Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules

2019 ◽  
pp. 219-231
Author(s):  
Souvik Roy ◽  
Soumyarup Sadhukhan ◽  
Arunava Sen
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rules

European voting rules flawed

Nature ◽  
2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Ball
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rules

A Political Economy Model of a Research University

2009 ◽  
pp. 132-143
Author(s):  
K. Sonin ◽  
I. Khovanskaya
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Structure ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Research University ◽  
Hiring Decisions ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Economy Model ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
Optimal Incentives

Hiring decisions are typically made by committees members of which have different capacity to estimate the quality of candidates. Organizational structure and voting rules in the committees determine the incentives and strategies of applicants; thus, construction of a modern university requires a political structure that provides committee members and applicants with optimal incentives. The existing political-economic model of informative voting typically lacks any degree of variance in the organizational structure, while political-economic models of organization typically assume a parsimonious information structure. In this paper, we propose a simple framework to analyze trade-offs in optimal subdivision of universities into departments and subdepartments, and allocation of political power.

Optimal Two Stage Committee Voting Rules

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Ayres ◽  
Colin Rowat ◽  
Nasser Zakariya
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rules ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Committee Voting

scholarly journals Accuracy of Verdicts under Different Jury Sizes and Voting Rules

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 221-236
Author(s):  
Alice Guerra ◽  
Barbara Luppi ◽  
Francesco Parisi
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rules

scholarly journals Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (1) ◽  
pp. 150-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilat Levy
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Career Concerns ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
The Public ◽  
Voting Rule ◽  
The Right

In this paper I analyze the effect of transparency on decision making in committees. I focus on committees whose members are motivated by career concerns. The main result is that when the decision-making process is secretive (when individual votes are not revealed to the public), committee members comply with preexisting biases. For example, if the voting rule demands a supermajority to accept a reform, individuals vote more often against reforms. Transparent committees are therefore more likely to accept reforms. I also find that coupled with the right voting rule, a secretive procedure may induce better decisions than a transparent one. (JEL D71, D72)

De gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 9 oktober 1994 : Analyse van de resultaten

Res Publica ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 37 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 352-388
Author(s):  
Johan Ackaert
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Institutional Setting ◽  
Local Elections ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Extreme Right ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Female Candidates ◽  
Compulsory Voting ◽  
General Terms ◽  
Campaign Expenditures

The institutional setting of the 1994 local elections was characterized by a by law introduced limitation of campaign expenditures and the increased share (at least 25%) of female candidates.  In spite of compulsory voting rules, the turnout decreased with 1,2%. The proportion of blanc or invalid votes increased slightly with 0,3%.  The results of the local elections followed the trends drawn by the 1991 general election. This means general losses for the traditional parties and large progress for the extreme right-wing parties. In the Flemish region, the winners were the extreme right-wing Vlaams Blok, the ecologist AGALEV and the VLD liberals.  The others parties lost votes. This was particularly the case for the Flemish-nationalist VU, followed by the socialists (SP) and the christian-democrats (CVP).In the Walloons region, all the traditional parties were set back or stagnated.  The socialists (PS) suffered the largest decline, but the liberals (PRL) and christian-democrats (PSC) lost voters too. The ecologist ECOLO only kept a modest status quo position. On the other hand, the extreme right-wing parties Front National and Agir realised a breakthrough. In Brussels, we notice the same tendencies, set-backs for the traditional parties and progress for the extreme rightwing parties (of both languages). The ecologists belonged there also to the winning side. Nevertheless, the fragmentation of the local political system should not be dramatized.In general terms, parties supporting the leaving political majorities in the municipalities were no langer electorally favoured. On the contrary, the liberals realized better results in these municipalities where they belonged to the opposition.

Costly Voting

2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tilman Börgers
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
Voluntary Participation ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Value Model ◽  
Private Value ◽  
Two Alternatives ◽  
Costly Voting

What are good voting rules if voting is costly? We analyze this question for the case that an electorate chooses among two alternatives. In a symmetric private value model of voting we show that majority voting with voluntary participation Pareto-dominates majority voting with compulsory participation as well as random decision-making.

Computer simulations of voting systems

2000 ◽  
Vol 03 (01n04) ◽  
pp. 181-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominique Lepelley ◽  
Ahmed Louichi ◽  
Fabrice Valognes
Keyword(s):  
Monte Carlo ◽  
Computer Simulations ◽  
Monte Carlo Methods ◽  
Scoring Rules ◽  
Voting Systems ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Asymptotic Case ◽  
Majority Principle ◽  
Voting Procedures ◽  
Democratic Principles

All voting procedures are susceptible to give rise, if not to paradoxes, at least to violations of some democratic principles. In this paper, we evaluate and compare the propensity of various voting rules -belonging to the class of scoring rules- to satisfy two versions of the majority principle. We consider the asymptotic case where the numbers of voters tends to infinity and, for each rule, we study with the help of Monte Carlo methods how this propensity varies as a function of the number of candidates.

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