Public-Private R&D Collaboration in Korea - A Cross-Sector Survey of Incentive Structures

2007 ◽  
pp. 93-113
Author(s):  
Matthew Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Structures

On Soviet Managerial Incentive Structures

1976 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 490 ◽  
Author(s):  
John P. Bonin
Keyword(s):  
Managerial Incentive ◽  
Incentive Structures

Why Does Aid Not Target the Poorest?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan C Briggs
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Aid ◽  
World Bank ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Local Population ◽  
Team Leaders ◽  
Donor Side ◽  
Local Effects ◽  
Remote Areas ◽  
Incentive Structures ◽  
Task Team

Abstract Foreign-aid projects typically have local effects, so they need to be placed close to the poor if they are to reduce poverty. I show that, conditional on local population levels, World Bank (WB) project aid targets richer parts of countries. This relationship holds over time and across world regions. I test five donor-side explanations for pro-rich targeting using a pre-registered conjoint experiment on WB Task Team Leaders (TTLs). TTLs perceive aid-receiving governments as most interested in targeting aid politically and controlling implementation. They also believe that aid works better in poorer or more remote areas, but that implementation in these areas is uniquely difficult. These results speak to debates in distributive politics, international bargaining over aid, and principal-agent issues in international organizations. The results also suggest that tweaks to WB incentive structures to make ease of project implementation less important may encourage aid to flow to poorer parts of countries.

scholarly journals Simultaneous production decisions in agricultural contexts: an experimental investigation of pesticide use, animal welfare and wheat production

2021 ◽  
Vol 123 (13) ◽  
pp. 19-36
Author(s):  
Julia Höhler ◽  
Jörg Müller
Keyword(s):  
Animal Welfare ◽  
Market Entry ◽  
Crop Production ◽  
Pesticide Use ◽  
Production Decisions ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Wheat Production ◽  
Simultaneous Production ◽  
Incentive Structures ◽  
Entry Games

PurposeFarmers often decide simultaneously on crop production or input use without knowing other farmers' decisions. Anticipating the behavior of other farmers can increase financial performance. This paper investigates the role of other famers' behaviors and other contextual factors in farmers' simultaneous production decisions.Design/methodology/approachMarket entry games are a common method for investigating simultaneous production decisions. However, so far they have been conducted with abstract tasks and by untrained subjects. The authors extend market entry games by using three real contexts: pesticide use, animal welfare and wheat production, in an incentivized framed field experiment with 323 German farmers.FindingsThe authors find that farmers take different decisions under identical incentive structures for the three contexts. While context plays a major role in their decisions, their expectations about the behavior of other farmers have little influence on their decision.Originality/valueThe paper offers new insights into the decision-making behavior of farmers. A better understanding of how farmers anticipate the behavior of other farmers in their production decisions can improve both the performance of individual farms and the allocational efficiency of agricultural and food markets.

Marketisation and Privatisation in Criminal Justice

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Public Sector ◽  
Corporate Sector ◽  
The Public ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Efficient Delivery ◽  
Incentive Structures ◽  
Responsibility Of Government ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
The Impact

Criminal justice used to be thought of as a field autonomous from politics and the economy, with the management of crime and punishment being seen as essentially the responsibility of government. However, in recent decades, policies have been adopted which blur the institutional boundaries and functions of the public sector with those of for-profit and civil society interests in many parts of the penal/welfare complex. The impact of these developments on society is contested: Proponents of the ‘neo-liberal penality thesis’ argue economic deregulation, welfare retrenchment, individualised choices – and associated responsibility – may be aligned by market forces into efficient delivery of ‘law and order’. Set against the neo-liberal penal position are arguments that the corporate sector may be no more efficient in delivering criminal justice services than is the public sector, and reliance on the profit motive to deliver criminal justice may lead to perverse incentivisation of NGOs or state agencies. It is to this debate we add our contribution. Criminal justice is an ideal sector in which to consider the implications arising from the differing incentive structures held by different institutions, both private and public, citizens, governments, social enterprise and the corporate sector. All agree on the need for criminal justice, even as they compete in the policy sphere to dictate its form and delivery.

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