Tax Shelter Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules — Comment on the paper by Daniel Shaviro

Author(s):  
Roman Seer
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 13-15
Author(s):  
Daniel Hawke

Purpose To explain a February 20, 2019 US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) settled enforcement action against Gladius Network LLC for failing to register an initial coin offering (ICO) under the federal securities laws, in which Gladius was able to avoid a civil penalty by self-reporting the violation and cooperating with the SEC enforcement staff. Design/methodology/approach Explains Gladius’ self-reporting, cooperation and remedial steps; why the SEC imposed no civil penalty on Gladius; and two similar cases the SEC instituted in July 2018 against companies that conducted unregistered ICOs, did not self-report, and were penalized. Provides analysis and conclusions. Findings The Gladius case offers important insight into how the SEC and its staff think about cooperation credit in resolving SEC enforcement actions and sends a clear message that self-reporting to the SEC can result in meaningful cooperation credit. In three recent cases, the Commission has made clear that once it put the industry on notice that ICOs could be securities that must be registered under the federal securities laws, a party risks enforcement action by failing to do so. Originality/value Expert analysis and guidance from an experienced securities lawyer who counsels clients on all manner of SEC enforcement, examination and regulatory policy matters.


1990 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-230
Author(s):  
Chris A. Wold
Keyword(s):  

2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (5) ◽  
pp. 1693-1720 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petro Lisowsky

ABSTRACT: Using confidential tax shelter and tax return data obtained from the Internal Revenue Service, this study develops and validates an expanded model for inferring the likelihood that a firm engages in a tax shelter. Results show that tax shelter likelihood is positively related to subsidiaries located in tax havens, foreign-source income, inconsistent book-tax treatment, litigation losses, use of promoters, profitability, and size, and negatively related to leverage. Supplemental tests show that total book-tax differences (BTDs) and the contingent tax liability reserve are significantly related to tax shelter usage, while discretionary permanent BTDs and long-run cash effective tax rates are not. Finally, the model is weaker, yet still significant, in the FIN 48 disclosure environment. This research provides investors and policymakers with an extended, validated measure to calculate the presence of extreme cases of corporate tax aggressiveness. Such information could also aid analysts and other tax and non-tax researchers in assessing the benefits and risks of firm behavior.


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