Topographic Analysis of Cognitive Load in Tacit Coordination Games Based on Electrophysiological Measurements

2021 ◽  
pp. 162-171
Author(s):  
Dor Mizrahi ◽  
Ilan Laufer ◽  
Inon Zuckerman
Sensors ◽  
2022 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 477
Author(s):  
Ilan Laufer ◽  
Dor Mizrahi ◽  
Inon Zuckerman

Previously, it was shown that some people are better coordinators than others; however, the relative weight of intuitive (system 1) versus deliberate (system 2) modes of thinking in tacit coordination tasks is still not resolved. To address this question, we have extracted an electrophysiological index, the theta-beta ratio (TBR), from the Electroencephalography (EEG) recorded from participants while they were engaged in a semantic coordination task. Results have shown that individual coordination ability, game difficulty and response time are each positively correlated with cognitive load. These results suggest that better coordinators rely more on complex thought process and on more deliberate thinking while coordinating. The model we have presented may be used for the assessment of the depth of reasoning individuals engage in when facing different tasks requiring different degrees of allocation of resources. The findings as well as future research directions are discussed.


Sensors ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (24) ◽  
pp. 7026
Author(s):  
Dor Mizrahi ◽  
Inon Zuckerman ◽  
Ilan Laufer

In recent years collaborative robots have become major market drivers in industry 5.0, which aims to incorporate them alongside humans in a wide array of settings ranging from welding to rehabilitation. Improving human–machine collaboration entails using computational algorithms that will save processing as well as communication cost. In this study we have constructed an agent that can choose when to cooperate using an optimal strategy. The agent was designed to operate in the context of divergent interest tacit coordination games in which communication between the players is not possible and the payoff is not symmetric. The agent’s model was based on a behavioral model that can predict the probability of a player converging on prominent solutions with salient features (e.g., focal points) based on the player’s Social Value Orientation (SVO) and the specific game features. The SVO theory pertains to the preferences of decision makers when allocating joint resources between themselves and another player in the context of behavioral game theory. The agent selected stochastically between one of two possible policies, a greedy or a cooperative policy, based on the probability of a player to converge on a focal point. The distribution of the number of points obtained by the autonomous agent incorporating the SVO in the model was better than the results obtained by the human players who played against each other (i.e., the distribution associated with the agent had a higher mean value). Moreover, the distribution of points gained by the agent was better than any of the separate strategies the agent could choose from, namely, always choosing a greedy or a focal point solution. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to construct an intelligent agent that maximizes its utility by incorporating the belief system of the player in the context of tacit bargaining. This reward-maximizing strategy selection process based on the SVO can also be potentially applied in other human–machine contexts, including multiagent systems.


Ledger ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 119-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Abramowicz

This paper proposes a self-governing cryptocurrency, dubbed Autonocoin. Cryptocurrency owners play formal tacit coordination games by making investments recorded on the blockchain. Such investments represent bets about the focal point resolution of normative issues, such as whether a proposed change to Autonocoin should occur. The game produces a result that resolves the issue. With a typical cryptocurrency, the client software establishes conventions that ultimately lead to the identification of the authoritative blockchain. Autonocoin completes a circle by making transactions on the blockchain that in turn define those conventions and the expected software behavior. The distributed consensus mechanism embodied by formal tacit coordination games, meanwhile, can make other types of decisions, including which of competing blockchains is authoritative and whether new Autonocoins should be rewarded to benefit those who have taken actions to benefit Autonocoin. This establishes a unique funding model for a cryptocurrency, and it addresses objections to cryptocurrencies issued predominantly to the initial founders, as well as to those that encourage wasteful mining activities.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document