Risk Management and Bilateral Contracts in Multi-agent Electricity Markets

Author(s):  
Hugo Algarvio ◽  
Fernando Lopes
Smart Cities ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 1437-1453
Author(s):  
Hugo Algarvio

Over the last few decades, the electricity sector has experienced several changes, resulting in different electricity markets (EMs) models and paradigms. In particular, liberalization has led to the establishment of a wholesale market for electricity generation and a retail market for electricity retailing. In competitive EMs, customers can do the following: freely choose their electricity suppliers; invest in variable renewable energy such as solar photovoltaic; become prosumers; or form local alliances such as Citizen Energy Communities (CECs). Trading of electricity can be done in spot and derivatives markets, or by bilateral contracts. This article focuses on CECs. Specifically, it presents how agent-based local consumers can form alliances as CECs, manage their resources, and trade on EMs. It also presents a review of how agent-based systems can model and support the formation and interaction of alliances in the electricity sector. The CEC can trade electricity directly with sellers through private bilateral agreements. During the negotiation of private bilateral contracts, the CEC receives the prices and volumes of their members and according to its negotiation strategy, tries to satisfy the electricity demands of all members and reduce their costs for electricity.


2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sin-Jin Lin ◽  
Ming-Fu Hsu

Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (9) ◽  
pp. 2397
Author(s):  
Reinaldo Crispiniano Garcia ◽  
Javier Contreras ◽  
Matheus de Lima Barbosa ◽  
Felipe Silva Toledo ◽  
Paulo Vinicius Aires da Cunha

In electricity markets, bilateral contracts (BC) are used to hedge against price volatility in the spot market. Pricing these contracts requires scheduling from either the buyer or the seller aiming to achieve the highest profit possible. Since this problem includes different players, a Generation Company (GC) and an Electricity Supplier Company (ESC) are considered. The approaches to solve this problem include the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) equilibrium and the Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinsky (RKS) bargaining solution. The innovation of this work is the implementation of an algorithm based on the RKS equilibrium to find a compromise strategy when determining the concessions to be made by the parties. The results are promising and show that the RKS approach can obtain better results compared to the Nash equilibrium method applied to a case study.


2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (03) ◽  
pp. 133-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luo Biao ◽  
Wan Liang ◽  
Liang Liang

The high level of complexity of tourism supply chain and the inherent risks that exist in the demand and supply of resources are viewed as major limiting factors in achieving high level performance. Though emerging literature on risk management in tourism industry or its equivalent exists, progress in this area is uneven, as most research focuses on this problem from the traditional single business risk management perspective, without considering the entire range of different suppliers involved in the provision and consumption of tourism products. This study applies risk management theory to a new research perspective, which is tourism supply chain management (SCM). This paper develops a framework for the design of a multi-agent-based decision support system (DSS) based on multi-agent theory and technique, in order to manage disruptions and mitigate risks in tourism supply chain.


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