A Comparative Analysis of Selection Criteria of Candidates in Belgium

The literature on candidate selection has focussed extensively on the degree of inclusiveness and decentralization of the selectorate, as part of the debate on intra-party democracy. However, much less attention has been paid to the degree of openness of candidacies, or selection criteria within parties. Yet parties have a lot of leeway in how they design selection criteria internally. Which guidelines do parties follow when making the crucial choice on which candidates to select for elections? This paper investigates selection criteria from two perspectives: the formal rules set by parties that restrict the candidate’s pool and the (informal) preferences of selectors that shape who gets selected. We aim first at contrasting the degree of party institutionalization and parties’ formal rules in candidate selection and so, we shed light on whether parties formalise their candidacy requirements and candidate selection processes to the same extent as other party activities. Second, the paper investigates the role of the selectorates, and how selectorate’s characteristics matter for the kind of (informal) selection criteria, be they intended at maximizing offices, votes or policies. Drawing on party statutes coded in the Political Party Database (PPDB) and 23 in-depth interviews with selectors, we study three francophone Belgian parties that differ both in terms of inclusiveness of the selectorate who has the final say on candidate selection and in terms of degree of centralisation, and in terms of party institutionalisation: the green party (Ecolo), the socialist party (PS), and the liberal party (MR). Our comparative analysis of parties, selection criteria provides new insights into the secret garden of politics and highlights in particular the major impact of parties, degree of centralization.

A jelenlét nélküli jelen(lét) – a hazai pártszervezetek fejlettségének területi különbségei

Numerous studies draw a direct link between party institutionalization and democratic (re) consolidation. The level of organization of a given political movement can easily determine their subsequent electoral performance. Not just in Hungary, but within the wider Central-Eastern-European region, accessing data on party membership, branch offices, etc., is extremely challenging, therefore concluding or discovering party organizational strength is a critical research area. In this study I am making a bold attempt to unveil the social embeddedness of the most important political parties from the 2014 general elections to the latest EP elections (2019), by using the polling station table-seater delegates` presence as an indicator of local party presence itself. I assume that, if a given party is not able to delegate a single person to a certain polling station, they have no operating organizations at the grassroots level, therefore it indicates their lack of localization and extensive network. With simple quantitative methodologies, I was also seeking the relationship between electoral performance and party organizational presence locally.

Institutionalization of transnationalizing political parties: the case of the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia

While party institutionalization research has advanced notably in the recent years, the institutionalization of political parties that extend their organizations abroad (i.e. transnationalizing parties) has remained an academically uncharted territory. This article draws on party institutionalization literature and analyses the particularities of institutionalization in transnationalizing parties. The findings suggest that transnational institutionalization takes place simultaneously on multiple levels (local, national and transnational) and is distinctly interactive, placing crucial importance on the activities and responsiveness of both the central party organization as well as the extraterritorial branches. The internal dimensions of institutionalization can be notably affected by the territorially and temporally scattered nature of emigrant communities and by the sense of inclusion provided to the activists. The external dimensions of transnational institutionalization involve a wider variety of actors than institutionalization on the national level and can also be more challenging due to the more contingent socialization patterns and interest in politics of transnational migrants. Transnational institutionalization of political parties is relevant to the parties and their continuous electoral success, but also for transnational migrant communities and impact of their political participation.

Islamist Parties and Women’s Representation in Morocco

Does electing Islamists help or hurt women? Due to the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) obtaining 13% of seats in the 2002–2007 legislature and the implementation of an electoral gender quota that resulted in thirty-five women winning seats in 2002, Morocco offers a rare opportunity to explore the intersectional impact of parliamentarians’ gender and party affiliation on women’s symbolic and service representation. Using visits to parliamentary offices in Tangiers, a city in northern Morocco, and an original survey of 112 Moroccan Members of Parliament (MPs) conducted in 2008, this chapter finds that responsiveness for female citizens depends on parliamentarians’ party and gender. Female legislators and Islamist deputies (including male Islamists) are also more likely to interact with female citizens than male parliamentarians from non-Islamist parties. It argues that the PJD’s stronger party institutionalization enhances legislators’ incentives to work in mixed-gender teams, leading to more frequent legislator interactions with female citizens. By offering novel evidence that developing a strong party system—in addition to electing women—is crucial for improving women’s representation in clientelistic settings, the results extend the literature on Islam, gender, and governance and offer insights into Islamist electoral success in clientelistic settings.

Conclusion

After comparing the different indicators (i.e. party institutionalization, fragmentation, polarization, volatility and closure) employed in the book, we show how the Cold War period (1945–1989) was exceptionally stable, especially in contrast to the inter-war and post-Berlin Wall periods. We also show how currently the West looks increasingly like the East in terms of the level of party institutionalization, while the East increasingly resembles the West in terms of closure. Actually, the West is becoming more polarized and fragmented than the East. In terms of parliamentary fragmentation, the party systems of the South and the East are converging towards each other, while the West is diverging from the rest of Europe with its increasingly high number of parties. Finally, the chapter summarizes the main findings of the book.

The Whole Is More than the Sum of the Parts

The seventh chapter establishes a theoretical distinction between the party- and the systemic-level analysis of party politics. We introduce new measures of party institutionalization, describe cross-temporal and cross-regional trends, and establish the degree of covariance between closure and party institutionalization. Even though there are many indications that high closure presupposes continuously existing, well-organized parties, we identify countries in which parties are highly institutionalized but the system is not, and cases where parties are relatively weak, but the system can be considered to be strong. The chapter shows how party institutionalization and closure (party system institutionalization) differ from each other. For the recent period, the former shows a steeply declining trend in Europe, while the latter is decreasing only marginally.

The Explanatory Model of Closure

This chapter provides a comprehensive explanatory model of party system closure. The model includes the variables analysed in the previous chapters (i.e. age and birth period of democracy, party institutionalization, parliamentary fragmentation, and polarization), with the addition of the degree of economic development, the type of electoral system (i.e. majoritarian or proportional), and the nature of the constitutional regime (i.e. presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary). Then we ask the question: what would be the explanatory model of party system institutionalization had we operationalized it in terms of volatility rather than closure? We show that the determinants of closure are not identical with those of volatility. The latter is more a function of the behaviour of the citizens, the former is more a product of elite decisions. At the end of the chapter we place the factors responsible for closure into a causal chain.

Party group collapse and strategic switching in the European Parliament

The literature on party group switching in the European Parliament contends that members re-affiliate primarily for strategic reasons. This article advances the discussion by also considering the occurrence of non-strategic switches which follow the collapse of weakly institutionalized groups. Using an original dataset which includes DW-Nominate scores (1979–2009), I operationalize policy-seeking behavior among strategic switchers by deriving member- and delegation-to-group policy distance variables. The pooled logistic regression models using a penalized maximum likelihood estimator make it possible to address quasicomplete separation, and the results show that members from large groups and delegations have significantly lower odds of switching. Further, as members or delegations become incongruent with their group, the odds of switching increase. The study has important implications for research investigating the relationship between weak party institutionalization and parliamentary behavior.

Institusionalisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) dan Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) di Kota Palembang

This research is entitled "INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL PARTIES IN PALEMBANG CITY: A Case Study of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the United Development Party (PPP)". This research explains that the institutionalization of Islamic political parties in Palembang City can affect the results of the legislative elections and the existence of voters, which at the time of the 2019 legislative elections in Palembang City, the votes and seats of Islamic political parties experienced very significant changes in terms of the number of votes. and legislative seats. Islamic political parties that experienced an increase in the number of votes and legislative seats, namely the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) when the 2014 legislative general election received three seats but in the 2019 legislative general election it got five seats, while the Islamic political parties which experienced a decrease in the number of votes and legislative seats, namely the Party The Development Association (PPP) when the 2014 legislative election won two seats, but in the 2019 legislative general election, it only got one seat. The reason the author chose the title Institutionalization of Islamic Political Parties in Palembang City is due to the extent to which Islamic parties have or have not been institutionalized, this research on the institutionalization of political parties uses the theory of Vicky Randall and Lars Svasand political parties are considered institutionalized if there are four degrees of institutionalization such as Degree of System, Degree of Value Identity , Degree of Decision Autonomy and Degree of Public Knowledge. Based on the theory used, the results of this study, among others, prove that PKS can be said to have been institutionalized and PPP has not been institutionalized based on the four degrees of political party institutionalization theory concept according to Vicky Randall and Lars Svasand. So that it can be directly proven by the results of research findings where the institutionalization of PKS and PPP parties has similarities and differences between the two Islamic political parties in absorbing the people's aspirations and fighting for the interests of Muslims in Palembang City.