The EU and Investor-State Dispute Settlement: WTO Litigators Going “Investor-State Arbitration” and Back to a Permanent “Investment Court”

2017 ◽  
pp. 247-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
August Reinisch
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Eu

The WTO Bananas Decision: Cutting Through the Thicket

1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce R. Hirsh
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade In Services ◽  
Allocation System ◽  
Goods And Services ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Quota Allocation ◽  
The Eu

The Bananas decision demonstrated that WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body are capable of effectively and clearly analyzing whether extremely complex measures are consistent with WTO rules. The trade-liberalizing decision established the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as a meaningful constraint on discriminatory measures with an impact on both goods and services and clarified the nature of the GATS Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) obligation. The decision also severely constrained the ability of the EU to justify non-tariff discriminatory measures such as the quota allocation system at issue in Bananas based on the Lomé waiver.

scholarly journals The Relative Success of WTO Dispute Settlement and What Planet Would the EU Investment Court System Be On? A Rejoinder to AJIL Unbound Comments

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 316-318
Author(s):  
Joost Pauwelyn
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
Public Perception ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court System ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Many ◽  
Better Than ◽  
The Eu

I am extremely grateful, and humbled, by the wealth of comments received on my AJIL article through this AJIL Unbound Symposium. One of the many points I take away from these reactions is, indeed, that my analysis offers a snapshot and that many of the critiques now leveled against Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) are, in Catherine Rogers’s words, “effectively recycled versions of criticisms that were originally leveled against the WTO and its decision-makers.” (Freya Baetens makes a similar point.)In this rejoinder, I would only like to make two points. Firstly, many commentators seem to think that in this article I took the normative position that World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement is “better” than ISDS. Although I did point to the current discrepancy in public perception of the respective regimes, I purposefully avoided expressing any personal, normative position on one being “better” than the other (but apparently not explicitly enough).

scholarly journals When the hegemon goes rogue: leadership amid the US assault on the liberal trading order

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristen Hopewell
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Leadership Role ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Lead System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The Us ◽  
Multilateral Trading System ◽  
The Eu

Abstract Under President Trump, the United States abdicated its traditional leadership role in the trading system, abandoning multilateralism for aggressive unilateralism and launching an active assault on the World Trade Organization (WTO). Most strikingly, the US blocked appointments to the Appellate Body, jeopardizing the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism. With the trade regime in crisis, a key question has been whether other states would have the will and capacity to lead system-preserving initiatives. While most attention has focused on whether China—widely seen as the chief hegemonic challenger to the US—would assume the mantle of leadership, there has been considerable scepticism about the European Union's capacity to exercise leadership amid the crisis. The EU has generally been seen as punching below its weight in terms of leadership at the WTO. In this article, however, I argue that it is the EU, rather than China, that has taken the lead in advancing concrete initiatives directed at defending and maintaining the multilateral trading system. The EU led the creation of an interim appeals arrangement to replace the defunct Appellate Body—in effect, creating an ‘Appellate Body minus the US’. Although the rules-based multilateral trading system remains under threat, it is the EU, not China, that is acting as a system-preserving power, leading efforts to defend the established order.

The CETA Opinion of the European Court of Justice and its Implications—Not that Selfish After All

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 503-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Riffel
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Court System ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Investment Protection ◽  
Constitutional Principle ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Eu

Abstract In Opinion 1/17, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) found the investment court system compatible with European Union (EU) law. The ruling concerned the mechanism in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) but the Court’s reasoning is equally applicable to other investment courts as established, for example, in the EU’s investment protection agreements with Singapore and Vietnam. This outcome was far from clear, given that in the past the accession to international dispute settlement bodies regularly foundered on the autonomy of the EU legal order. The present article parses the CETA Opinion and explores its implications. It particularly focuses on autonomy as a constitutional principle and its advancement in Opinion 1/17. Importantly, the ECJ accepted the superiority of a court created by international agreement in relation to the said agreement. Furthermore, it clarified that it is not prerequisite for the Court to rule first on the meaning to be given to an act of EU law before that act can be the subject matter of an investment dispute. Finally, the pdrerogative of the EU to autonomously set the level of protection of a public welfare goal must be secured in a treaty for the EU to join it.

Transparency and participatory aspects of investor-state dispute settlement in the EU ‘new wave’ trade agreements

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 781-800 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna Lam ◽  
Güneş Ünüvar
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Free Trade Agreements ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Forum Shopping ◽  
New Wave ◽  
Commercial Arbitration ◽  
Investment Arbitration ◽  
The Eu

AbstractThis article scrutinizes the investment chapters in the new EU Free Trade Agreements from a transparency perspective. The article examines the claims that the dispute settlement mechanisms in the new treaties are sufficiently participatory and more transparent than their predecessors. Procedural standards related to confidentiality of proceedings shall be analysed in the context of existing transparency safeguards in investment arbitration. In addition to procedural guarantees of transparency, the article examines relevant substantive rules affecting participatory aspects of dispute settlement. Furthermore, the article discusses forum-shopping strategies of the parties in the field of investment-related disputes, including internal forum-shopping and parallel proceedings using different procedural mechanisms. In this context, lessons from other fields such as international commercial arbitration related to transparency (in cases in which public interest is present) are highlighted. The proposal for the establishment of an integrated, multilateral court for investment cases is also invoked.

Guarding the Great Wall?—jurisprudential review of treaty interpretative tools in Chinese BIT-based arbitration cases

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shen Wei
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Active Role ◽  
The Other ◽  
Policy Response ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Us ◽  
Great Wall ◽  
The Eu

Abstract Inconsistency has been said to be one of the most severe shortcomings the existing investor–State dispute settlement (the ISDS) system possesses. Inconsistency, if not cured, is likely to affect the legitimacy of the ISDS. Partly in response to the claims of inconsistency and illegitimacy of the ISDS, the EU has proposed to have a permanent investment court to replace the ISDS while the US proposed to have an appellate body for the current ISDS along with a large camp of undecided states having no firm position on the ISDS reform. China, on the other hand, has not issued an official response to the concept of a permanent investment court, partially because of its less active role in the use of the existing ISDS. More recent years have witnessed China’s increasing involvement in ISDS cases. The purpose of this article is to review these China BIT-related ISDS cases, in particular, the awards on jurisdiction, and the tribunals’ varying techniques in interpreting the ISDS clauses in China’s BITs with a focus on the jurisprudential analyses of these cases and the tribunals’ treaty interpretive techniques. Not surprisingly, the interpretative tendency has been quite uniform. In brief, the tribunals have tended to be more expansive when they were called upon to determine the jurisdictional issues. Although this article is largely jurisprudential, a sense of the tribunals’ arbitral techniques may help shape some foundational underpinnings for China’s policy response to the proposals to reform the ISDS system made by the EU, the US, and others.

scholarly journals Baptists and Bootleggers in the Biodiesel Trade: EU–Biodiesel (Indonesia)

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-315
Author(s):  
Carolyn Fischer ◽  
Timothy Meyer
Keyword(s):  
Renewable Energy ◽  
Palm Oil ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Export Tax ◽  
Market Opportunities ◽  
Antidumping Duties ◽  
Environmentally Sound ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

AbstractEU–Biodiesel (Indonesia) is the latest in two lines of cases. On the one hand, the case offers yet another example of the Dispute Settlement Body striking down creative interpretations of antidumping rules by developed countries. Applying the Appellate Body's decision in EU–Biodiesel (Argentina), the panel found that the EU could not use antidumping duties to counteract the effects of Indonesia's export tax on palm oil. On the other hand, the decision is another chapter in the battle over renewable energy markets. Both the EU and Indonesia had intervened in their markets to promote the development of domestic biodiesel industries. The panel's decision prevents the EU from using antidumping duties to preserve market opportunities created by its Renewable Energy Directive for its domestic biodiesel producers. The EU has responded in two ways. First, through regulations that disfavor palm-based biodiesel, but not biodiesel made from from other foodstocks, such as rapeseed oil commonly produced in the EU. Second, the EU has imposed countervailing duties on Indonesian biodiesel, finding that Indonesia's export tax on crude palm oil constitutes a subsidy to Indonesian biodiesel producers. The EU's apparently inelastic demand for protection raises two questions: First, when domestic political bargains rest on both protectionist and non-protectionist motives and policies have both protectionist and non-protectonist effects, what are the welfare consequences of restraining only overt protectionism? Second, under what circumstances may regulatory approaches be even less desirable than duties for addressing combined protectionist and environmental interests, and would the WTO have the right powers to discipline them in an environmentally sound way?

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