scholarly journals Article 38: The Right to Protection from Armed Conflict

Author(s):  
Gerison Lansdown
Keyword(s):  

Abstract‘Children have to be educated on the dangers of armed conflict. A law has to be there that would protect children from participating in armed conflict.’ (Africa).

Author(s):  
Ian Park

There is a difference between a State’s substantive and procedural right to life obligations. This chapter explores what amount to a state’s substantive right to life obligations with reference to Article 2, ECHR and Article 6, ICCPR. The respective provisions are analysed to determine the extent of a state’s substantive right to life obligations during armed conflict and then a comparison between the two international law instruments is undertaken. In order to undertake such a comparison, the exceptions to the right to life in both the ECHR and ICCPR are examined. Once determined, the planning and conduct of a military operation are considered, to assess the extent to which, in general terms, right to life obligations are considered in these areas.


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 10-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Stanley

Most armed conflict today takes place within urban terrain or within an urbanised context. An extreme variant of such armed conflict is violence perpetrated by external state and non-state forces within the city, known as urbicide. Urbicidal violence deliberately strives to kill, discipline or deny the city to its inhabitants by targeting and then reordering the sociomaterial urban assemblage. Civil resistance within urbicidal violence seeks to subvert the emerging alternative sovereign order sought by such forces. It does so by using the inherent logic of the city in order to maintain/restore the community's social cohesion, mitigate the violence, affirm humanity, and claim the right to the city. This paper investigates the city-logic of civil resistance through examples drawn from the recent urbicidal experiences of Middle East cities such as Gaza, Aleppo, Mosul, and Sana'a. Theoretical insights from the conflict resolution literature, critical urban theory, and assemblage thinking inform the argument.


2009 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 431
Author(s):  
Sophie Rondeau

Le présent article fait état d’un questionnement sur l’état actuel du rôle des normes juridiques émanant du système de droit international humanitaire (DIH) en ce qui a trait au droit à la réparation, en prenant soin de mettre la personne en tant que victime de la guerre au centre de notre réflexion. En considérant la notion de réparation sous l’angle de la victime comme un tout à décrire et à analyser, nous cherchons à savoir s’il existe un droit à la réparation que possède la victime d’un conflit armé régi par le droit international humanitaire. Le fondement même de cette recherche s’appuie donc sur le cadre normatif conventionnel du DIH régissant la notion de réparation, que cette dernière accorde ou non un droit à une victime.This paper presents a series of questions on the present state of the role of judicial standards arising from the system of international humanitarian law [IHL] as regards the right to compensation, by making it a point to place the person as a war victim at the center of our reflection. In considering the concept of compensation from the angle of the victim as a whole, we seek to know whether there exists a right to compensation to which the victim of an armed conflict governed by international humanitarian law is entitled. The very foundation of this research is thus based on the conventional normative framework of IHL governing the concept of compensation, whether or not it grants a right to a victim.


1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth J Keith

The Right Honourable Sir Kenneth Keith was the fourth speaker at the NZ Institute of International Affairs Seminar. In this article he describes and reflects upon the role of courts and judges in relation to the advancement of human rights, an issue covered in K J Keith (ed) Essays on Human Rights (Sweet and Maxwell, Wellington, 1968). The article is divided into two parts. The first part discusses international lawmakers attempting to protect individual groups of people from 1648 to 1948, including religious minorities and foreign traders, slaves, aboriginal natives, victims of armed conflict, and workers. The second part discusses how from 1945 to 1948, there was a shift in international law to universal protection. The author notes that while treaties are not part of domestic law, they may have a constitutional role, be relevant in determining the common law, give content to the words of a statute, help interpret legislation which is in line with a treaty, help interpret legislation which is designed to give general effect to a treaty (but which is silent on the particular matter), and help interpret and affect the operation of legislation to which the international text has no apparent direct relation. 


2012 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-201
Author(s):  
Vladan Joncic ◽  
Milos Petrovic

The fundamental question of international law of armed conflict is the question of military necessity principle in international law of armed conflict, ie. in international humanitarian law. Hearings on this issue is necessary because it is still the danger that the principle of recognition of the needs of military regulations and deceive the application of international law of armed conflict. That?s why the military needs to be seen as a permitted deviation from compliance with rules of war. Extreme, this concept has led to the emergence of the theory of the military. Its radical variant of the proceeds from the Maxims of German classical scholars of international law. The result of theoretical assumptions had the effect of limiting the acceptance of military necessity of the first codification of the day. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949. The heavily consider the military. In all the texts of international conventions is determined by military necessity, as a circumstance or set of circumstances which affect the duty of obeying the regulations of international law. In international law there is no general rule of military necessity as a basis or reason for justified violations of rules of international law of armed conflict. The rules of international law represent a compromise between the desire for a decoration rules of warfare and the need to ensure all the necessary tools that can lead to victory. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949. the military need to provide in terms of the principles of humanity. Set rules on military necessity in the Geneva Conventions give the right correction factor in the role of the law of armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions there is a degree of confusion in terminology, where the concept of military necessity needlessly allocated a number of synonyms. This is because the international law of armed conflict and emerged as a normative regulation of proportionality between the military needs) and general principles and humane principles.


Author(s):  
Christof Heyns ◽  
Dapo Akande ◽  
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne ◽  
Thompson Chengeta

This chapter provides a holistic examination of the international legal frameworks which regulate targeted killings by drones. It argues that for a particular drone strike to be lawful, it must satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international legal regimes. It is argued that the legality of a drone strike under the jus ad bellum does not preclude the wrongfulness of that strike under international humanitarian law or international human rights law. The chapter then considers the important legal challenges that the use of armed drones poses under each of the three legal frameworks mentioned above. It considers the application of the right to life in armed conflict, particularly in territory not controlled by the state conducting the strike. The chapter then turns to some of the key controversies in the application of international humanitarian law to drone strikes, such as the possibility of a global non-international armed conflict and the question of who may be targeted in a non-international armed conflict. The final substantive section considers the law relating to the use of force by states against non-state groups abroad.


Author(s):  
Bothe Michael

This chapter focuses on rules of the law of neutrality concerning the protection of the victims of armed conflicts, which must be considered as part of international humanitarian law. ‘Neutrality’ describes the particular status, as defined by international law, of a state not party to an armed conflict. This status entails specific rights and duties in the relationship between the neutral and the belligerent states. On one hand, there is the right of the neutral state to remain apart from, and not to be adversely affected by, the conflict. On the other hand, there is the duty of non-participation and impartiality. The right not to be adversely affected means that the relationship between the neutral and belligerent States is governed by the law of peace, which is modified only in certain respects by the law of neutrality. In particular, the neutral State must tolerate certain controls in the area of maritime commerce. The duty of non-participation means, above all, that the state must abstain from supporting a party to the conflict. This duty not to support also means that the neutral state is under a duty not to allow one party to the conflict to use the resources of the neutral state against the will of the opponent.


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