Wittgenstein and Religion

2006 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kober

It will be shown that Wittgenstein's philosophical approach to religion is substantially shaped by William James' . For neither during the period nor later does Wittgenstein thematise religious doctrines, but rather struggles to determine what it means for a sincere person to have a specific religious (James called these attitudes "experiences"). Wittgenstein's almost exclusive focus on attitudes explains, (i) why he is able to strictly discriminate between scientific and empirical claims on the one hand and religious utterances on the other, (ii) why religious and mythical narrations should not be understood as promoting (pre-scientific) theories, (iii) why Wittgenstein non-cognitively interprets religious utterances such as "This is God's will" as avowals, and (iv) why he seems to promote fideism. Wittgenstein's one-sided way of reflecting on religious matters, however, should not be understood as adumbrating or even promoting any more specific account of religion, especially bearing in mind that many of his remarks concerning religion are connected to or motivated by reflections on his own life. This thesis is meant to imply that Wittgenstein does not, as the usual understanding holds, offer a theology for atheists.

REFLEXE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (60) ◽  
pp. 29-63
Author(s):  
Martin Rabas

The present article has two objectives. One is to elucidate the philosophical approach presented in the so-called Strahov Systematic Manuscripts of Jan Patočka in terms of consciousness and nature. The other is to compare this philosophical approach with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s theses on nature, as elaborated in 1956–1961, and to point out some advantages and limitations of both approaches. In our opinion, Patočka’s philosophical approach consists, on the one hand, in a descriptive analysis of human experience, which he understands as a pre-reflective self-relationship pointing towards the consciousness of the world. On the other hand, on the basis of this descriptive analysis Patočka consequently explicates all non-human life, inorganic matter, and finally the whole of nature as life in its own right, the essence of which is also a certain self-relation with a tendency towards consciousness. The article then briefly presents Merleau-Ponty’s theses on nature, and finally compares them with Patočka’s overall theses on nature. The advantage of Patočka’s notion of nature as against Merleau-Ponty’s is that, in Patočka’s view, nature encompasses both the principle of unity and individuality. On the other hand, the advantage of Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of nature as against Patočka’s lies in the consistent interconnectedness of the infinite life of nature and the finite life of individual beings.


Author(s):  
Harold James

This introductory chapter sketches a brief portrait of the Krupp company. It first explores the various symbolisms of the Krupp name over the years, the criticisms and praise leveled at the company, and considers how this company had become as iconic as was and is, especially in the world of business. The chapter examines three themes which it credits with the development of the Krupp company: the absence of an exclusive focus on profitability, an acknowledgement that technically advanced enterprises exist in an international and even global system, and the company's position between family affairs on the one hand and the establishment of a business organization on the other.


Author(s):  
Arthur Fine

Traditionally, scientific realism asserts that the objects of scientific knowledge exist independently of the minds or acts of scientists and that scientific theories are true of that objective (mind-independent) world. The reference to knowledge points to the dual character of scientific realism. On the one hand it is a metaphysical (specifically, an ontological) doctrine, claiming the independent existence of certain entities. On the other hand it is an epistemological doctrine asserting that we can know what individuals exist and that we can find out the truth of the theories or laws that govern them. Opposed to scientific realism (hereafter just ‘realism’) are a variety of antirealisms, including phenomenalism and empiricism. Recently two others, instrumentalism and constructivism, have posed special challenges to realism. Instrumentalism regards the objects of knowledge pragmatically, as tools for various human purposes, and so takes reliability (or empirical adequacy) rather than truth as scientifically central. A version of this, fictionalism, contests the existence of many of the objects favoured by the realist and regards them as merely expedient means to useful ends. Constructivism maintains that scientific knowledge is socially constituted, that ‘facts’ are made by us. Thus it challenges the objectivity of knowledge, as the realist understands objectivity, and the independent existence that realism is after. Conventionalism, holding that the truths of science ultimately rest on man-made conventions, is allied to constructivism. Realism and antirealism propose competing interpretations of science as a whole. They even differ over what requires explanation, with realism demanding that more be explained and antirealism less.


2005 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
J. L. Helberg

Integrality of the psalms according to the relation between Psalm 1 (and 2) and the rest of the psalms The article explores views about the unity of the psalms and, as the author’s own approach, focuses especially on the need of the psalmist(s) not to be estranged. Simultaneously the place of trust in the psalms as well as that of the Torah/Law/Word of the Lord is scrutinised. The Torah requires on the one hand that one must distance oneself from an erroneous way of life, like disregarding God’s will and righteousness and on the other hand that one associates with a covenantal circle or community. The integrality of the psalms, like that of life, is rooted in the Torah of Yahweh, in close connection with the covenant.


Perception ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benny Shanon

Written and visual surveys were administered in order to assess people's models of the physical world. A comparison was made between scientific theories and the layman's philosophy of nature on the one hand, and between people's conceptions and perceptions on the other hand. The findings suggest that there are discrepancies on both levels: people do not conceive the world as physicists do, and their conceptions are different from their perceptions.


Author(s):  
Filippo Del Lucchese

This chapter argues that Aristotle’s enquiry on the nature and meaning of monstrosity is rooted in his positive attitude toward the knowledge of lower nature, which enjoy the same status of the science of higher beings. Heavens and earth are thus connected through the divine principle that is active throughout the whole nature. Gods thus become author of, but also responsible for, what happens in nature, and Aristotle’s argument provides the ground for every future theodicy. Monstrosity plays a major role in this philosophical approach. Aristotle develops the opposition between the normal and the abnormal development, through the concept of accidental necessity, namely the necessity that is at stake in natural processes that not always happen in the same way. Monsters are of pivotal importance in this ontological picture, because of their paradoxical ambiguity. On the one hand, they are the sign and symptom or a resistant nature, which opposes itself to Aristotle’s major ontological invention, namely the form and the final cause. On the other hand, without this hyatus between formal perfection and actual reality, nature would not exist in the way we experience it: there would be no diversity, no better and worse, no normal and monstrous. Monstrosity is necessary for Aristotle to explain nature and its ontological structure based on the substitition of dynamic forms and ends to both the static ideas of Plato and the exclusively material reality of atomists.


Author(s):  
Eric Scerri

Although periodic systems were produced independently by six codiscoverers in the space of a decade, Dmitri Mendeleev’s system is the one that has had the greatest impact by far. Not only was Mendeleev’s system more complete than the others, but he also worked much harder and longer for its acceptance. He also went much further than the other codiscoverers in publicly demonstrating the validity of his system by using it to predict the existence of a number of hitherto unknown elements. According to the popular story, it was Mendeleev’s many successful predictions that were directly responsible for the widespread acceptance of the periodic system, while his competitors either failed to make predictions or did so in a rather feeble manner. Several of his predictions were indeed widely celebrated, especially those of the elements germanium, gallium, and scandium, and many historians have argued that it was such spectacular feats that assured the acceptance of Mendeleev’s periodic system by the scientific community. The notion that scientific theories are accepted primarily if they make successful predictions seems to be rather well ingrained into scientific culture, and the history of the periodic table has been one of the episodes through which this notion has been propagated. However, philosophers and some scientists have long debated the extent to which predictions influence the acceptance of scientific theories, and it is by no means a foregone conclusion that successful predictions are more telling than other factors. In looking closely at the bulk of Mendeleev’s predictions in this chapter, it becomes clear that, at best, only half of them proved to be correct. This raises a number of questions. First of all, why is it that history has been so kind to Mendeleev as a maker of predictions? As historian of chemistry William Brock has pointed out, “Not all of Mendeleev’s predictions had such a happy outcome; like astrologers’ failures, they are commonly forgotten.”


2018 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 521-549
Author(s):  
Jana V. Schmidt ◽  

A near exclusive focus on Hannah Arendt’s concept of forgiveness from her major work The Human Condition has obscured the equally important model of reconciliation in her writings on aesthetics and in her Thought Notebook. By engaging Arendt in a dialogue with her contemporaries and friends Ingeborg Bachmann and Hermann Broch, on the one hand, and with the classic thinkers of tragedy, Aristotle and Goethe, on the other hand, I show how reconciliation responds to the situation of fatherlessness after 1945 and, as a “reconciliation with reality,” offers a new basis for intersubjectivity. Having, as Arendt writes, “enough of origin within” ourselves to do without pre-established categories cannot mean that we must begin to “father” ourselves but that, on the contrary, our inception as beings born to begin anew leaves us radically forlorn and yet equipped with everything we need to “make world” with one another. The essay contends that imagination, judgment, and understanding build a network of thought figures in Arendt that are tied to reality through the work of reconciliation.


1972 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 165-181
Author(s):  
Oliver Johnson

Of all the kinds of arguments that philosophers use to support their conclusions, the one type that I find personally to stick longest and most vividly in my mind is the verbal pictures they occasionally draw. Whether this is a result of the fact that I myself think best in pictorial terms or, as I would rather like to believe, is a tribute to the verbal artistry of the writers themselves, it remains true that, for me, the history of philosophy is punctuated with pictures, some pleasing and others perplexing. I need hardly mention Plato; with the Allegory of the Cave, the Myth of Er, the Charioteer of the Soul, and countless others he is beyond question the supreme master of the art. But other examples easily come to mind. I see Descartes seated in solitude before the fire in his dressing gown, suddenly to be surprised by a malignant demon, who appears at his shoulder to whisper insinuatingly into his ear that 2 plus 2 does not equal 4 at all. Or William James on a camping trip with friends trying to decide whether one of their number who keeps circling a tree on which a squirrel clings - and in turn circles the tree at equal speed, keeping the tree between him and his tormenter and never permitting the latter to get into a position behind his back - does or does not circle the squirrel, as he undoubtedly does circle the tree to which the squirrel clings. Or, I see G. E. Moore - and it is this picture that gives rise to the present paper - carefully contemplating two complete, independent, and quite different worlds, trying to decide which of the two is intrinsically better than the other.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 42
Author(s):  
Ahmad Amir Aziz

Apart from Kuhn and Popper, Lakatos has become an important figure in the<br />field of Philosophy of Science for his scientific theories, which he calls research<br />programmes. For Lakatos, Popper’s theoretical falsification can be immensely dangerous<br />when applied to the already established theories. On the other hand, in contrast to Kuhn<br />who assumed that a paradigm is by its nature immeasurable, Lakatos maintains that the<br />competing scientific discoveries may in fact be compared between one another. To him,<br />the main issues with regard to the logic of discovery cannot be dealt with satisfactorily<br />unless we do so within the framework of research programmes. The practical<br />implementation of this would be that the hard core of this framework cannot be subjected<br />to modification -let alone- rejection. This hard core must in other words be protected<br />from what he terms falsification. Lakatos also maintains that what can be said as scientific<br />is a series of theory, and not a single theory. This model of research programmes can in<br />fact be used in Islamic Studies in order to develop new theoretical principles that may<br />play a role of convincing protective-belt on the one hand, and to find new premises<br />whose discoveries can be used universally on the other


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