Joint Dispute Settlement and Judicial Interpretation – A Precondition for Participation in the EU Internal Market?

2019 ◽  
pp. 175-189
Author(s):  
Sven Norberg
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Judicial Interpretation ◽  
The Eu

The EU ban on the import of seal products and the WTO regulations: neglected human rights of the Arctic indigenous peoples?

Polar Record ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 154-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kamrul Hossain
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Indigenous Peoples ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Indigenous Communities ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
Eu Regulation ◽  
Critical Issues ◽  
The Eu

ABSTRACTThe EU ban on the import and commercialising of seals and seal products in the EU market, has attracted intense attention in recent years. As seal products mostly originate from outside the EU, it is argued that the EU action has been discriminatory and hence contrary to the WTO regulations. Canada and Norway have been critical of the EU regulation and have initiated dispute settlement procedures within the WTO since most of the products that enter into the internal market are mainly from these countries. The ban also provoked anger within the Inuit and other indigenous communities, mainly from Canada and Greenland. Although the EU regulation provides an exception for Inuit and indigenous hunts and the subsequent commercialisation of resulting products into the internal market, the exception suffers from clarity and lacks proper implementation procedures. The regulation is predicted to lead to the ultimate disappearance of the seal market in the EU, which directly affects the Inuit and other indigenous peoples engaged in sealing activities. They may lose their means of subsistence. While analysing the critical issues concerning the EU and the WTO regulations and its exceptions, the article focuses on the human rights perspective of the Arctic indigenous peoples affected by the EU ban.

Interpreting the EU Internal Market

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Lindeboom
Keyword(s):  
Internal Market ◽  
The Eu

Epilogue

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze
Keyword(s):  
Internal Market ◽  
Positive Answer ◽  
The Past ◽  
Output Legitimacy ◽  
The Eu

Can the judicial creation of the EU internal market be justified? A famous—positive—answer has, in the past, been suggested by Miguel Maduro’s We the Court; and the first section explores the credentials of his ‘majoritarian activism’ thesis. The second section surveys alternative forms of legitimacy, such as ‘output legitimacy’ and ‘messianic legitimacy’, but it also offers a new Kantian approach to the legitimacy question.

The WTO Bananas Decision: Cutting Through the Thicket

1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce R. Hirsh
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade In Services ◽  
Allocation System ◽  
Goods And Services ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Quota Allocation ◽  
The Eu

The Bananas decision demonstrated that WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body are capable of effectively and clearly analyzing whether extremely complex measures are consistent with WTO rules. The trade-liberalizing decision established the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as a meaningful constraint on discriminatory measures with an impact on both goods and services and clarified the nature of the GATS Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) obligation. The decision also severely constrained the ability of the EU to justify non-tariff discriminatory measures such as the quota allocation system at issue in Bananas based on the Lomé waiver.

scholarly journals The Relative Success of WTO Dispute Settlement and What Planet Would the EU Investment Court System Be On? A Rejoinder to AJIL Unbound Comments

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 316-318
Author(s):  
Joost Pauwelyn
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
Public Perception ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court System ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Many ◽  
Better Than ◽  
The Eu

I am extremely grateful, and humbled, by the wealth of comments received on my AJIL article through this AJIL Unbound Symposium. One of the many points I take away from these reactions is, indeed, that my analysis offers a snapshot and that many of the critiques now leveled against Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) are, in Catherine Rogers’s words, “effectively recycled versions of criticisms that were originally leveled against the WTO and its decision-makers.” (Freya Baetens makes a similar point.)In this rejoinder, I would only like to make two points. Firstly, many commentators seem to think that in this article I took the normative position that World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement is “better” than ISDS. Although I did point to the current discrepancy in public perception of the respective regimes, I purposefully avoided expressing any personal, normative position on one being “better” than the other (but apparently not explicitly enough).

scholarly journals FOREIGN TRADE ACTIVITY OF UKRAINE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SIGNING OF «FTA+» WITH THE EU AND FTA WITH THE CIS

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (127) ◽  
pp. 116-127
Author(s):  
O. Lytvyn
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Trade ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Russian Federation ◽  
Labour Force ◽  
Free Trade Area ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Economic Collaboration ◽  
Foreign Trade Activity ◽  
The Eu

This article deals with the prospects, possible risks and threats of deep and comprehensive free trade area («FTA+») between Ukraine and the EU. Features of foreign economic activity of Ukraine within the framework of FTA with the CIS are also considered in the article. A detailed analysis of the foreign trade statement and regional pattern of exports and imports of Ukraine is presented for the last few years. The key difference between «FTA+» with the EU and classic free trade areas is determined. Risks of the external economic collaboration of Ukraine with the European countries are described after intensifying of the conflict between Ukraine and Russian Federation. Reasons of suspension of the Free trade agreement between Russia and Ukraine are marked. It operated within the framework of FTA with the CIS, trade and economic collaboration between the countries until the abolition of a free trade with Ukraine by Russian Federation. The consequences of the European technical and phytosanitary standards, substantial diminishing of export and import duties and measures related to the preparation of internal market to «FTA+» are analysed for Ukraine. The form of «FTA+» is found out, which foresees the reduction and liquidation of trade barriers within the framework of a free trade regime. It doesn’t deal only with liberalization of bilateral commodity trade but such spheres, as: trade in services, regime of foreign direct investment, public purchasing and labour force movement. The form of «FTA+» also foresees a wide adaptation program of economic and sectoral legislation of Ukraine to the norms and standards of the EU that will allow removing of nontariff barriers for domestic exports to internal market of the EU.

scholarly journals When the hegemon goes rogue: leadership amid the US assault on the liberal trading order

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristen Hopewell
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Leadership Role ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Lead System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The Us ◽  
Multilateral Trading System ◽  
The Eu

Abstract Under President Trump, the United States abdicated its traditional leadership role in the trading system, abandoning multilateralism for aggressive unilateralism and launching an active assault on the World Trade Organization (WTO). Most strikingly, the US blocked appointments to the Appellate Body, jeopardizing the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism. With the trade regime in crisis, a key question has been whether other states would have the will and capacity to lead system-preserving initiatives. While most attention has focused on whether China—widely seen as the chief hegemonic challenger to the US—would assume the mantle of leadership, there has been considerable scepticism about the European Union's capacity to exercise leadership amid the crisis. The EU has generally been seen as punching below its weight in terms of leadership at the WTO. In this article, however, I argue that it is the EU, rather than China, that has taken the lead in advancing concrete initiatives directed at defending and maintaining the multilateral trading system. The EU led the creation of an interim appeals arrangement to replace the defunct Appellate Body—in effect, creating an ‘Appellate Body minus the US’. Although the rules-based multilateral trading system remains under threat, it is the EU, not China, that is acting as a system-preserving power, leading efforts to defend the established order.

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