Songlines

Jeremy Bernstein’s book A Song for Molly is a fantasy in the form of fictional autobiography from which Bernstein declines to “pick out the real parts.” Sheldon Lee Glashow, in reviewing the book, finds it to be a delightful example of episodic storytelling, as Bernstein weaves around many seminal intellectual achievements, and drops many names: Robert Axelrod, Émile Borel, Richard Dawkins…

Revisiting Robert Axelrod: Cooperation, School Management and Teacher Unions

The militancy of teacher unions is frequently associated with the disruption in schools where unions are antagonistic to management. The objective of this qualitative study was to examine the impact of cooperation between teacher unions and school management. Using Axelrod’s theory of the Evolution of Cooperation, the instrument explored whether school principals can forge successful cooperation between school managers and union site committees. Several studies are showing that cooperation among staff is critical for learner achievement and collegiality. Furthermore, cooperation enables the school’s role-players to work towards a shared vision. The conclusions point out that school managers should consciously engender cooperation to run successful schools where teachers would not betray one another. A methodical cooperation plan could be the missing tool required to turn unsuccessful schools around to become successful.

Does Capitalism Need a Government to Be Nice: Robert Axelrod and His Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Computer Tournament

In the past few decades, the progressive political ideal of strong central governments or collective morality being necessary to enforce cooperative behavior has become widely-accepted. However, many philosophers throughout history, especially that from the classical liberalism tradition, have espoused free market, open society ideals arguing not only that governments are the source of much of the immorality and conflict many are afraid of, but also that man left in a free environment can and will cooperate and develop naturally moral systems that allow for economic and societal development. Robert Axelrod, more recently, studied this debate using the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game from traditional game theory and applied computer science to find that, indeed, cooperation can arise naturally even between selfish prisoners. This paper develops the study further by examining more realistic situations of PD games involving multiple players, using computer simulations, i.e. agent-based modeling, and finds that Axelrod’s original conclusions hold true.

OS CONTRATOS DE LOCAÇÃO NA MODALIDADE “BUILT TO SUIT” E A COOPERAÇÃO ENTRE OS AGENTES ECONÔMICOS

O presente trabalho estuda a relação entre os contratos de locação na modalidade “built to suit” e a importância da cooperação dos agentes econômicos com base nos estudos de Robert Axelrod. Neste sentido, tem-se por objetivo geral analisar os contratos de “built to suit” na perspectiva do ordenamento jurídico específico (Código Civil Brasileiro e Lei n. 8.245/1991), da ética e da cooperação empresarial, como método de remover os impedimentos aos acordos particulares, admitindo que as condições livremente compactuadas no contrato podem alocar eficientemente os direitos dos agentes econômicos. E, por objetivos específicos, analisar a credibilidade e a cooperação entre os agentes econômicos. Para tanto, utilizou-se da doutrina a respeito do tema e pesquisa jurisprudencial no âmbito de tribunais brasileiros.

Reciprocity in International Studies

Reciprocity refers to the character of the actions and reactions between two or more actors. This character is commonly one of responding in kind to the actions of another. As such, reciprocity is considered one of the fundamental processes observed by scholars in the study of international relations (IR). In the realm of international politics, the study of reciprocity typically encompasses formal/experimental and empirical research. Some scholars look at ethical dimensions and the propagation of norms such as the Golden Rule, while others undertake empirical analysis of patterns of reciprocity in search of answers to questions about the existence, predictability, and diffusion of reciprocity. As a concept, reciprocity has applications in a range of IR topics such as the basic ingredients of cooperation, the escalation and return of conflict, and the adherence to international law. Within the realm of conflict processes, the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and formal frameworks are often used to represent arms races and similar security concerns. Related to the iterated PD is the work of Robert Axelrod, who demonstrated the robustness of the reciprocal strategy known as tit-for-tat (TFT). One puzzle on reciprocity that deserves consideration in future research is that the expectation of a long time horizon for interaction should stimulate the incentive to cooperate, but long time horizons may also be associated with long pasts. One way to find the answer to this puzzle is to incorporate reciprocity into more general models of international interaction.

Endogenous Parties, Interaction of Different Decision Rules

This chapter attempts to develop more realistic and interesting models in which the set of competing parties is a completely endogenous output of the process of party competition. It also seeks to model party competition when different party leaders use different decision rules in the same setting by building on an approach pioneered in a different context by Robert Axelrod. This involves long-running computer “tournaments” that allow investigation of the performance and “robustness” of decision rules in an environment where any politician using any rule may encounter an opponent using either the same decision rule or some quite different rule. The chapter is most interested in how a decision rule performs against anything the competitive environment might throw against it, including agents using decision rules that are difficult to anticipate and/or comprehend.

LA COOPERACIÓN: ESTRATEGIA PARA LA SOSTENIBILIDAD DE LOS RECURSOS // COOPERATION: STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINABILITY OF RESOURCES // COOPERAÇÃO: ESTRATÉGIA PARA A SUSTENTABILIDADE DOS RECURSOS

Surge una gran inquietud en relación a cuál debe ser el principio de la estructuración de una organización, sino existe una base que subyace los cimientos de la estructura cuyo objetivo sea la sostenibilidad de los recursos. La idea no es simplemente definir la estructura corporativa, sino también buscar beneficios mutuos de forma colectiva que facilite la sostenibilidad y la optimización de los recursos de la organización, a partir de estrategias coherentes, pertinentes, viables y rigurosas. Para ello se plantean los postulados de críticos como Robert Axelrod, Thomas Hobbes, Michael Taylor, Thomas Schelling, Roy Behr y Elinor Ostrom, Garret Hardin, que sirvieron de base para la formulación teórica de la evolución en los sistemas de cooperación relacionados con los recursos. Se exponen y analizan los principios de: definición de límites, reglas y sanciones para los apropiadores de los recursos, arreglos de elección colectiva, y supervisión. Producto de los planteamientos expuestos, se infiere que para obtener beneficios relevantes, se hace necesario desarrollar modelos de autoadministración y autogestión colectiva.

O Programa Bolsa Família visto como um Jogo Cooperativo: Teria Axelrod algo a Ensinar ao Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social?

O presente artigo tem por escopo a análise da política pública brasileira conhecida como Programa Bolsa Família sob um viés especifico da análise econômica do Direito: a teoria da cooperação. O alicerce teórico sob o qual se sedimenta a pesquisa é o livro do cientista político Robert Axelrod intitulado A evolução da cooperação, no qual propõe cinco pilares básicos para que a cooperação possa emergir dentro de um determinado sistema: aumentar o escopo do futuro; alterar os incentivos; tornar as pessoas mais altruístas; ensinar reciprocidade; e melhorar as habilidades de reconhecimento. Buscando a eficiência da política pública analisada, a pesquisa coloca a estrutura organizacional do Programa Bolsa Família, em especial suas condicionantes de recebimento e punições por descumprimento, em um quadro comparativo com os pontos da cooperação propostos, a fim de propor alterações jurídico-institucionais em seu funcionamento, aptos a promover a cooperação entre o beneficiário e o Governo Federal.