The Paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg

1986 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isaac Levi

In The Enterprise of Knowledge (Levi, 1980a), I proposed a general theory of rational choice which I intended as a characterization of a prescriptive theory of ideal rationality. A cardinal tenet of this theory is that assessments of expected value or expected utility in the Bayesian sense may not be representable by a numerical indicator or indeed induce an ordering of feasible options in a context of deliberation. My reasons for taking this position are related to my commitment to the inquiry-oriented approach to human knowledge and valuation favored by the American pragmatists, Charles Peirce and John Dewey. A feature of any acceptable view of inquiry ought to be that during an inquiry points under dispute ought to be kept in suspense pending resolution through inquiry.

Author(s):  
János Nagy ◽  
András Némethi

AbstractThe present note is part of a series of articles targeting the theory of Abel maps associated with complex normal surface singularities with rational homology sphere links (Nagy and Némethi in Math Annal 375(3):1427–1487, 2019; Nagy and Némethi in Adv Math 371:20, 2020; Nagy and Némethi in Pure Appl Math Q 16(4):1123–1146, 2020). Besides the general theory, by the study of specific families we wish to show the power of this new method. Indeed, using the general theory of Abel maps applied for elliptic singularities in this note we are able to prove several key properties for elliptic singularities (e.g. the statements of the next paragraph), which by ‘old’ techniques were not reachable. If $$({\widetilde{X}},E)\rightarrow (X,o)$$ ( X ~ , E ) → ( X , o ) is the resolution of a complex normal surface singularity and $$c_1:{\mathrm{Pic}}({\widetilde{X}})\rightarrow H^2({\widetilde{X}},{\mathbb {Z}})$$ c 1 : Pic ( X ~ ) → H 2 ( X ~ , Z ) is the Chern class map, then $${\mathrm{Pic}}^{l'}({\widetilde{X}}):= c_1^{-1}(l')$$ Pic l ′ ( X ~ ) : = c 1 - 1 ( l ′ ) has a (Brill–Noether type) stratification $$W_{l', k}:= \{{\mathcal {L}}\in {\mathrm{Pic}}^{l'}({\widetilde{X}})\,:\, h^1({\mathcal {L}})=k\}$$ W l ′ , k : = { L ∈ Pic l ′ ( X ~ ) : h 1 ( L ) = k } . In this note we determine it for elliptic singularities together with the stratification according to the cycle of fixed components. E.g., we show that the closure of any $$W(l',k)$$ W ( l ′ , k ) is an affine subspace. For elliptic singularities we also characterize the End Curve Condition and Weak End Curve Condition in terms of the Abel map, we provide several characterization of them, and finally we show that they are equivalent.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 25 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Deses ◽  
Eraldo Giuli ◽  
E. Lowen-Colebunders

<p>In this paper we present an example in the setting of closure spaces that fits in the general theory on “complete objects” as developed by G. C. L. Brümmer and E. Giuli. For V the class of epimorphic embeddings in the construct Cl<sub>0</sub> of T<sub>0</sub> closure spaces we prove that the class of V-injective objects is the unique firmly V-reflective subconstruct of Cl0. We present an internal characterization of the Vinjective objects as “complete” ones and it turns out that this notion of completeness, when applied to the topological setting is much stronger than sobriety. An external characterization of completeness is obtained making use of the well known natural correspondence of closures with complete lattices. We prove that the construct of complete T<sub>0</sub> closure spaces is dually equivalent to the category of complete lattices with maps preserving the top and arbitrary joins.</p>


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-217
Author(s):  
David Sidorsky

The search for moral objectivity has been constant throughout the history of philosophy, although interpretations of the nature and scope of objectivity have varied. One aim of the pursuit of moral objectivity has been the demonstration of what may be termed its epistemological thesis, that is, the claim that the truth of assertions of the goodness or rightness of moral acts is as legitimate, reliable, or valid as the truth of assertions involving other forms of human knowledge, such as common sense, practical expertise, science, or mathematics. Another aim of the quest for moral objectivity may be termed its pragmatic formulation; this refers to the development of a method or procedure that will mediate among conflicting moral views in order to realize a convergence or justified agreement about warranted or true moral conclusions. In the ethical theories of Aristotle, David Hume, and John Dewey, theories that represent three of the four variants of ethical naturalism (defined below) that are surveyed in this essay, the epistemological thesis and the pragmatic formulation are integrated or combined. The distinction between these two elements is significant for the present essay, however, since I want to show that linguistic naturalism, the fourth variant I shall examine, has provided a demonstration of the epistemological thesis about moral knowledge, even if the pragmatic formulation has not been successfully realized.


Author(s):  
Hans Joas

Together with Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey, George Herbert Mead is considered one of the classic representatives of American pragmatism. He is most famous for his ideas about the specificities of human communication and sociality and about the genesis of the ‘self’ in infantile development. By developing these ideas, Mead became one of the founders of social psychology and – mostly via his influence on the school of symbolic interactionism – one of the most influential figures in contemporary sociology. Compared to that enormous influence, other parts of his philosophical work are relatively neglected.


Author(s):  
Peter J. Poczynok ◽  
Ralph L. Barnett

During ambulation, every maneuver causes the feet to impose a tangential loading at each contact with the floor. If the frictional resistance at the contact point is less than the associated tangential loading, slipping occurs and sometimes falling. There are five disciplines, some recently developed, that enable one to develop the general theory for predicting the number of walkers who will slip within a given time period on a statistically homogeneous and isotropic floor. These include force-plate studies, floor duty cycles, tribometry, extreme value theory of slipperiness, and floor reliability theory. When used with some additional bookkeeping notions, the general theory will be extended to real floors traversed by walkers with multiple ambulation styles and wearing a variety of footwear. In contrast, conventional slip and fall theory does not account for floor usage, different footwear and various ambulation styles, nor can it be used to determine the number of walkers who actually slip on a given floor.


2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (2) ◽  
pp. 596-627
Author(s):  
Eric Bahel ◽  
Yves Sprumont

We model uncertain social prospects as acts mapping states of nature to (social ) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF ) assigns an act to each profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. An SCF is strategyproof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the states of nature or her valuation of the outcomes. It is unanimous if it picks the feasible act that all agents find best whenever such an act exists. We offer a characterization of the class of strategyproof and unanimous SCFs in two settings. In the setting where all acts are feasible, the chosen act must yield the favorite outcome of some ( possibly different) agent in every state of nature. The set of states in which an agent’s favorite outcome is selected may vary with the reported belief profile; it is the union of all states assigned to her by a collection of constant, bilaterally dictatorial, or bilaterally consensual assignment rules. In a setting where each state of nature defines a possibly different subset of available outcomes, bilaterally dictatorial or consensual rules can only be used to assign control rights over states characterized by identical sets of available outcomes. (JEL D71, D81, R53)


1985 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie Green

So-called ‘general theory’, or ‘systems theory’, is now nearly friendless among political scientists. The charm it once held as an ordering framework for empirical research has given way to that of the economic models of the rational choice school. While the successor paradigm was self-consciously reacting against the ‘over-socialized’ conception of man underlying systems theory and political sociology in general, much of its broader appeal was founded on similar claims: the promise of a testable, empirical theory, and an aspiration to complete generality. Perhaps these two goals will turn out to be irreconcilable; there is some plausibility in the view that, in practical affairs anyway, the idea of a general empirical theory is a contradiction in terms. In this article, however, I wish to examine a problem for systems theory which is not due to this tension, one which has gone unnoticed, and which has survived the decline and fall of the research programme.


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