scholarly journals Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

Antitrust law explicitly depends on market definition. Many issues in IPlaw also depend on market definition, though that definition is rarelyexplicit.Applying antitrust's traditional market definition to IP goods leads tosome startling results. Despite the received wisdom that IP rights don'tnecessarily confer market power, a wide array of IP rights do exactly thatunder traditional antitrust principles. This result requires us to rethinkboth the overly-rigid way we define markets in antitrust law and thecompetitive consequences of granting IP protection. Both antitrust and IPmust begin to think realistically about those consequences, rather thanfalling back on rigid formulas or recitation of the mantra that there is noconflict between IP and antitrust.

Author(s):  
Nicolas Petit

This chapter draws the implications of the theory of moligopoly competition for antitrust law and policy. In digital industries, economic forces discounted in received theory produce socially beneficial incentives on monopoly firms to compete by indirect entry in untipped markets, when they understand that their monopoly rents in tipped markets are under pressure. Antitrust should thus focus on maintaining competitive pressure in markets that have tipped, and apply more forgiving rules towards the leveraging of market power in untipped markets. Besides, antitrust should adopt tools that allow fact finders to draw a better line between tipped and untipped markets, complementing inferences of monopoly power drawn from structural methods of market definition and evaluation of market power.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Heim

Data is the core of Internet-based business models. Ever since Facebook took over WhatsApp, European antitrust law has been faced with the question of how to deal with mergers, especially those involving the well-known Internet giants ("FANG"). Under what circumstances can market power be based as a prohibition criterion on the possession of and access to data? What competitive effects of data-based market power are to be feared in horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers? How can any commitments remedy this form of market power? The work takes into account technical developments such as artificial intelligence as well as data protection aspects.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial. Section 4 considers the goals of competition law. Section 5 introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law, while reminding the reader that market shares are only ever a proxy for market power and can never be determinative of market power in themselves.


2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Sean Morris

This Article defines the notion of market power and how in conjunction with trademark rights give rise to elements that are deemed anticompetitive in a free market society. This Article uses legal arguments to consider how important developments in antitrust economics, particularly product differentiation and monopolistic competition, have contributed to the notion that trademarks are a source of market power. The Article uses a number of cases in the field of trademarks to underscore the key points that trademarks are a source of market power. These case developments contribute to the monopolistic tendencies of trademarks and describe how such tendencies are associated with the theory on market power and product differentiation. Empirically, the Article examines beer products from a single large corporation and the various trademarks/brands to determine whether such brands are a source of market power, effectively giving that manufacturer a monopoly on the beer market. A discussion of product hopping in pharmaceuticals is used to supplement the theories and evidence from the beer market. The Article also develops a theory of branded monopoly and suggests that, as a result of single ownership of trademarks and brands that are abundant from a single owner trademark’s market power, questions relating to antitrust foreclosure are often raised, despite the fact that market power is not anticompetitive per se. If it is recognized that trademarks are a source of market power, and hence, a core concern for antitrust law and policy, then the legal foundations of the current trademark system would need a radical redesign. If, on the other hand, it is recognized that trademarks are a source of market power, but do not conflict with antitrust law, and antitrust enforcers are to ignore conducts such as market foreclosure and other barriers to entry as a result of excessive trademarks and brands, then both antitrust and trademark law can continue to co-exist in the current system. 


2021 ◽  
pp. 117-121
Author(s):  
Eric A. Posner

While antitrust law is an important response to labor market monopsony, it cannot solve all the problems of labor monopsony. A significant degree of labor market power is “frictional,” that is, without artificial barriers to entry or excessive concentration of employment. The two major sources of such friction are search costs and job differentiation. Search costs refer to the costs a worker must incur in order to find a job. Job differentiation refers to the variations in amenities and other conditions that distinguish otherwise similar-seeming jobs. A simple mathematical exercise, drawing on estimates of concentration and aggregate and firm-specific labor supply elasticities, shows that even if labor market concentration were eliminated, workers would be paid less than 60% of the competitive wage.


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