Competition Law and Consumer Law: Why We Need a Common Consumer Model

Author(s):  
Thomas Ackermann
Author(s):  
Chagny Muriel

This chapter examines how the Antitrust Damages Directive has been transposed in France. It begins with an overview of the transposition procedure, focusing on the French private enforcement context from the Ordinance of 1 December 1986—the ‘Magna Carta’ of French competition law—to Law no. 2008-776 of 4 August 2008 and the Consumer Law Act of 17 March 2014 (Hamon Law). It then discusses the scope of the transposition measure, noting that the French government went beyond the Directive and instituted a single regime for damages actions, before analysing specific issues that arose during the transposition, including those relating to the concept of an undertaking, the binding effect of competition authorities' decisions, the presumption of harm, the passing-on of overcharges, types of harm and assessment of damages, joint and several liability and the recovery of contributions from co-infringers, consensual dispute resolution, time-barring deadlines, access to evidence, and class actions.


Author(s):  
Pieter T. M. Desmet ◽  
Franziska Weber

AbstractIn many areas such as consumer law or competition law, legislators can opt between two alternative forms of sanctions to remedy wrongdoing: they can impose an infringer to pay either a fine or a compensation. There is a major research gap regarding the infringers’ reactions to the different forms of sanctions. This paper reports an experiment that investigated infringers’ willingness to pay compensation versus fines. Results show that regardless of victim characteristics (whether the victim is a company or an NGO), infringers are willing to pay higher amounts in compensation than in fines, view compensation as more fair and believe compensation is better able to restore their reputation. Compensation and fines did not differ in the extent to which they stimulated infringers’ willingness to take precautionary measures. Participants who inflicted harm to a company rather than an NGO, surprisingly viewed their sanction as more fair, irrespective of the type of sanction in place. Our findings highlight some important strengths of compensation from a infringer’s point of view that are to be weighed in the policy debate.


2012 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 1-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah J. Healey

AbstractChina and Australia are extremely significant trade partners and investors. Australia has a very well established competition law, now called the Competition and Consumer Law 2010, with a well-established merger regime. China has a relatively new competition law, the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007. This article compares merger control in the two jurisdictions. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has already referred to an Australian decision in rejecting a merger, the only reference to a foreign decision to date, which confirms the utility of the comparison. This article critically evaluates the determinations of MOFCOM and compares the approach of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), the Australian regulator. It assesses the transparency and predictability of procedures and decision-making in the two jurisdictions.


Author(s):  
Vagelis Papakonstantinou

DRM systems have been implemented in the past few years by the Content Industry as the panacea against all copyright (and Intellectual Property Rights in general) infringements over the Internet. The validity of this statement shall be assessed in this analysis, identifying its strengths and record to-date and highlighting its shortcomings in an increasingly complex e-commerce (Web 2.0) environment. While doing this, particular attention shall be given to (mostly EU) Intellectual Property Law, Consumer Law, Data Protection Law, and Competition Law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (17) ◽  
pp. 29-52
Author(s):  
Viktoria H.S.E. Robertson

The paper analyses to what extent financial consumer protection forms part of the competition law objective of consumer welfare that EU competition law nowadays adheres to. It argues that while EU consumer law more generally aims at protecting the final consumer, EU financial consumer protection instruments often protect a broader spectrum of customers. This wider notion of the consumer can also be found in EU competition law, where the consumer is usually likened to any customer. A notable difference between EU financial consumer protection and EU competition law, however, is that they place a different emphasis on structural goals and inherently individual components. In EU competition law, the structural protection of competition is thought to eventually protect consumers. By uniting individual and structural aspects of consumer welfare, as well as by combining reactive and proactive consumer protection, EU competition law and EU financial consumer protection law can together achieve a financial protection of consumers that naturally goes beyond what each area of the law could achieve alone. A stringent approach, however, would require the development of a comprehensive EU financial consumer law which includes both dimensions.


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