Ecogenetic Analysis and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Harvested Populations

1993 ◽  
pp. 187-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne M. Getz ◽  
Veijo Kaitala
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Stable Strategies

Evolutionary Stable Strategies for Supply Chains: Selfishness, Fairness, and Altruism

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (6) ◽  
pp. 532-551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caichun Chai ◽  
Hailong Zhu ◽  
Zhangwei Feng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chains ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Management Strategies ◽  
Individual Preference ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategies ◽  
Pure Strategies ◽  
The Stability

Abstract The management strategies of a firm are inevitable affected by individual behavior preferences. The effect of individual preference on the evolutionary dynamics for supply chains is studied by employing replicator dynamics. Each firm has three behavior preferences: selfishness, fairness, and altruism. Firstly, the case that the strategy set of manufacturers and retailers including two pure strategies is considered and the effect of preference parameter on the equilibrium outcome in the short-term interaction is discussed. Secondly, the equilibrium state in the short-term is always disturbed because the change of the environment, firm’s structure, and so forth. Using the replicator dynamics, the evolutionary stable strategies of manufacturers and retailers in the long-term interaction are analyzed. Finally, the extend case that the strategy set of manufacturers and retailers include three pure strategies is investigated. These results are found that the strategy profile in which both manufacturer and retailer choose fairness or altruism, or one player chooses fair or altruistic strategy and the other player chooses selfish strategy may be evolutionary stable, the stability of these equilibria depends on the the preference parameters.

Fairness, Commitment, and Inequality

2008 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
István Back
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Ecological Model ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Successful Strategy ◽  
Cooperative Relationships ◽  
Competitive Environments ◽  
Interaction Partners ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategies

Conditional cooperation is a prominent explanation of reciprocal cooperation in repeated exchange. However, empirical evidence for commitment behavior indicates that people tend to build long-term cooperative relationships characterized by largely unconditional cooperation. Using an agent-based ecological model, earlier work showed that in competitive environments commitment can be a more successful strategy than fair reciprocity. We move further in two respects. First, we add the possibility of randomly mutating strategies under evolutionary pressures. Our results show the lack of evolutionary stable strategies but we also find that commitment strategies still outperform fairness strategies on average. Our second extension introduces inequality in individual capabilities. We find that inequality shifts the balance from commitment towards fairness strategies. Our explanation is that under inequality, strategies benefit from changing interaction partners from time to time because this gives more agents access to strong partners.

scholarly journals Multi-Player Evolutionary Game of Network Attack and Defense Based on System Dynamics

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (23) ◽  
pp. 3014
Author(s):  
Pengxi Yang ◽  
Fei Gao ◽  
Hua Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Network Attack ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategies ◽  
Player Game ◽  
Attack And Defense ◽  
Mathematical Derivation

We formalize the adversarial process between defender and attackers as a game and study the non-cooperative evolutionary game mechanism under bounded rationality. We analyze the long-term dynamic process between the attacking and defending parties using the evolutionary stable strategies derived from the evolutionary game model. First, we construct a multi-player evolutionary game model consisting of a defender and multiple attackers, formally describe the strategies, and construct a three-player game payoff matrix. Then, we propose two punishment schemes, i.e., static and dynamic ones. Moreover, through the combination of mathematical derivation with simulation, we obtain the evolutionary stable strategies of each player. Different from previous work, in this paper, we consider the influence of strategies among different attackers. The simulation shows that (1) in the static punishment scheme, increasing the penalty can quickly control the occurrence of network attacks in the short term; (2) in the dynamic punishment scheme, the game can be stabilized effectively, and the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the change of the initial values.

scholarly journals The Impact of Penalty and Subsidy Mechanisms On The Decisions of Governments, Businesses, and Consumers During COVID-19 ——Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuxun Zhou ◽  
Rahman Mohammad Mafizur ◽  
Khanam Rasheda ◽  
Brad R. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Virus Disease ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Initial Point ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Corona Virus ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategies ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Purpose – Based on the fact that punishment and subsidy mechanisms affect the anti-epidemic incentives of major participants in a society, the issue of this paper is how the penalty and subsidy mechanisms affect the decisions of governments, businesses, and consumers during Corona Virus Disease 2019. The goal of this paper is to understand strategic selections from governments, enterprises, and consumers to maximize their respective utility during Corona Virus Disease 2019, and the impact of penalty and subsidy mechanism on the decisions of governments, businesses, and consumers.Design/Methodology/approach - This paper proposes a tripartite evolutionary game theory, involving governments, businesses, and consumers, to firstly analyze the evolutionary stable strategies and to secondly analyze the impact of penalty and subsidy mechanism on their strategy selection during Corona Virus Disease 2019. Thirdly, this paper uses numerical analysis to simulate the strategy formation process of governments, enterprises, and consumers in Japan and India based on their different penalty and subsidy mechanism.Findings – This paper suggests that there are four evolutionarily stable strategies corresponding to the actual anti-epidemic situations of different countries in reality. We find that different subsidy and penalty mechanisms lead to different evolutionary stable strategies. If governments, enterprises, and consumers fighting the pandemic together, the government need to set a low subsidy mechanism and a high penalty mechanism.Originality/value - There are some limitations in the literature, such as long term strategies, rational hypothesis, and convergence path analysis in higher dimensional evolutionary game theory. This paper fills the gap and extends the theory of COVID-19 management theory. Firstly, this paper has important practical significance. This paper finds out the long-term equilibrium strategies of governments, businesses, and consumers under Corona Virus Disease 2019, which can provide an important theoretical and decision-making basis for pandemic prevention and control. Secondly, our paper extends the analytical paradigm of the tripartite evolutionary game theory. We extend the analysis of the dynamic process from the initial point to the convergence point and make a theoretical contribution to the development of high-dimensional evolutionary game theory.

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