Zero-Knowledge Proof for Lattice-Based Group Signature Schemes with Verifier-Local Revocation

2018 ◽  
pp. 772-782 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maharage Nisansala Sevwandi Perera ◽  
Takeshi Koshiba
Keyword(s):  
Group Signature ◽  
Zero Knowledge ◽  
Signature Schemes ◽  
Zero Knowledge Proof

scholarly journals Side-Channel Protections for Picnic Signatures

2021 ◽  
pp. 239-282
Author(s):  
Diego F. Aranha ◽  
Sebastian Berndt ◽  
Thomas Eisenbarth ◽  
Okan Seker ◽  
Akira Takahashi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Hash Function ◽  
Proof System ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Attacks ◽  
Zero Knowledge ◽  
Signature Schemes ◽  
First Order ◽  
The Third ◽  
Zero Knowledge Proof

We study masking countermeasures for side-channel attacks against signature schemes constructed from the MPC-in-the-head paradigm, specifically when the MPC protocol uses preprocessing. This class of signature schemes includes Picnic, an alternate candidate in the third round of the NIST post-quantum standardization project. The only previously known approach to masking MPC-in-the-head signatures suffers from interoperability issues and increased signature sizes. Further, we present a new attack to demonstrate that known countermeasures are not sufficient when the MPC protocol uses a preprocessing phase, as in Picnic3.We overcome these challenges by showing how to mask the underlying zero-knowledge proof system due to Katz–Kolesnikov–Wang (CCS 2018) for any masking order, and by formally proving that our approach meets the standard security notions of non-interference for masking countermeasures. As a case study, we apply our masking technique to Picnic. We then implement different masked versions of Picnic signing providing first order protection for the ARM Cortex M4 platform, and quantify the overhead of these different masking approaches. We carefully analyze the side-channel risk of hashing operations, and give optimizations that reduce the CPU cost of protecting hashing in Picnic by a factor of five. The performance penalties of the masking countermeasures ranged from 1.8 to 5.5, depending on the degree of masking applied to hash function invocations.

scholarly journals CacheQuote: Efficiently Recovering Long-term Secrets of SGX EPID via Cache Attacks

2018 ◽  
pp. 171-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fergus Dall ◽  
Gabrielle De Micheli ◽  
Thomas Eisenbarth ◽  
Daniel Genkin ◽  
Nadia Heninger ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Secure Computation ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Zero Knowledge ◽  
Signature Schemes ◽  
Number Problem ◽  
Trusted Hardware ◽  
Hidden Number Problem ◽  
Cache Attacks ◽  
Zero Knowledge Proof

Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) allows users to perform secure computation on platforms that run untrusted software. To validate that the computation is correctly initialized and that it executes on trusted hardware, SGX supports attestation providers that can vouch for the user’s computation. Communication with these attestation providers is based on the Extended Privacy ID (EPID) protocol, which not only validates the computation but is also designed to maintain the user’s privacy. In particular, EPID is designed to ensure that the attestation provider is unable to identify the host on which the computation executes. In this work we investigate the security of the Intel implementation of the EPID protocol. We identify an implementation weakness that leaks information via a cache side channel. We show that a malicious attestation provider can use the leaked information to break the unlinkability guarantees of EPID. We analyze the leaked information using a lattice-based approach for solving the hidden number problem, which we adapt to the zero-knowledge proof in the EPID scheme, extending prior attacks on signature schemes.

GROUP AUTHENTICATION SCHEME BASED ON ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOF

2021 ◽  
pp. 68-84
Author(s):  
E. A. Shliakhtina ◽  
◽  
D. Y. Gamayunov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Mutual Authentication ◽  
Security Analysis ◽  
Authentication Scheme ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Convergence Time ◽  
Group Signature ◽  
Sybil Attack ◽  
Zero Knowledge ◽  
User Groups ◽  
Zero Knowledge Proof

In this paper, we address the problem of mutual authentication in user groups in decentralized messaging systems without trusted third party. We propose a mutual authentication algorithm for groups using zero-knowledge proof. Using the algorithm, which is based on trust chains existing in decentralized network, users are able to authenticate each other without establishing a shared secret over side channel. The proposed algorithm is based on Democratic Group Signature protocol (DGS) and Communication-Computation Efficient Group Key algorithm for large and dynamic groups (CCEGK). We have performed security analysis of the proposed mutual authentication scheme against several attacks including Sybil attack and have made complexity estimation for the algorithm. The algorithm is implemented in an experimental P2P group messaging application, and using this implementation we estimate overhead of the authentication scheme and convergence time for several initial configurations of user groups and trust chains.

scholarly journals Almost Fully Secured Lattice-Based Group Signatures with Verifier-Local Revocation

Cryptography ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 33
Author(s):  
Maharage Nisansala Sevwandi Perera ◽  
Takeshi Koshiba
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Group Signature ◽  
Key Generation ◽  
Signature Scheme ◽  
Zero Knowledge ◽  
Signature Schemes ◽  
Group Signatures ◽  
Desirable Feature ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Security Notion

An efficient member revocation mechanism is a desirable feature when group signature schemes are applied in practical scenarios. Revocation methods, such as verifier-local revocation (VLR), provide an efficient member revocation in applications of group signatures. However, VLR-group signatures rely on a weaker security notion. On the other hand, group signature schemes for static groups gain stronger security with the full-anonymity security notion. Even though an outsider sees the secret signing keys of all group members in the full-anonymity, the signer is still anonymous. Achieving the full-anonymity for VLR group signature schemes is challenging due to the structure of secret signing keys. The secret signing keys of those schemes consist of tokens, which are used to manage revocation. The reveal of tokens may destroy the anonymity of the signers. We obtain stronger security for the lattice-based VLR group signature schemes by providing a new key generation method, which outputs revocation tokens without deriving from the members’ secret signing keys. We propose a new group signature scheme from lattices with VLR, which achieves stronger security than the previous related works. To avoid signature forgeries, we suggest a new zero-knowledge proof system that requires signers to validate themselves. Moreover, we output an efficient tracing mechanism.

scholarly journals An access control model for the Internet of Things based on zero-knowledge token and blockchain

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lihua Song ◽  
Xinran Ju ◽  
Zongke Zhu ◽  
Mengchen Li
Keyword(s):  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Access Control ◽  
Single Point ◽  
Control Model ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Security Level ◽  
Zero Knowledge ◽  
Access Control Model ◽  
Test Analysis ◽  
Zero Knowledge Proof

AbstractInformation security has become a hot topic in Internet of Things (IoT), and traditional centralized access control models are faced with threats such as single point failure, internal attack, and central leak. In this paper, we propose a model to improve the access control security of the IoT, which is based on zero-knowledge proof and smart contract technology in the blockchain. Firstly, we deploy attribute information of access control in the blockchain, which relieves the pressure and credibility problem brought by the third-party information concentration. Secondly, encrypted access control token is used to gain the access permission of the resources, which makes the user's identity invisible and effectively avoids attribute ownership exposure problem. Besides, the use of smart contracts solves the problem of low computing efficiency of IoT devices and the waste of blockchain computing power resources. Finally, a prototype of IoT access control system based on blockchain and zero-knowledge proof technology is implemented. The test analysis results show that the model achieves effective attribute privacy protection, compared with the Attribute-Based Access Control model of the same security level, the access efficiency increases linearly with the increase of access scale.

scholarly journals An Application of p-Fibonacci Error-Correcting Codes to Cryptography

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (7) ◽  
pp. 789
Author(s):  
Emanuele Bellini ◽  
Chiara Marcolla ◽  
Nadir Murru
Keyword(s):  
Error Correcting Code ◽  
Error Correcting Codes ◽  
Multiparty Computation ◽  
Zero Knowledge ◽  
Signature Schemes ◽  
Standardization Process ◽  
Technology Standardization

In addition to their usefulness in proving one’s identity electronically, identification protocols based on zero-knowledge proofs allow designing secure cryptographic signature schemes by means of the Fiat–Shamir transform or other similar constructs. This approach has been followed by many cryptographers during the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) standardization process for quantum-resistant signature schemes. NIST candidates include solutions in different settings, such as lattices and multivariate and multiparty computation. While error-correcting codes may also be used, they do not provide very practical parameters, with a few exceptions. In this manuscript, we explored the possibility of using the error-correcting codes proposed by Stakhov in 2006 to design an identification protocol based on zero-knowledge proofs. We showed that this type of code offers a valid alternative in the error-correcting code setting to build such protocols and, consequently, quantum-resistant signature schemes.

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