Diagramming, Argumentation Schemes and Critical Questions

Author(s):  
Douglas Walton ◽  
Chris Reed
Author(s):  
Fabrizio Macagno ◽  
Douglas Walton

AbstractIn this paper it is shown how certain defeasible argumentation schemes can be used to represent the logical structure of the most common types of argument used for statutory interpretation both in civil and common law. The method is based on an argumentation structure in which the conclusion, namely, the meaning attributed to a legal source, is modeled as a claim that needs that is be supported by pro and con defeasible arguments. The defeasible nature of each scheme is shown by means of critical questions, which identify the default conditions for the accepting interpretative arguments and provide a method for evaluating a given argument as weak or strong.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Ryan Phillip Quandt ◽  
John Licato

Argumentation schemes bring artificial intelligence into day to day conversation. Interpreting the force of an utterance, be it an assertion, command, or question, remains a task for achieving this goal. But it is not an easy task. An interpretation of force depends on a speaker’s use of words for a hearer at the moment of utterance. Ascribing force relies on grammatical mood, though not in a straightforward or regular way. We face a dilemma: on one hand, deciding force requires an understanding of the speaker’s words; on the other hand, word meaning may shift given the force in which the words are spoken. A precise theory of how mood and force relate helps us handle this dilemma, which, if met, expands the use of argumentation schemes in language processing. Yet, as our analysis shows, force is an inconstant variable, one that contributes to a scheme’s defeasibility. We propose using critical questions to help us decide the force of utterances.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-315
Author(s):  
Marcin Koszowy ◽  
Douglas Walton

Abstract The aim of this paper is to elaborate tools that would allow us to analyse arguments from authority and guard against fallacious uses of them. To accomplish this aim, we extend the list of existing argumentation schemes representing arguments from authority. For this purpose, we formulate a new argumentation scheme for argument from deontic authority along with a matching set of critical questions used to evaluate it. We argue that clarifying the ambiguity between arguments from epistemic and deontic authority helps building a better explanation of the informal fallacy of appeal to authority (argumentum ad verecundiam).


2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 267 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Godden ◽  
Douglas Walton

This paper begins a working through of Blair’s (2001) theoretical agenda concerning argumentation schemes and their attendant critical questions, in which we propose a number of solutions to some outstanding theoretical issues. We consider the classification of schemes, their ultimate nature, their role in argument reconstruction, their foundation as normative categories of argument, and the evaluative role of critical questions.We demonstrate the role of schemes in argument reconstruction, and defend a normative account of their nature against specific criticisms due to Pinto (2001). Concerning critical questions, we propose an account on which they are founded in the R.S.A. cogency standard, and develop an account of the relationship between critical questions and burden of proof. Our ultimate aim is to initiate a reconciliation between dialectical and informal logic approaches to the schemes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-96
Author(s):  
Fabrizio Macagno

RESUMO:Neste artigo demonstra-se como os esquemas argumentativos (esquemas que representam argumentos refutáveis, combinados com perguntas críticas correspondentes), podem ser usados para representar a estrutura lógica dos vários tipos de argumentos reconhecidos como fundamentais na interpretação da lei por Tarello (1980). Defende-se que o processo de interpretação da lei tem uma estrutura argumentativa distinta na qual a conclusão, nomeadamente o significado disputável ou questionado atribuído a uma fonte jurídica, é uma afirmação que necessita ser respaldada por argumentos refutáveis a favor ou contra. Esta transformação de argumentos de interpretação numa estrutura de esquemas argumentativos é analisada em detalhe em dois argumentos, o argumento psicológico e o argumento a contrario. A natureza refutável de cada esquema é demonstrada por meio de questões críticas que identificam as condições padrão para a aceitação de argumentos interpretativos e fornecem um método para avaliar a força ou a fraqueza de um determinado argumento.  ABSTRACT:In this paper, the logical structures of the interpretative arguments summarizing the various interpretative canons considered fundamental by Tarello (1980) are represented by argumentation schemes, namely patterns of defeasible arguments combined with their corresponding critical questions. The process of statutory interpretation is shown to have a specific argumentative structure where the conclusion corresponds to the disputed or questionable meaning attributed to a legal source and needs to be supported and attacked through defeasible arguments. This translation of interpretative arguments into argumentation schemes is illustrated in detail considering two specific arguments, the psychological and the a contrario arguments. The defeasibility conditions of each scheme are summarized in a set of critical questions, which identify the default conditions for accepting interpretative arguments and provide a method for evaluating a given argument as weak or strong. 


Author(s):  
Douglas Walton ◽  
Christopher Reed ◽  
Fabrizio Macagno

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Malik Mufti

This articles argues (a) that democratic discourse has already become hegemonic among mainstream Islamist movements in Turkey and the Arab world; (b) that while this development originated in tactical calculations, it constitutes a consequential transformation in Islamist political thought; and (c) that this transformation, in turn, raises critical questions about the interaction of religion and democracy with which contemporary Islamists have not yet grappled adequately but which were anticipated by medieval philosophers such as al-Farabi and Ibn Rushd. The argument is laid out through an analysis (based on textual sources and interviews) of key decisions on electoral participation made by Turkey’s AK Party and the Muslim Brotherhoods in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Particular attention is focused on these movements’ gradual embrace of three key democratic principles: pluralism, the people as the source of political authority, and the legitimacy of such procedural mechanisms as multiple parties and regular elections.


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