scholarly journals Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk

2008 ◽  
pp. 215-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. Hammond
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Form Invariance ◽  
First Mover Advantage ◽  
First Mover

scholarly journals Intra-Labour Strategic Commitment

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Matthew Nolan
Keyword(s):  
Adjustment Costs ◽  
Department Store ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Strategic Investment ◽  
Skilled Labour ◽  
Strategic Commitment ◽  
First Mover Advantage ◽  
The Cost ◽  
First Mover

<p>This thesis explores a strategic investment motive for the choice of skilled labour (management). Using the case study of department store competition, we argue that management is an observable and irreversible input. This allows firms to use it to obtain a first-mover advantage in oligopolistic interactions. We find that, given complementarities of labour inputs, firms will hire excess management relative to the cost-minimising input bundle. This idea is first illustrated with a simple two-stage example. We then show that over-management also holds in a more realistic setting with  infinitely-lived firms facing finite adjustment costs.</p>

scholarly journals Intra-Labour Strategic Commitment

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Matthew Nolan
Keyword(s):  
Adjustment Costs ◽  
Department Store ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Strategic Investment ◽  
Skilled Labour ◽  
Strategic Commitment ◽  
First Mover Advantage ◽  
The Cost ◽  
First Mover

<p>This thesis explores a strategic investment motive for the choice of skilled labour (management). Using the case study of department store competition, we argue that management is an observable and irreversible input. This allows firms to use it to obtain a first-mover advantage in oligopolistic interactions. We find that, given complementarities of labour inputs, firms will hire excess management relative to the cost-minimising input bundle. This idea is first illustrated with a simple two-stage example. We then show that over-management also holds in a more realistic setting with  infinitely-lived firms facing finite adjustment costs.</p>

scholarly journals Control without Confirmation: The Politics of Vacancies in Presidential Appointments

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
CHRISTINA M. KINANE
Keyword(s):  
Policy Making ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Political Control ◽  
Presidential Appointments ◽  
Capacity To Act ◽  
First Mover Advantage ◽  
First Mover ◽  
Legislative Approval

Scholarship on separation of powers assumes executives are constrained by legislative approval when placing agents in top policy-making positions. But presidents frequently fill vacancies in agency leadership with unconfirmed, temporary officials or leave them empty entirely. I develop a novel dataset of vacancies across 15 executive departments from 1977 to 2016 and reevaluate the conventional perspective that appointment power operates only through formal channels. I argue that presidents’ nomination strategies include leaving positions empty and making interim appointments, and this choice reflects presidents’ priorities and the character of vacant positions. The evidence indicates that interim appointees are more likely when positions have a substantial capacity to act on presidential expansion priorities and suggest that presidents can capitalize on their first-mover advantage to evade Senate confirmation. The results further suggest that separation of powers models may need to consider how deliberate inaction and sidestepping of formal powers influence political control and policy-making strategies.

Strategic Complements with First Mover Advantage

1998 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 284-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reiko Aoki
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Complements ◽  
First Mover Advantage ◽  
First Mover

Boeing and Airbus: Competitive Strategy in the Very-Large-Aircraft Market

2017 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Nabil Al-Najjar ◽  
Ichiro Aoyagi ◽  
Guy Goldstein ◽  
Ted Korupp ◽  
Bin Liu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Competitive Strategy ◽  
Natural Monopoly ◽  
Development Cost ◽  
Strategic Issues ◽  
First Mover Advantage ◽  
Strategic Issue ◽  
Winner Takes All ◽  
First Mover ◽  
Large Aircraft

Boeing and Airbus are contemplating entry into very-large-aircraft (VLA) markets. Both firms are convinced the market cannot support two players due to the extremely high R&D costs and the limited (and highly uncertain) state of demand. The key strategic issue is the uncertainty surrounding Boeing's development cost: to what extent would Boeing's experience with the 747 help it reduce the R&D cost of a new VLA prototype? The main point is that Boeing's strategic moves signal its private information, and that this eliminates any first-mover advantage Boeing might have had in this market.To introduce some of the strategic issues arising in natural monopoly industries in which the winner takes all, and focus on the issues of credible preemption and signaling.

scholarly journals Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (5) ◽  
pp. 2548-2564 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jose Apesteguia ◽  
Ignacio Palacios-Huerta
Keyword(s):  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Psychological Effects ◽  
Control Groups ◽  
Sequential Order ◽  
Socioeconomic Outcomes ◽  
Competitive Environments ◽  
First Mover Advantage ◽  
Psychological Pressure ◽  
And Control ◽  
First Mover

Emotions can have important effects on performance and socioeconomic outcomes. We study a natural experiment where two teams of professionals compete in a tournament taking turns in a sequence. As the sequential order is determined by the random outcome of a coin flip, the treatment and control groups are determined via explicit randomization. Hence, absent any psychological effects, both teams should have the same probability of winning. Yet, we find a systematic first-mover advantage. Further, professionals are self-aware of their own psychological effects and, when given the chance, they rationally react by systematically taking advantage of these effects. (JEL C93, D03, D82, L83)

scholarly journals First-mover Advantage and the Private Value of Public Science

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashish Arora ◽  
Sharon Belenzon ◽  
Bernardo Dionisi
Keyword(s):  
Public Science ◽  
First Mover Advantage ◽  
Private Value ◽  
First Mover

Taking the Lead: Bank Recovery and Resolution Rules

2020 ◽  
pp. 71-90
Author(s):  
Scott James ◽  
Lucia Quaglia
Keyword(s):  
Significant Influence ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Bank Failures ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Response Regulators ◽  
Financial Industry ◽  
First Mover Advantage ◽  
The Us ◽  
Alliance Building ◽  
First Mover

As in the case of bank capital, elected officials were quick to respond to voter concerns by substantially expanding regulators’ powers over bank recovery and resolution. In response, regulators developed stringent new rules on loss-absorbing capacity (LAC) and ‘living wills’ for banks. However, the financial industry on the whole did not seek to resist the changes. Nonetheless, UK regulators sought to act as pace-setters in this area at the international and EU levels to manage the cross-border externalities generated by bank failures. They were therefore able to exert significant influence in the formulation of new international standards on resolution and LAC, and over the EU’s new Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. This was achieved by leveraging their substantial regulatory expertise, alliance-building (with the US), and ‘first-mover advantage’.

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