scholarly journals Communication, Rationality, and Conceptual Changes in Scientific Theories

2015 ◽  
pp. 259-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Zenker ◽  
Peter Gärdenfors
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Conceptual Changes

Review of The structure of scientific theories. 2nd ed.

1978 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 473-473
Author(s):  
DAVID L. KRANTZ
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Theories

Science and Dialectics in the Philosophies of Deleuze, Bachelard and DeLanda

Paragraph ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Williams
Keyword(s):  
Gilles Deleuze ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Gaston Bachelard ◽  
Contemporary Science

This article charts differences between Gilles Deleuze's and Gaston Bachelard's philosophies of science in order to reflect on different readings of the role of science in Deleuze's philosophy, in particular in relation to Manuel DeLanda's interpretation of Deleuze's work. The questions considered are: Why do Gilles Deleuze and Gaston Bachelard develop radically different philosophical dialectics in relation to science? What is the significance of this difference for current approaches to Deleuze and science, most notably as developed by Manuel DeLanda? It is argued that, despite its great explanatory power, DeLanda's association of Deleuze with a particular set of contemporary scientific theories does not allow for the ontological openness and for the metaphysical sources of Deleuze's work. The argument turns on whether terms such as ‘intensity’ can be given predominantly scientific definitions or whether metaphysical definitions are more consistent with a sceptical relation of philosophy to contemporary science.

Laws of Nature

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Universe

The concept of a law of nature, while familiar, is deeply puzzling. Theorists such as Descartes think a divine being governs the universe according to the laws which follow from that being’s own nature. Newton detaches the concept from theology and is agnostic about the ontology underlying the laws of nature. Some later philosophers treat laws as summaries of events or tools for understanding and explanation, or identify the laws with principles and equations fundamental to scientific theories. In the first part of this volume, essays from leading historians of philosophy identify central questions: are laws independent of the things they govern, or do they emanate from the powers of bodies? Are the laws responsible for the patterns we see in nature, or should they be collapsed into those patterns? In the second part, contributors at the forefront of current debate evaluate the role of laws in contemporary Best System, perspectival, Kantian, and powers- or mechanisms-based approaches. These essays take up pressing questions about whether the laws of nature can be consistent with contingency, whether laws are based on the invariants of scientific theories, and how to deal with exceptions to laws. These twelve essays, published here for the first time, will be required reading for anyone interested in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and the histories of these disciplines.

Carnap's Definition of 'Analytic Truth' for Scientific Theories

1976 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 506-522
Author(s):  
J. K. Derden,
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Analytic Truth ◽  
Definition Of

A Note of Simplicity as a Principle for Evaluating Rival Scientific Theories

1976 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 438-440 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard L. Rolston
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Theories

Professor Nagel on the Cognitive Status of Scientific Theories

1968 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 412-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry C. Byerly
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Status ◽  
Scientific Theories

Wittgenstein and Religion

2006 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kober
Keyword(s):  
William James ◽  
The Other ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Philosophical Approach ◽  
God's Will ◽  
The One ◽  
Exclusive Focus

It will be shown that Wittgenstein's philosophical approach to religion is substantially shaped by William James' . For neither during the period nor later does Wittgenstein thematise religious doctrines, but rather struggles to determine what it means for a sincere person to have a specific religious (James called these attitudes "experiences"). Wittgenstein's almost exclusive focus on attitudes explains, (i) why he is able to strictly discriminate between scientific and empirical claims on the one hand and religious utterances on the other, (ii) why religious and mythical narrations should not be understood as promoting (pre-scientific) theories, (iii) why Wittgenstein non-cognitively interprets religious utterances such as "This is God's will" as avowals, and (iv) why he seems to promote fideism. Wittgenstein's one-sided way of reflecting on religious matters, however, should not be understood as adumbrating or even promoting any more specific account of religion, especially bearing in mind that many of his remarks concerning religion are connected to or motivated by reflections on his own life. This thesis is meant to imply that Wittgenstein does not, as the usual understanding holds, offer a theology for atheists.

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