Antitrust in Moligopoly Markets

2020 ◽  
pp. 172-237
Author(s):  
Nicolas Petit
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Monopoly Power ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Competitive Pressure ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Economic Forces ◽  
Monopoly Rents ◽  
Structural Methods

This chapter draws the implications of the theory of moligopoly competition for antitrust law and policy. In digital industries, economic forces discounted in received theory produce socially beneficial incentives on monopoly firms to compete by indirect entry in untipped markets, when they understand that their monopoly rents in tipped markets are under pressure. Antitrust should thus focus on maintaining competitive pressure in markets that have tipped, and apply more forgiving rules towards the leveraging of market power in untipped markets. Besides, antitrust should adopt tools that allow fact finders to draw a better line between tipped and untipped markets, complementing inferences of monopoly power drawn from structural methods of market definition and evaluation of market power.

scholarly journals Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Ip Protection ◽  
Traditional Market

Antitrust law explicitly depends on market definition. Many issues in IPlaw also depend on market definition, though that definition is rarelyexplicit.Applying antitrust's traditional market definition to IP goods leads tosome startling results. Despite the received wisdom that IP rights don'tnecessarily confer market power, a wide array of IP rights do exactly thatunder traditional antitrust principles. This result requires us to rethinkboth the overly-rigid way we define markets in antitrust law and thecompetitive consequences of granting IP protection. Both antitrust and IPmust begin to think realistically about those consequences, rather thanfalling back on rigid formulas or recitation of the mantra that there is noconflict between IP and antitrust.

Monopoly Power Corrodes Choice and Resiliency in the Food System

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 198-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Woodall ◽  
Tyler L. Shannon
Keyword(s):  
Food Safety ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Food System ◽  
Monopoly Power ◽  
Grocery Industry ◽  
Size Scale ◽  
Retail Grocery

The wave of mega-mergers sweeping the food, agribusiness, and retail grocery industry from seed to supermarket has accelerated consolidation and concentrated market power in the hands of only a few dominant corporations. Federal regulators have done little to curb the merger mania in these sectors, which will ultimately lower the prices farmers receive for crops and livestock and raise the prices consumers pay for food. But the consolidation also has significantly constrained the range of choices consumers have at the supermarket, prevented independent food innovators from surviving in the marketplace, amplified food safety problems, and presented challenges to the resiliency of the food system itself. This article examines the size, scale, and scope of recent mergers in the food, agribusiness, and grocery retail sectors and discusses the ramifications for consumers, farmers, and the food system.

Datenbasierte Marktmacht in der europäischen Fusionskontrolle

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Heim
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Business Models ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Competitive Effects ◽  
The Core ◽  
Technical Developments ◽  
Access To Data

Data is the core of Internet-based business models. Ever since Facebook took over WhatsApp, European antitrust law has been faced with the question of how to deal with mergers, especially those involving the well-known Internet giants ("FANG"). Under what circumstances can market power be based as a prohibition criterion on the possession of and access to data? What competitive effects of data-based market power are to be feared in horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers? How can any commitments remedy this form of market power? The work takes into account technical developments such as artificial intelligence as well as data protection aspects.

5. The legal framework

2021 ◽  
pp. 48-54
Author(s):  
Ariel Ezrachi
Keyword(s):  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Monopoly Power ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Us ◽  
Restraint Of Trade ◽  
The Eu

‘The legal framework’ outlines the key competition provisions currently in the US and EU. Like in most other jurisdictions, EU and US laws include competition provisions that are used to address antitrust violations such as anti-competitive agreements or abuse of monopoly power. They also include laws dealing with proposed mergers and acquisitions. The US Antitrust Law prohibits contracts and agreements between two or more individuals or entities in restraint of trade or commerce. Meanwhile, EU competition law prohibits agreements between ‘undertakings’ that have, as their object or effect, the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition, and affect trade between the EU member states.

1. Competition policy and economics

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial. Section 4 considers the goals of competition law. Section 5 introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law, while reminding the reader that market shares are only ever a proxy for market power and can never be determinative of market power in themselves.

scholarly journals Dynamic Durable Goods Monopoly and Market Power

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 22
Author(s):  
Basak Altan
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Discrete Time ◽  
Durable Goods ◽  
Infinite Horizon ◽  
Monopoly Power ◽  
Durable Good ◽  
Durable Goods Monopoly ◽  
Markov Perfect

We analyze a vertically differentiated market for an imperfectly durable good served by a monopolist in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. Our goal is to identify the Markov perfect stationary equilibria where the seller can maintain his monopoly power. We establish that the set of parameters supporting a monopoly outcome is larger when the seller offers different quality versions of the same product. Hence, our results suggest that, when the innate durability of a product is high, the seller should offer different quality versions of the product.

Exclusion, Invasion and Abuse: Competition Law and its Constitutional Context

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 183-224
Author(s):  
Daniel Francis
Keyword(s):  
Historical Development ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
The Third ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Political Response ◽  
Broad Type ◽  
Orthodox View

Abstract The orthodox view of antitrust, or competition, law is that it should be interpreted and enforced purely to maximise economic efficiency. This chapter argues that it is by no means so clear that the maximization of efficiency should be the sole aim of competition law, either as a matter of common-law tradition or as a matter of ‘original’ legislative intent. Moreover, such a narrow approach neglects the important social and political components and consequences of antitrust policy and adjudication. This chapter further argues that antitrust law exhibits a striking resemblance, in many ways, to constitutional law, in particular to the extent that it constitutes a social and political response, administered by courts, to three particularly problematic applications of power—the ‘exclusion, invasion and abuse’ of the title. The first section of the chapter introduces these themes. In the second section, the exclusion-invasion-abuse model is described and the implications of each broad type of rule are explored. In the third section, the historical development of modern antitrust law is traced in order to show that the ‘pure efficiency’ standard lacks any credible historical claim to particular authority or authenticity. The fourth and final section, a brief survey of competing normative accounts of antitrust law offers in order to demonstrate the extent to which a myopic focus on efficiency can occlude the underlying policy consequences of antitrust law and policy-making.

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