scholarly journals Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice

2016 ◽  
pp. 269-302
Author(s):  
Hans Rott
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Belief Contraction

The Paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg

1986 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isaac Levi
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
John Dewey ◽  
Expected Value ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Numerical Indicator ◽  
Charles Peirce ◽  
Oriented Approach

In The Enterprise of Knowledge (Levi, 1980a), I proposed a general theory of rational choice which I intended as a characterization of a prescriptive theory of ideal rationality. A cardinal tenet of this theory is that assessments of expected value or expected utility in the Bayesian sense may not be representable by a numerical indicator or indeed induce an ordering of feasible options in a context of deliberation. My reasons for taking this position are related to my commitment to the inquiry-oriented approach to human knowledge and valuation favored by the American pragmatists, Charles Peirce and John Dewey. A feature of any acceptable view of inquiry ought to be that during an inquiry points under dispute ought to be kept in suspense pending resolution through inquiry.

Support for the System

1985 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie Green
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Systems Theory ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Political Sociology ◽  
Research Programme ◽  
Economic Models ◽  
Empirical Theory ◽  
Conception Of Man

So-called ‘general theory’, or ‘systems theory’, is now nearly friendless among political scientists. The charm it once held as an ordering framework for empirical research has given way to that of the economic models of the rational choice school. While the successor paradigm was self-consciously reacting against the ‘over-socialized’ conception of man underlying systems theory and political sociology in general, much of its broader appeal was founded on similar claims: the promise of a testable, empirical theory, and an aspiration to complete generality. Perhaps these two goals will turn out to be irreconcilable; there is some plausibility in the view that, in practical affairs anyway, the idea of a general empirical theory is a contradiction in terms. In this article, however, I wish to examine a problem for systems theory which is not due to this tension, one which has gone unnoticed, and which has survived the decline and fall of the research programme.

CAN RATIONAL CHOICE BE CONSIDERED A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME? EVIDENCE FROM INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL PANEL DATA

Criminology ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS A. LOUGHRAN ◽  
RAY PATERNOSTER ◽  
AARON CHALFIN ◽  
THEODORE WILSON
Keyword(s):  
Panel Data ◽  
General Theory ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
General Theory Of Crime ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Theory Of Crime

scholarly journals Belief contraction in the context of the general theory of rational choice

1993 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 1426-1450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Rott
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
Revealed Preference ◽  
Representation Theorems ◽  
Belief Contraction ◽  
Elementary Model ◽  
Partial Meet Contraction ◽  
Finite Case ◽  
Open Question ◽  
Classic Paper

AbstractThis paper reorganizes and further develops the theory of partial meet contraction which was introduced in a classic paper by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson. Our purpose is threefold. First, we put the theory in a broader perspective by decomposing it into two layers which can respectively be treated by the general theory of choice and preference and elementary model theory. Second, we reprove the two main representation theorems of AGM and present two more representation results for the finite case that “lie between” the former, thereby partially answering an open question of AGM. Our method of proof is uniform insofar as it uses only one form of “revealed preference”, and it explains where and why the finiteness assumption is needed. Third, as an application, we explore the logic characterizing theory contractions in the finite case which are governed by the structure of simple and prioritized belief bases.

Taking Institutions Seriously: How Regime Analysis can be Relevant to Multilevel Environmental Governance

2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Vogler
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Environmental Governance ◽  
Global Environmental Governance ◽  
Institutional Facts ◽  
Institutional Approach ◽  
Environmental Regimes ◽  
Global Environmental ◽  
Regime Analysis

This article starts with the observation that in the study and practice of global environmental governance (GEG) institutions and organizations are often conflated. For regime theorists they are not the same thing and the argument is advanced that, despite its failings, the regime/institutional approach continues to have significant analytical advantages. However, the benefits of regime analysis can only be realized if it avoids becoming an arena for inter-governmental rational choice theorizing and takes institutions seriously. One way of doing this is to utilize John Searle's “general theory of institutional facts.” Searle's work provides the inspiration for a re-consideration of the bases, components, domain and explanation of global environmental regimes. It is argued that it could yield a new institutional approach which overcomes some of the problems of existing regime analyses in ways appropriate to the study of multilevel environmental governance.

Die Theorie rationalen Handelns, das Modell der Frame-Selektion und die Wirkungen von Bestrafungen auf Kooperation

2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-115
Author(s):  
Karl-Dieter Opp
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Theory Of Action

ZusammenfassungFehr & Gächter (2000, 2002) überprüfen in einem Kollektivgut-Experiment Hypothesen über die Wirkungen von Bestrafungen auf Kooperation. Hartmut Esser (2018, in dieser Zeitschrift) behauptet, dass zentrale Ergebnisse des Experiments der „rational choice“-Theorie (RCT) widersprechen und das Modell der Frame-Selektion (MFS) bestätigen. Es wird gezeigt, dass Esser eine problematische enge Version der RCT heranzieht. Eine „weite“ Version weist die von Esser behandelten Probleme nicht auf und kann die Ergebnisse des Experiments erklären. Weiter wird auf gravierende Probleme des MFS hingewiesen, die die Erklärung der experimentellen Befunde fragwürdig erscheinen lassen. Die Analyse zeigt weiter, dass das MFS eine Ergänzung und nicht eine Alternative zu einer weiten RCT ist und auf keinen Fall die übergreifende „general theory of action“ ist, wie Esser behauptet.

Extreme self-sacrifice beyond fusion: Moral expansiveness and the special case of allyship

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Crimston ◽  
Matthew J. Hornsey
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Biological Markers ◽  
Natural Environment ◽  
Relevant Dimension ◽  
Special Case

AbstractAs a general theory of extreme self-sacrifice, Whitehouse's article misses one relevant dimension: people's willingness to fight and die in support of entities not bound by biological markers or ancestral kinship (allyship). We discuss research on moral expansiveness, which highlights individuals’ capacity to self-sacrifice for targets that lie outside traditional in-group markers, including racial out-groups, animals, and the natural environment.

Rational Choice and Democratic Deliberation

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido Pincione ◽  
Fernando R. Teson
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Democratic Deliberation
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