Rentiers of the low-carbon economy? Renewable energy's extractive fiscal geographies

Progressive movements today call for transformative state-led investment in renewable energy and other climate infrastructures—in the United States, a vision that confronts inherited legacies of austerity. I argue that a significant obstacle is the neoliberal toolkit through which the US federal government subsidizes renewables, an indirect, highly opaque system of tax credits and incentives. For forty years, tax subsidies have ‘paid’ private financial players to invest in renewables, via allowing them to claim legal tax shelters against their other income. In this political economic analysis, I question, first, how US renewable energy acquired this peculiar form of public finance ‘through the tax code’, unique in the global industry. Second, I explore how the model has shaped US renewables financing, development, and ownership. I center two decisive moments: the California ‘wind rush’ in the 1980s, and the ongoing renewables boom of the last fifteen years. This history articulates financial experiments and tax sheltering scandals of the Reagan Administration with exploitation returned today in more organized (and lucrative) form, as ‘tax equity’ finance. Via tax equity, a handful of major US banks dominate financing for renewables and other politically embattled public goods. They exert a troubling ability to extract rents for their capital, gatekeep what projects get built and by whom, and stall US renewables development altogether. Today, the practice is increasingly strained by these and other problems—growing public costs, private capacity ceilings, and amplification of sectoral crises. Under Biden, it faces probable reform, but may need more comprehensive reimagination.

U.S. Tax Progressivity and Redistribution

U.S. federal taxes have become more progressive since 1979, largely due to more generous tax credits for lower income individuals. Though top statutory rates fell substantially, this affected few taxpayers and was offset by decreased use of tax shelters, such that high-income average tax rates have been relatively stable. Redistribution, which accounts for both taxes and transfers, has also increased according to Congressional Budget Office data. Measures of progressivity and redistribution, however, capture different aspects of policy. Over the longer run, earlier decreases suggest a U-shaped tax progressivity curve since WWII, with the minimum occurring in 1986.

SUPPLY-DEMAND SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO PANDEMIC ISSUES (EXAMPLE OF GEORGIA)

In this article, it is discussed the main threats and consequences of the cause of the modern economic crisis - the coronavirus pandemic - that have affected the macroeconomic situation in different countries and regions of the world. The focus is on the radical international economic changes that have caused supply and demand shocks, which have conditioned the structural nature of the crisis. The negative consequences of the pandemic in different sectors of the world are analyzed and general tendencies related to foreign trade, protectionism, employment, fiscal, monetary and other policies are listed. It describes the anti-crisis economic plan developed by the Georgian government and provides examples related to corporate tax shelters. Finally, the conclusion stresses that the priority of the post-crisis economic plan should be to position the country well after the end of the pandemic, as well as to overcome macroeconomic problems such as current account deficits, public debt, unemployment and poverty, rapid economic growth, competitiveness and etc.

Corporate tax aggression and debt in Iran

Purpose This study aims to investigate the impact tax shelters and cost of debt in Iran. It also aims determine methods to identify tax-aggressive policies through corporate structure and corporate policies, as well as various solutions to handle these issues. Design/methodology/approach For this purpose, the data of 155 listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) during the years of 2008-2015 will be considered. The number of observations includes 1,085 companies. Data was analyzed using logistic panel regression with R software. Findings The results of the hypotheses show that financial leverage use is not inversely related to companies’ tax-aggressive policies. There is no direct relationship between sales and financial leverage. Overall, there is no inverse relationship between tax shelters and total debt. Originality/value The results extend the empirical findings of Graham and Tucker and Wilson. The authors also investigated the relationship between tax shelters and financing (total debt). These findings are crucial to the state; although several studies with similar subjects have been conducted in different countries, the current study is the first of its type in Iran.

Instilling Subpart F with Horizontal Equity as Applicable to Individual U.S. Shareholders

ABSTRACT Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code is a body of anti-abuse provisions designed to prevent U.S. shareholders from avoiding tax on the earnings (Subpart F income) generated by foreign corporations they control. Overall, its provisions lack the tax principle of horizontal equity based on tax neutrality. This article will expose the lack of horizontal equity, as applied to individual (not corporate) U.S. shareholders, by being both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive in imposing punitive tax consequences when tax avoidance is unachievable, including the taxation of GILTI, a new type of Subpart F income. It is under-inclusive because tax avoidance is achievable by taking advantage of certain loopholes in Subpart F. Using IRC §469 (that successfully eliminated tax shelters) as a model, this article recommends revisions to relevant Subpart F provisions that will eliminate tax avoidance without punitive tax consequences and also foreclose potential tax avoidance opportunities.

Social networks and tax avoidance: evidence from a well-defined Norwegian tax shelter

In 2005, over 8% of Norwegian shareholders transferred their shares to new (legal) tax shelters intended to defer taxation of capital gains and dividends that would otherwise be taxable in the aftermath of a reform implemented in 2006. Using detailed administrative data, we identify family networks and describe how take-up of tax avoidance progresses within a network. A feature of the reform was that the eligibility to set up a tax shelter changed discontinuously with individual shareholding of a firm and we use this fact to estimate the causal effect of availability of tax avoidance for a taxpayer on tax avoidance by others in the network. We find that eligibility in a social network increases the likelihood that others will take-up. This suggests that taxpayers affect each other’s decisions about tax avoidance, highlighting the importance of accounting for social interactions in understanding enforcement and tax avoidance behavior, and providing a concrete example of optimization frictions in the context of behavioral responses to taxation.