Some Lessons from the Use of the RAINS Model in International Negotiations

2007 ◽  
pp. 197-210
Author(s):  
Markus Amann
Keyword(s):  
International Negotiations

Negotiating Global Change: Progressive Multilateralism in Trade in Telecommunications Talks

2003 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Murphy Ives
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Global Change ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
World Trade ◽  
International Negotiations ◽  
Position Change ◽  
Multilateral Trade ◽  
Unilateral Action ◽  
Loss Avoidance ◽  
Predominant Factor

AbstractThis article provides an analysis of negotiated change within the global telecommunications regime. It examines how agreements are achieved in the area of trade and telecommunications, particularly within the aegis of the Geneva-based World Trade Organization (WTO). It argues that, in the negotiations examined, the interplay between unilateral action, bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral processes and the ensuing alchemy of coercion and concord led to an overall reframing of the central problem and thereby facilitated multilateral consensus. Drawing upon evidence from Japan-U.S. bilateral, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and multilateral trade and telecom talks, this research tests the proposition that coercive pressure is the predominant factor in bringing about negotiated change. It also considers the alternate thesis that integrative reframing, involving the search for mutual gains, was paramount in facilitating change. Qualitative observations signal the phenomenon of progressive multilateralism, or the sequential interplay of unilateral action, bilateral, and multilateral processes, wherein undercurrents of coercion reorient perceptions of the outcome from uncertain gains towards loss avoidance. Together with information exchange and interaction, one observes position change. Understanding the dynamics at important impasse points facilitates a critical, political-economy reading of these international negotiations as well as more general conclusions about the nature of governance in this area.

Law and contestation in international negotiations

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 672-690
Author(s):  
Kyle Rapp
Keyword(s):  
Discourse Analysis ◽  
International Relations ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
International Negotiations ◽  
The Us ◽  
Legal Grounds

AbstractWhat is the role of rhetoric and argumentation in international relations? Some argue that it is little more than ‘cheap talk’, while others say that it may play a role in persuasion or coordination. However, why states deploy certain arguments, and why these arguments succeed or fail, is less well understood. I argue that, in international negotiations, certain types of legal frames are particularly useful for creating winning arguments. When a state bases its arguments on constitutive legal claims, opponents are more likely to become trapped by the law: unable to develop sustainable rebuttals or advance their preferred policy. To evaluate this theory, I apply qualitative discourse analysis to the US arguments on the crime of aggression at the Kampala Review Conference of the International Criminal Court – where the US advanced numerous arguments intended to reshape the crime to align with US interests. The analysis supports the theoretical propositions – arguments framed on codified legal grounds had greater success, while arguments framed on more political grounds were less sustainable, failing to achieve the desired outcomes. These findings further develop our understanding of the use of international law in rhetoric, argumentation, and negotiation.

The present and future competence of the European Union in the Arctic

Polar Record ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 361-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timo Koivurova ◽  
Kai Kokko ◽  
Sebastien Duyck ◽  
Nikolas Sellheim ◽  
Adam Stepien
Keyword(s):  
International Negotiations ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Crucial Importance ◽  
Arctic Council ◽  
The Third ◽  
Broad Array ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Arctic Policy ◽  
The Eu

ABSTRACTThe European Union's (EU's) intention of becoming a permanent observer in the Arctic Council and the reluctance of Arctic actors to grant it that status have made the union's aspirations in the Arctic the subject of a continuing debate. The discussion appears to be dominated by geographical considerations and the EU's gradually emerging Arctic policy. This article puts forward a different view of the EU's presence in the region, one drawing on an analysis of relevant EU competences. As a complex international actor, the EU has acquired a broad array of decision-making powers from its member states, powers that partly extend to Iceland and Norway via the EEA Agreement. Moreover, the EU has in many cases become a relevant actor in international negotiations and treaty making processes the outcomes of which are of crucial importance for the governance of the Arctic. Our argument in the third and concluding section is that only by including the EU in Arctic governance can the international community provide better prospects for the union to sensitise its policies and discourses to the Arctic realities and for other Arctic actors to understand how the union functions. This argument is supported by an analysis of the EU's restrictions on the import of seal products and the ensuing litigation.

Negotiating under Political Uncertainty: National Elections and the Dynamics of International Co-operation

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 315-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mareike Kleine ◽  
Clement Minaudier
Keyword(s):  
International Negotiations ◽  
Informational Efficiency ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Political Uncertainty ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
National Elections ◽  
Run Up ◽  
Uncertain Outcomes ◽  
Level 2 ◽  
The Eu

This article explores if (and how) national elections affect the chances of concluding an international agreement. Drawing on a literature about the informational efficiency of elections, it examines how political uncertainty in the run-up to an election impacts the dynamics of international negotiations. Using the case of decision making in the European Union (EU), it finds that (1) pending national elections significantly reduce the chances of reaching an agreement at the international level (2) this effect is strongest during close elections with uncertain outcomes and (3) the effect is particularly pronounced in the case of elections in larger member states. The findings highlight the fruitfulness of further research on the dynamics between national and international politics. The article has positive and normative implications for the literature on two-level games, international negotiations and legislative bargaining in the EU.

Chinese Thought, Game Theory, and Strategic International Negotiations

1999 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Chinese Philosophy ◽  
International Negotiations ◽  
Strategic Analysis ◽  
Chinese Thought

AbstractIn this article, the insights of Chinese philosophy and economic game theory are examined with a focus on international negotiations. While Chinese philosophy texts have existed for over 2,000 years, game theory is a more recent tool of strategic analysis. We illustrate four strategic negotiation principles based on these two theories with stylized examples specifically designed to help negotiators involved in international contexts.

Domestic Politics and International Negotiations: the Politics of Global Warming in the United States

1993 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael T. Hatch
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Global Warming ◽  
Policy Process ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Political Process ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Negotiations ◽  
International Treaty ◽  
International Commitments ◽  
External Pressures

The United States chose an approach to global warming that came to be viewed by much of the international community as a barrier to effective action. In explaining why, this article analyzes the interaction of the domestic political process and international negotiations. It argues that—while external pressures brought to bear through the negotiations leading up to UNCED pushed the domestic agenda on global warming—the nature of the political process, in combination with the nature of the global warming issue itself, set the general limits for U.S. participation in cooperative international arrangements to manage global warming. That is, given the broad set of interests activated by global warming concerns and the ready access those interests had to decision-making bodies through a pluralist policy process, consensus on an approach to global warming proved impossible. The U.S., unwilling to accept international commitments that obligated it to domestic actions, thwarted efforts to get an international treaty containing firm targets and timetables.

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