A long line of work in social psychology has studied variations in people’s susceptibility to persuasion—the extent to which they are willing to modify their opinions on a topic. This body of literature suggests an interesting perspective on theoretical models of opinion formation by interacting parties in a network: in addition to considering interventions that directly modify people’s intrinsic opinions, it is also natural to consider interventions that modify people’s susceptibility to persuasion.
In this work, motivated by this fact, we propose an influence optimization problem. Specifically, we adopt a popular model for social opinion dynamics, where each agent has some fixed innate opinion, and a resistance that measures the importance it places on its innate opinion; agents influence one another’s opinions through an iterative process. Under certain conditions, this iterative process converges to some equilibrium opinion vector. For the unbudgeted variant of the problem, the goal is to modify the resistance of any number of agents (within some given range) such that the sum of the equilibrium opinions is minimized; for the budgeted variant, in addition the algorithm is given upfront a restriction on the number of agents whose resistance may be modified.
We prove that the objective function is in general non-convex. Hence, formulating the problem as a convex program as in an early version of this work (Abebe et al., KDD’18) might have potential correctness issues. We instead analyze the structure of the objective function, and show that any local optimum is also a global optimum, which is somehow surprising as the objective function might not be convex. Furthermore, we combine the iterative process and the local search paradigm to design very efficient algorithms that can solve the unbudgeted variant of the problem optimally on large-scale graphs containing millions of nodes. Finally, we propose and evaluate experimentally a family of heuristics for the budgeted variant of the problem.
Foundational Moments, Representative Claims and the Ecology of Social Ignorance
