, we do not yet know much about the consequences of these multilevel electoral systems (MLESs) on party behaviour. To fill this gap, we examine party manifestos for European Parliament (EP) elections and compare them with party manifestos for national elections. Using manifesto data and covering 15 European Union (EU) countries between 1979 and 2014, we focus on European issues and ask whether parties’ issue emphasis and the positions they take are the same in both kinds of documents and respectively at both levels of the MLES. We show that although parties put more emphasis on EU issues in EP than in national elections, they behave sincerely regarding their position towards the EU – these are very similar irrespective of the electoral context. As many elections take place in MLES environments, in Europe, in particular, but far beyond, this noteworthy finding is highly relevant for scholars of party competition in general and even more instructive for the so far fragmented literature exploring the implications of MLESs.


2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (9) ◽  
pp. 1208-1238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenzo De Sio ◽  
Andrea De Angelis ◽  
Vincenzo Emanuele

The issue yield model introduced a theory of the herestethic use of policy issues as strategic resources in multidimensional party competition. We extend the model by systematically addressing the specificities of issue yield dynamics in multiparty systems, with special regard to parties’ issue yield rankings (relative position) and issue yield heterogeneity (differentiation) on each issue. Second, we introduce a novel research design for original data collection that allows for a more systematic testing of the model, by featuring (a) a large number of policy issues, (b) the use of Twitter content for coding parties’ issue emphasis, and (c) an appropriate time sequence for measuring issue yield configurations and issue emphasis. We finally present findings from a pilot implementation of such design, performed on the occasion of the 2014 European Parliament election in Italy. Findings confirm the soundness of the design and provide support for the newly introduced hypotheses about multiparty competition.


Author(s):  
James F. Adams ◽  
Samuel Merrill III ◽  
Bernard Grofman

Author(s):  
Christopher S. Randolph, Jr.

Presidential candidates often make issue appeals during their campaigns, but question exists as to whether the actions of presidents are consistent with their messages as candidates. Examining presidential documents and direct communications between candidates and voters allows an exploration of the degree to which presidential priorities reflect issues emphasized in campaigns. This analysis is followed by a discussion of the effects of electoral dynamics on the consistency between campaign messages and presidential agendas.


Author(s):  
Michael Laver ◽  
Ernest Sergenti

This chapter attempts to develop more realistic and interesting models in which the set of competing parties is a completely endogenous output of the process of party competition. It also seeks to model party competition when different party leaders use different decision rules in the same setting by building on an approach pioneered in a different context by Robert Axelrod. This involves long-running computer “tournaments” that allow investigation of the performance and “robustness” of decision rules in an environment where any politician using any rule may encounter an opponent using either the same decision rule or some quite different rule. The chapter is most interested in how a decision rule performs against anything the competitive environment might throw against it, including agents using decision rules that are difficult to anticipate and/or comprehend.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-60
Author(s):  
Gregor Zons ◽  
Anna Halstenbach

AbstractDespite its right-wing populist character, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) shows no signs of a strong party leadership. We ascribe this state of the party leadership to the AfD’s institutionalization as a new party and show how organizational features interact with the skill set and goals of the party leaders. At the party level, we, firstly, outline the organizational change at the top of the party and the party leader selection rules. Secondly, we depict leadership turnover and competitiveness. At the leader level, we investigate the failure of Bernd Lucke, the key founder and one of the initial party leaders, as a manifestation of the leadership-structure dilemma of new parties. Embedded in a leadership team and faced with a growing extra-parliamentary party structure, Lucke tried to secure his initial autonomy and position of power by an attempt to become the sole party leader. His subsequent exit from the AfD laid bare the fact that he was not able to manage the challenges of the organizational consolidation phase, in which a new party needs a coordinator and consensus-builder. The AfD itself has proven its organizational autonomy from its initial leaders and its distaste for a strong and centralized party leadership. The barriers for the latter remain in place while, at the same time, the party institutionalization is still on-going, especially regarding its place in the German party competition.


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