scholarly journals Does the concept of rule of law have any material content? A Nordic point of view

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (6) ◽  
pp. 774-791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juha Raitio

What does the concept of rule of law mean? Does it contain any material elements? Despite the difficulties, it is worth trying to define the rule of law, but in a certain context. Now this context relates to the Nordic (mainly Finnish), German and British conceptions of the rule of law as well as to the rule of law in the European Union. The rule of law is a relatively contradictory concept from a theoretical perspective. For example, one may disagree whether the concept of democracy is a prerequisite for the rule of law. Another difficult question seems to be whether the concept of the rule of law contains a substantive element. The third issue to disagree relates to the question whether and to what extent one should take into account the contemporary European and international interpretations of the concept. In this article the emphasis is on the EU law perspective in a sense that the rule of law is connected to respect for democracy and the protection of human rights just like it has been presented in the Article 2 TEU.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim Lane Scheppele ◽  
Dimitry Vladimirovich Kochenov ◽  
Barbara Grabowska-Moroz

Abstract Although compliance with the founding values is presumed in its law, the Union is now confronted with persistent disregard of these values in two Member States. If it ceases to be a union of Rule-of-Law-abiding democracies, the European Union (EU) is unthinkable. Purely political mechanisms to safeguard the Rule of Law, such as those in Article 7 Treaty of European Union (TEU), do not work. Worse still, their existence has disguised the fact that the violations of the values of Article 2 TEU are also violations of EU law. The legal mechanisms tried thus far, however, do not work either. The fundamental jurisprudence on judicial independence and irremovability under Article 19(1) TEU is a good start, but it has been unable to change the situation on the ground. Despite ten years of EU attempts at reining in Rule of Law violations and even as backsliding Member States have lost cases at the Court of Justice, illiberal regimes inside the EU have become more consolidated: the EU has been losing through winning. More creative work is needed to find ways to enforce the values of Article 2 TEU more effectively. Taking this insight, we propose to turn the EU into a militant democracy, able to defend its basic principles, by using the traditional tools for the enforcement of EU law in a novel manner. We demonstrate how the familiar infringement actions—both under Article 258 and 259 TFEU—can be adapted as instruments for enforcing EU values by bundling a set of specific violations into a single general infringement action to show how a pattern of unlawful activity rises to the level of being a systemic violation. A systemic violation, because of its general and pervasive nature, in itself threatens basic values above and beyond violations of individual provisions of the acquis. Certified by the Court of Justice, a systemic violation of EU law should call for systemic compliance that would require the Member State to undo the effects of its attacks on the values of Article 2. The use of Article 260 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) to deduct fines from EU funds due to be received by the troubled Member State would provide additional incentives for systemic compliance. We illustrate this proposed militant democratic structure by explaining and critiquing what the Commission and Court together have done to reign in the governments of Hungary and Poland so far and then showing how they can do better.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 439-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Śledzińska-Simon ◽  
Petra Bárd

Abstract The article proves a long-lasting legacy of Martin Krygier’s work on the rule of law. Taking the European Union as a case study, and specifically—the recent infringement action concerning the judicial independence in Poland, the article addresses the point (teleos) of the rule of law, the conditions the institutions need to fulfill to make this point, and institutional measures that help to meet these conditions in the EU as a whole and its Member States. It argues that the rule of law can be achieved via various paths, but there is general agreement on when its basic elements such as the guarantees against arbitrary removal of judges are missing. Therefore, it concludes, the EU does not need to determine the anatomy of national institutions, but it needs to remain vigilant against such modifications that put at risk the effectiveness of EU law, and the judicial protection of individual rights in particular.


Author(s):  
Artur Nowak-Far

AbstractAt present, the European rule of law enforcement framework under Article 7 TEU (RLF) is vulnerable to unguaranteed, discretionary influences of the Member States. This vulnerability arises from its procedural format which requires high thresholds in decision-making with the effect that this procedure is prone to be terminated by the EU Member States likely to be scrutinized under it, if only they collude. Yet, the Framework may prove effective to correct serious breaches against human rights (in the context of ineffective rule of law standards). The European Commission is bound to pursue the RLF effectiveness for the sake of achieving relative uniformity of application of EU law (at large), and making the European Union a credible actor and co-creator of international legal order. The RLF is an important tool for the maintenance of relative stability of human rights and the rule of law in the EU despite natural divergence propensity resulting from the procedural autonomy of the EU Member States. By achieving this stability, the EU achieves significant political weight in international dialogue concerning human rights and the rule of law and preserves a high level of its global credibility in this context. Thus, RLF increases the EU’s effectiveness in promoting the European model of their identification and enforcement.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivana Damjanovic ◽  
Nicolas de Sadeleer

In Opinion 1/17 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that the new Investment Court System (ICS) in the Canada–EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) is compatible with the EU constitutional framework. This article examines the CJEU’s analysis of the ICS in its Opinion through the prism of EU values and objectives. Given the judicial nature of the ICS, the article unfolds around the concept of the rule of law. The scope and the content of this core EU value are considered under both EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In particular, the ICS is analysed in light of the two core rule-of-law requirements: equal treatment and the independence of courts, enshrined in Articles 20 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). Importantly, in Opinion 1/17 the CJEU for the first time applied Article 47 CFR to a court outside the EU judicial system. While the CJEU ruled that the ICS complies with the CFR rule-of-law criteria, this article argues that it nevertheless falls short of the rule-of-law standards required for judicial bodies under EU law. The article demonstrates that the CJEU prioritises free and fair trade as the CETA’s core objective, rather than the rule of law, and endorses the ICS as the conditio sine qua non of guaranteeing such trade. The Court’s findings have wider consequences for the rule of law in international law as the EU continues to pursue the establishment of a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC).


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (10) ◽  
pp. 1959-1979 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Dawson ◽  
Elise Muir

According to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, the European Union is a political and economic union founded on a respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law, referred to hereafter as EU fundamental values. The central place of this commitment in the EU Treaties suggests a founding assumption: That the EU is a Union of states who themselves see human rights and the rule of law as irrevocable parts of their political and legal order. Reminiscent of the entry of Jorg Haider's far-right Freedom Party into the Austrian government in 2000, the events of 2012 have done much to shake that assumption; questioning both how interwoven the rule of law tradition is across the present-day EU, and the role the EU ought to play in policing potential violations of fundamental rights carried out via the constitutional frameworks of its Member States. Much attention in this field, much like the focus of this paper, has been placed on events in one state in particular: Hungary.


2020 ◽  
pp. 108-143
Author(s):  
Pavlos Eleftheriadis

This chapter examines the question of the relations between EU law and domestic law from the point of view of a political theory of the European Union. It is common to see EU law under ‘federalism’ or under a theory of ‘statism’. These two views are outlined at the start of this chapter by examining various arguments made for them. They are both rejected. The chapter defends a rival view, the ‘internationalist’ reading of the EU, according to which it is a branch of the law of nations. A careful look at the EU treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU shows that the EU endorses an internationalist model based on equality and reciprocity. The EU does not replace the relation between citizens and political power. It does not establish a new constitutional law that replaces the national ones. It is a new way of organizing the relations between the various member states whose equality it fully respects. The coherence of European Union law is therefore not provided by uniformity imposed by a single master or constitutional rule, but is given by the political coordination of the laws of the member states achieved under the treaties. Coherence is achieved because the member states have adopted similar, although not identical, constitutional principles.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-171
Author(s):  
Adnan Mahmutovic ◽  
Helza Nova Lita

This paper discusses the distinctiveness of the European Union with focus on the Rule of Law and its importance for the EU integration process. Rule of Law is a notion that is very frequently used, but at the same time quite controversial as it is not so easy always to reach generally accepted meaning. Therefore, this paper provides a analysis of the EU Rule of Law  as multidimensional legal principle gravitating between values and principles. The paper acknowledges that a concept of the EU rule of law can be the subject of diverse interpretations and implementation. High-ranking government officials of a two EU member states, Poland and Hungary, have argued recently that a concept of the EU rule of law lacks well-defined rules and remains the subject of much debate. Therefore, the paper provides for better understanding of the concept itself within the specific supranational legal environment. Also, the paper argues that the future of the EU and its integrations depends largely on the respect of the rule of law that remains to be a core and the element of unity within Europe’s legal space. The relationship between the principles and values upon which the EU is founded remain close and interrelated. The EU Rule of law with all its distinctiveness can be concluded with certainty that it reflects a specific character and nature of the EU legal system.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-96
Author(s):  
Frederik Naert

Abstract This contribution addresses some particular aspects of fisheries and some specificities of the European Union (EU) in this field. The first section explains how institutional settings in the framework of which all states concerned can discuss mutual rights and obligations, including the ‘due regard’ obligation in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), have been established in the field of fisheries. The second section presents two examples of situations in which the ‘due regard’ obligation has given rise to discussion: the negotiations on an Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean and discussions on Marine Protected Areas and other similar areas. In the third section, a few issues that are particular to the EU are identified, including the competences transferred to the EU and their external exercise by the EU and the impact of EU law on relations between Member States in their respective EEZs.


Author(s):  
Charlotte Reyns

Admissibility of questions for preliminary ruling – Independence of courts and tribunals in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union as Dorsch Consult criterion under Article 267 TFEU – Independence of courts and tribunals in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union as element of the Rule of Law value under Article 19 TEU – Structural inadmissibility of questions for preliminary ruling as perverse consequence of the attempts to safeguard independence of the EU judiciary


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Franziska-Marie Laura Hilpert

Suggested citation:  Franziska-Marie Laura Hilpert, 'An Old Procedure with new Solutions for the Rule of Law Crisis' (2019) 2(2) NJEL 1. While commentators for the past years, have highlighted that there is no effective enforcement mechanism after accession for the values of the European Union which are enshrined in Article 2 TEU, the Juncker Commission has announced in 2017 that it will be ‘bigger and more ambitious on big things, and smaller and more modest on small things’ thus applying a more strategic approach to enforcement in terms of handling infringements. This Article thus analyses two cases brought by the Juncker Commission after 2017 and on their bases seeks to show that the infringement procedure, when applied strategically, is and remains an effective enforcement mechanism even for the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU in the ‘rule of law crisis’. Thus, by way of analysis of the case C-619/18 Commission v Poland and its comparison with similar cases which have not been as effective, it is shown how the infringement procedure can prevent the enforcement of the most controversial provisions regarding the judiciary in Hungary and Poland and ensure the separation of powers, which is essential for the rule of law. Moreover, by comparison of the Commission’s request and the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in C-235/17 Commission v Hungary it is shown how the Charter could become a significant legal instrument in the Commissions infringement policy towards Member States that are undermining fundamental rights and the rule of law. This Article thereby aims to contribute to the discussion on how to effectively enforce the values of the EU enshrined in Article 2 TEU through an existing enforcement mechanism.


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