Current threats to the rule of law in the EU: The foundation on which the authority of EU law rests

2019 ◽  
pp. 301-308
Author(s):  
Pauliine Koskelo
Keyword(s):  
Eu Law ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Fanou

In its recent Opinion 1/17, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) examined the compatibility of an external judicial body, the Investment Court System (ICS) under the EU–Canada Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), with EU law. At a time when judicial independence has arisen as one of the main challenges for the rule of law in the EU, this article discusses the Court’s findings in relation to the compatibility of the ICS with the right of access to an independent and impartial tribunal.


Author(s):  
Wojciech Sadowski

AbstractInvestment treaty law and EU law began to develop in the same era and share some important philosophical and axiological foundations. The pressure on the CEE countries to enter into numerous bilateral investment treaties in late 80s and early 90s, in the context of the EU accession aspirations of the former communist countries, was likely to result, eventually, in a conflict between EU law and investment treaty law. The conflict could have been managed in three different ways, yet the CJEU decided in Achmea to declare an undefined volume of intra-EU arbitrations to be incompatible with EU law. This important judgment, which delivered an outcome desired by the European Commission and a number of Member States, is based on questionable legal reasoning that creates high uncertainty in this area of law. The doubts include the scope of application of Achmea, which is now a highly debatable issue. The CJEU itself saw it necessary to limit the scope of Achmea by declaring in Opinion 1/17 (CETA) that the legal reasoning of Achmea did not apply to investment protection treaties with third countries. The Member States of the EU remain politically divided in their views as to whether Achmea applies to the Energy Charter Treaty. And while the problems with the rule of law and independence of the judiciary in certain Member States continue to grow, Achmea has left an important gap for which there is no substitute in the current architecture of the EU legal system.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivana Damjanovic ◽  
Nicolas de Sadeleer

In Opinion 1/17 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that the new Investment Court System (ICS) in the Canada–EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) is compatible with the EU constitutional framework. This article examines the CJEU’s analysis of the ICS in its Opinion through the prism of EU values and objectives. Given the judicial nature of the ICS, the article unfolds around the concept of the rule of law. The scope and the content of this core EU value are considered under both EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In particular, the ICS is analysed in light of the two core rule-of-law requirements: equal treatment and the independence of courts, enshrined in Articles 20 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). Importantly, in Opinion 1/17 the CJEU for the first time applied Article 47 CFR to a court outside the EU judicial system. While the CJEU ruled that the ICS complies with the CFR rule-of-law criteria, this article argues that it nevertheless falls short of the rule-of-law standards required for judicial bodies under EU law. The article demonstrates that the CJEU prioritises free and fair trade as the CETA’s core objective, rather than the rule of law, and endorses the ICS as the conditio sine qua non of guaranteeing such trade. The Court’s findings have wider consequences for the rule of law in international law as the EU continues to pursue the establishment of a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC).


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-106
Author(s):  
Davor Petrić

This contribution reflects on the EU law side of the story of Slovenia and Croatia’s border dispute. It discusses some of the key parts of the Advocate General’s opinion and the Court of Justice’s judgment in this case, including the issue of the scope of EU law, the status of international law in EU law, the interpretation of international law for the purposes of EU law adjudication, and the rule of law dimensions of the border dispute between the two neighbouring Member States. It also offers some general remarks on the nature of legal scholarship that can be read as a response to some of the academic commentary of this case.


Author(s):  
Matthias Schmidt ◽  
Piotr Bogdanowicz

AbstractThis chapter builds on an assessment of infringement proceedings in the EU rule of law crisis that we previously published in the Common Market Law Review. We offer a close reading of two recent prominent infringement cases by the European Commission against Poland (cases C-619/18 and C-192/18). Noteworthy advancements in EU law made with them are in particular a clarification on the parallel use of Articles 7 TEU and 258 TFEU, the use of both interim relief and an expedited procedure prior to the judgment, and, as regards the merits, further substance for the functioning of Articles 19 TEU and 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights regarding the operationalisation of the rule of law in EU law. We offer a critical assessment of the Court’s findings and contextualise in light of two Commission communications on the rule of law published in 2019.


Author(s):  
Zoltán Szente

This chapter investigates Hungary’s non-compliance problems and the insights these can provide into the relations between the EU and Hungary. Since 2010 there has been a new period in these relations—the Hungarian constitutional changes have challenged the EU, testing its capacity and ability to protect the Rule of Law in the Member States. This situation stands in contrast to Hungary’s legal harmonization and institutional adaptation to EU requirements prior to 2010. Now, when the challenge from the inside—that is, from a Member State—to the democratic value system of the community is significantly greater than ever, the EU faces an unexpected obstacle. To work out an effective and long-term solution to a situation which has never occurred before, the chapter examines the problem in greater detail—in particular whether it threatens the foundations of EU law as a whole.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim Lane Scheppele ◽  
Dimitry Vladimirovich Kochenov ◽  
Barbara Grabowska-Moroz

Abstract Although compliance with the founding values is presumed in its law, the Union is now confronted with persistent disregard of these values in two Member States. If it ceases to be a union of Rule-of-Law-abiding democracies, the European Union (EU) is unthinkable. Purely political mechanisms to safeguard the Rule of Law, such as those in Article 7 Treaty of European Union (TEU), do not work. Worse still, their existence has disguised the fact that the violations of the values of Article 2 TEU are also violations of EU law. The legal mechanisms tried thus far, however, do not work either. The fundamental jurisprudence on judicial independence and irremovability under Article 19(1) TEU is a good start, but it has been unable to change the situation on the ground. Despite ten years of EU attempts at reining in Rule of Law violations and even as backsliding Member States have lost cases at the Court of Justice, illiberal regimes inside the EU have become more consolidated: the EU has been losing through winning. More creative work is needed to find ways to enforce the values of Article 2 TEU more effectively. Taking this insight, we propose to turn the EU into a militant democracy, able to defend its basic principles, by using the traditional tools for the enforcement of EU law in a novel manner. We demonstrate how the familiar infringement actions—both under Article 258 and 259 TFEU—can be adapted as instruments for enforcing EU values by bundling a set of specific violations into a single general infringement action to show how a pattern of unlawful activity rises to the level of being a systemic violation. A systemic violation, because of its general and pervasive nature, in itself threatens basic values above and beyond violations of individual provisions of the acquis. Certified by the Court of Justice, a systemic violation of EU law should call for systemic compliance that would require the Member State to undo the effects of its attacks on the values of Article 2. The use of Article 260 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) to deduct fines from EU funds due to be received by the troubled Member State would provide additional incentives for systemic compliance. We illustrate this proposed militant democratic structure by explaining and critiquing what the Commission and Court together have done to reign in the governments of Hungary and Poland so far and then showing how they can do better.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 439-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Śledzińska-Simon ◽  
Petra Bárd

Abstract The article proves a long-lasting legacy of Martin Krygier’s work on the rule of law. Taking the European Union as a case study, and specifically—the recent infringement action concerning the judicial independence in Poland, the article addresses the point (teleos) of the rule of law, the conditions the institutions need to fulfill to make this point, and institutional measures that help to meet these conditions in the EU as a whole and its Member States. It argues that the rule of law can be achieved via various paths, but there is general agreement on when its basic elements such as the guarantees against arbitrary removal of judges are missing. Therefore, it concludes, the EU does not need to determine the anatomy of national institutions, but it needs to remain vigilant against such modifications that put at risk the effectiveness of EU law, and the judicial protection of individual rights in particular.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Schmidt

This book offers, in five parts, an analysis of the so-called rule of law crisis in the EU. The first part focuses on the concepts that help to understand the rule of law crisis, in particular that of “systemic deficiencies in the rule of law”. In order to shine light on the complex concept of “rule of law” included in Art. 2 TEU, the author focusses on the operationalisation of the rule of law in recent CJEU jurisprudence. The second part of the book is devoted to developments in certain Member States that make up the rule of law crisis. Special attention is paid to Poland and Hungary. The third part deals with the main thesis of the book: why it is useful to conceive of the measures taken in response to the rule of law crisis as "constitutional supervision” in EU law. The merits and roots of this concept are discussed in detail. On this basis, the fourth part presents the core of the analysis: the different mechanisms of EU constitutional supervision. After introducing its different actors, the work focuses on the activities of the European Commission. The final part concludes with an outlook.


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (6) ◽  
pp. 774-791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juha Raitio

What does the concept of rule of law mean? Does it contain any material elements? Despite the difficulties, it is worth trying to define the rule of law, but in a certain context. Now this context relates to the Nordic (mainly Finnish), German and British conceptions of the rule of law as well as to the rule of law in the European Union. The rule of law is a relatively contradictory concept from a theoretical perspective. For example, one may disagree whether the concept of democracy is a prerequisite for the rule of law. Another difficult question seems to be whether the concept of the rule of law contains a substantive element. The third issue to disagree relates to the question whether and to what extent one should take into account the contemporary European and international interpretations of the concept. In this article the emphasis is on the EU law perspective in a sense that the rule of law is connected to respect for democracy and the protection of human rights just like it has been presented in the Article 2 TEU.


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