SEC credits self-reporting and cooperation in not imposing penalty on ICO sponsor

Purpose To explain a February 20, 2019 US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) settled enforcement action against Gladius Network LLC for failing to register an initial coin offering (ICO) under the federal securities laws, in which Gladius was able to avoid a civil penalty by self-reporting the violation and cooperating with the SEC enforcement staff. Design/methodology/approach Explains Gladius’ self-reporting, cooperation and remedial steps; why the SEC imposed no civil penalty on Gladius; and two similar cases the SEC instituted in July 2018 against companies that conducted unregistered ICOs, did not self-report, and were penalized. Provides analysis and conclusions. Findings The Gladius case offers important insight into how the SEC and its staff think about cooperation credit in resolving SEC enforcement actions and sends a clear message that self-reporting to the SEC can result in meaningful cooperation credit. In three recent cases, the Commission has made clear that once it put the industry on notice that ICOs could be securities that must be registered under the federal securities laws, a party risks enforcement action by failing to do so. Originality/value Expert analysis and guidance from an experienced securities lawyer who counsels clients on all manner of SEC enforcement, examination and regulatory policy matters.

AML compliance in the age of individual accountability

Purpose To analyze FinCEN’s settlement with Thomas Haider and examine regulatory agencies’ emphasis on individual accountability and the implications of this emphasis for anti-money laundering (AML) compliance personnel, and to provide practical guidance for personnel who have involvement with or oversight of corporate AML programs. Design/methodology/approach This article analyzes the Thomas Haider settlement and its importance for individuals involved in AML compliance functions. This analysis includes an examination of several recent corporate and individual enforcement actions to contextualize the Thomas Haider settlement and its usefulness in the prediction of trends in the financial regulatory space. Findings This article concludes that FinCEN’s May 2017 settlement with Thomas Haider, which resolved the first occurrence of FinCEN’s filing suit to enforce a civil penalty against an individual, illustrates the importance of effective AML programs and highlights the potential consequences for individuals who fail to ensure effective programs. The article also makes specific practical suggestions for AML compliance personnel, and finds that such personnel should be particularly conscientious in light of regulatory agencies’ focus on individual accountability in resolving corporate enforcement actions. Originality/value This article contains valuable information about recent regulatory enforcement activity and practical guidance for AML compliance personnel from experienced lawyers with specialties in financial services and white collar regulatory enforcement.

Realising the Public Potential of Corporate Law: Twenty Years of Civil Penalty Enforcement in Australia

Traditionally corporate law has been viewed as having characteristics that are commonly associated with private law. Largely this view developed as a result of the “law and economics” scholarship which dominated the corporate law debate, especially in the United States, in the last quarter of last Century. While the traditional “law and economics” approach supports the view that corporate law should be treated as a branch of private law, and that the state should have no role in its enforcement, other scholars, particularly those that adopt a progressive approach, argue that corporate law has, and should be recognised as having characteristics that are usually associated with public law. Arguably, an area of Australian corporate law that displays characteristics that are usually associated with public law is the statutory directors’ duties and the civil penalty regime that supports them. This enforcement regime gives the state through the corporate regulator, standing to take court based proceedings to enforce what are in effect, contracts that established corporate governance structures. This article seeks to determine the appropriate role of a public regulator in these circumstances. The questions considered are: whose interests should the public regulator represent when it is tasked with the responsibility of enforcing the statutory directors’ duties that largely codify fiduciary and common law duties? Given that the duties are owed by directors to their company should the primary role of the public regulator be to represent the interests of the company, and its shareholders, who have suffered a loss as a result of the alleged contravention of the directors’ duties or should the primary role of the public regulator be to act in the interests of the members of the larger community? In these situations what are the interests of the larger community? Drawing on regulatory theory the argument advanced in this paper is that despite the fact that the statutory directors’ duties codify what are in effect private rights between directors and their companies, the primary role of a public regulator is not to utilise the enforcement mechanisms at its disposal in order to obtain compensation for companies who have suffered a loss. Rather, the regulator's primary role is to act in the interests of the larger community by utilising the enforcement mechanisms at its disposal strategically in order to encourage greater compliance.

Stepping Stones — from Corporate Fault to Directors' Personal Civil Liability

Several recent cases have seen the courts approving ASIC's employment of a ‘stepping stone’ approach that applies directors‘ statutory duty of care as well as their other statutory duties in a novel context. The first ‘stepping stone‘ involves an action against a company for contravention of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The establishment of corporate fault may then step stone to a finding that by exposing their company to the risk of criminal prosecution, civil liability or significant reputational damage, directors contravened one or more of their statutory duties in ss 180-2 of the Corporations Act, particularly their statutory duty of care, with the attendant civil penalty consequences. The effect of the ‘stepping stone’ approach is that directors may face a type of derivative civil liability for corporate fault. In this paper we analyse the stepping stone approach and assess the justification for imposing civil liability on directors for their company's misbehaviour. This paper also examines whether an extension of the stepping stone approach could make directors liable for their company's contraventions of non-Corporations Act laws as well as open the floodgates to make directors personally liable to shareholders, creditors, employees, or others affected by corporate fault.