Dynamic Coalition Logic: Granting and Revoking Dictatorial Powers

2021 ◽  
pp. 88-101
Author(s):  
Rustam Galimullin ◽  
Thomas Ågotnes
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Logic

scholarly journals From Coalition Logic to STIT

2006 ◽  
Vol 157 (4) ◽  
pp. 23-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Broersen ◽  
Andreas Herzig ◽  
Nicolas Troquard
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Logic

scholarly journals A normal simulation of coalition logic and an epistemic extension

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Broersen ◽  
Andreas Herzig ◽  
Nicolas Troquard
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Logic

ON THE COMPLEXITY OF COALITIONAL REASONING

2002 ◽  
Vol 04 (03) ◽  
pp. 237-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARC PAULY
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information ◽  
Effectivity Function ◽  
Multistage Processes ◽  
Extensive Game ◽  
Coalition Logic ◽  
Implementation Problem ◽  
The World ◽  
Np Complete ◽  
Two Parameters ◽  
Extensive Games

Coalitional power in multistage processes is modeled using effectivity frames, which link an effectivity function to every possible state of the world. Effectivity frames are general enough to capture, e.g., what groups of agents can bring about in extensive games of perfect and almost perfect information. Coalition Logic is used to describe effectivity frames, and the question of generating an extensive game satisfying a given specification is formulated as a satisfiability problem in Coalition Logic. Using this logical reformulation, we show that the complexity of this implementation problem depends on two parameters: For coalitional specifications, the problem is shown to be PSPACE-complete. For individual specifications on the other hand, i.e., for specifications which only refer to the powers of individual agents, generating an implementation with perfect information is PSPACE-complete, whereas generating an implementation with almost perfect information is NP-complete.

scholarly journals The Ceteris Paribus Structure of Logics of Game Forms (Extended Abstract)

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Grossi ◽  
Emiliano Lorini ◽  
François Schwarzentruber
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Dynamic Logic ◽  
Satisfiability Problem ◽  
Ceteris Paribus ◽  
Coalition Logic ◽  
Polynomial Reduction ◽  
Complexity Result ◽  
Game Forms

We present a simple Ceteris Paribus Logic (CP) and study its relationship with existing logics that deal with the representation of choice and power in games in normal form including atemporal STIT, Coalition Logic of Propositional Control (CL-PC) and Dynamic Logic of Propositional Assignments (DL-PA). Thanks to the polynomial reduction of the satisfiability problem for atemporal STIT in the satisfiability problem for CP, we obtain a complexity result for the latter problem.

scholarly journals The Ceteris Paribus Structure of Logics of Game Forms

2015 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 91-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Grossi ◽  
Emiliano Lorini ◽  
Francois Schwarzentruber
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Dynamic Logic ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Equivalence Classes ◽  
Finite Sets ◽  
Ceteris Paribus ◽  
Coalition Logic ◽  
Game Forms

The article introduces a ceteris paribus modal logic, called CP, interpreted on the equivalence classes induced by finite sets of propositional atoms. This logic is studied and then used to embed three logics of strategic interaction, namely atemporal STIT, the coalition logic of propositional control (CL−PC) and the starless fragment of the dynamic logic of propositional assignments (DL−PA). The embeddings highlight a common ceteris paribus structure underpinning the key operators of all these apparently very different logics and show, we argue, remarkable similarities behind some of the most influential formalisms for reasoning about strategic interaction

scholarly journals THE LOGIC OF JOINT ABILITY IN TWO-PLAYER TACIT GAMES

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 481-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER HAWKE
Keyword(s):  
Expressive Power ◽  
Strategic Information ◽  
Reliable Communication ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
Coalition Logic ◽  
Meta Level ◽  
Strategic Coordination ◽  
Strategic Ability ◽  
Cooperating Agents

AbstractLogics of joint strategic ability have recently received attention, with arguably the most influential being those in a family that includes Coalition Logic (CL) and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). Notably, both CL and ATL bypass the epistemic issues that underpin Schelling-typecoordination problems, by apparently relying on the meta-level assumption of (perfectly reliable) communication between cooperating rational agents. Yet such epistemic issues arise naturally in settings relevant to ATL and CL: these logics are standardly interpreted on structures where agents move simultaneously, opening the possibility that an agent cannot foresee the concurrent choices of other agents. In this paper we introduce a variant of CL we callTwo-Player Strategic Coordination Logic(SCL2). The key novelty of this framework is an operator for capturing coalitional ability when the cooperating agents cannot share strategic information. We identify significant differences in the expressive power and validities of SCL2and CL2, and present a sound and complete axiomatization for SCL2. We briefly address conceptual challenges when shifting attention to games with more than two players and stronger notions of rationality.

scholarly journals Coalition logic with individual, distributed and common knowledge1

2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (7) ◽  
pp. 1041-1069 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Ågotnes ◽  
Natasha Alechina
Keyword(s):  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Satisfiability Problem ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Distributed Knowledge ◽  
Agent Systems ◽  
Coalition Logic ◽  
Multi Agent

Abstract Coalition logic is currently one of the most popular logics for multi-agent systems. While logics combining coalitional and epistemic operators have received considerable attention, completeness results for epistemic extensions of coalition logic have so far been missing. In this paper we provide several such results and proofs. We prove completeness for epistemic coalition logic with common knowledge, with distributed knowledge, and with both common and distributed knowledge, respectively. Furthermore, we completely characterise the complexity of the satisfiability problem for each of the three logics. We also study logics with interaction axioms connecting coalitional ability and knowledge.

A first-order coalition logic for BDI-agents

2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-245
Author(s):  
Qingliang Chen ◽  
Kaile Su ◽  
Abdul Sattar ◽  
Xiangyu Luo ◽  
Aixiang Chen
Keyword(s):  
Bdi Agents ◽  
First Order ◽  
Coalition Logic
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