A Comparative Analysis of Market Definition in Antitrust Law and WTO Law: Some Suggestions for Vietnam

2021 ◽  
pp. 449-475
Author(s):  
Phuong T. M. Tong ◽  
Nghia Van Tang
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Antitrust Law

scholarly journals Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Ip Protection ◽  
Traditional Market

Antitrust law explicitly depends on market definition. Many issues in IPlaw also depend on market definition, though that definition is rarelyexplicit.Applying antitrust's traditional market definition to IP goods leads tosome startling results. Despite the received wisdom that IP rights don'tnecessarily confer market power, a wide array of IP rights do exactly thatunder traditional antitrust principles. This result requires us to rethinkboth the overly-rigid way we define markets in antitrust law and thecompetitive consequences of granting IP protection. Both antitrust and IPmust begin to think realistically about those consequences, rather thanfalling back on rigid formulas or recitation of the mantra that there is noconflict between IP and antitrust.

Antitrust in Moligopoly Markets

2020 ◽  
pp. 172-237
Author(s):  
Nicolas Petit
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Monopoly Power ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Competitive Pressure ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Economic Forces ◽  
Monopoly Rents ◽  
Structural Methods

This chapter draws the implications of the theory of moligopoly competition for antitrust law and policy. In digital industries, economic forces discounted in received theory produce socially beneficial incentives on monopoly firms to compete by indirect entry in untipped markets, when they understand that their monopoly rents in tipped markets are under pressure. Antitrust should thus focus on maintaining competitive pressure in markets that have tipped, and apply more forgiving rules towards the leveraging of market power in untipped markets. Besides, antitrust should adopt tools that allow fact finders to draw a better line between tipped and untipped markets, complementing inferences of monopoly power drawn from structural methods of market definition and evaluation of market power.

Kartellrechts-Compliance für Manager

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natascha Chorongiewski
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Antitrust Law

Antitrust law has become increasingly controversial and relevant in recent decades. This study examines the cases in which managers can be held liable for antitrust violations and compliance failures. To this end, the author first analyses fundamentally in which cases a compliance obligation exists and from what it can be derived, and then focuses on antitrust violations and, in particular, cases in which manager liability can be considered. In doing so, it also includes criminal liability and a mitigation of liability in accordance with a so-called compliance defence. A comparative analysis of different jurisdictions concludes the work.

Rechtsvergleichende Einordnung von Preisschirmeffekten (Umbrella Pricing) in das Kartellschadensersatzrecht

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipp Eckel
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
European Law ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Detailed Classification ◽  
Leniency Programme

Der Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über die Frage der schadensersatzrechtlichen Ersetzbarkeit von Preisschirmschäden nach der Entscheidung des EuGH in der Rs. „Kone“ und würdigt kritisch die Reaktionen in der deutsch- und englischsprachigen Literatur auf das Urteil, indem u.a. das Erfordernis eines zweigliedrigen Zurechnungstatbestandes mit einer doppelten Vermutungsregel betont und die Behandlung der Kronzeugenregelungen durch den Gerichtshof abgelehnt werden. Rechtsvergleichend wird aufgezeigt, dass einige Erfahrungswerte aus Rechtsprechung und Literatur zum US-amerikanischen Antitrust Law auch für die unionsrechtliche Beurteilung von umbrella pricing fruchtbar gemacht werden können und dass sich die Anforderungen des EuGH unter Berücksichtigung der bisherigen nationalen Praxis zu Preisschirmeffekten ohne weiteres in das nationale Kartelldeliktsrecht des Vereinigten Königreichs und Österreichs implementieren lassen. Die Abhandlung schließt mit einer ausführlichen Einordnung des EuGH-Urteils in das deutsche Schadensrecht unter Berücksichtigung der bisherigen BGH-Rechtsprechung und argumentiert für eine Berücksichtigung von Preisschirmeffekten über den identischen relevanten Markt hinaus. Umbrella Pricing after the ECJ’s decision in „Kone“: A comparative analysis and classification into the German tort law This paper provides an overview of the requirements of compensation of umbrella damages according to the ECJ’s decision in „Kone“ and comments critically on the reactions on this decision in German and Englishspeaking literature stressing the imperative of a two-part causation-requirement and criticising the ECJ’s argument about the leniency programme. A comparative analysis shows that assessment under European Law may benefit from the jurisprudence and literature in US Antitrust Law and that the requirements stated in „Kone“ can be implemented into the national tort laws of the United Kingdom and Austria without further problems. The paper ends with a detailed classification of the principles established in „Kone“ into the German tort law considering the previous national jurisprudence and argues in favour of the compensation of umbrella damages from neighbouring markets.

scholarly journals Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?

2007 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 155-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis W Carlton
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Department Of Justice ◽  
The Right ◽  
Positive Effect ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Over Time

Economics has had an enormous positive effect on the evolution of antitrust policy over the last 30 years or so. However, the evolving forces of technology and globalization, together with experience gained over time, suggest that further modernization is in order. This paper addresses a number of controversial antitrust doctrines that need fixing, or at least some modernizing. Specifically, I analyze market definition; the interaction of intellectual property and antitrust law; certain types of exclusionary conduct (tying and bundling discounts); and procedural issues involving economic matters such as damage multiples, the right to sue, and laws of contribution. I am currently Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economic Analysis in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and have served as a Commissioner on the Congress-appointed Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC). While I've drawn on these experiences in forming my opinions, the views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the AMC or those of the Department of Justice.

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