Epistemic and deontic authority in the argumentum ad verecundiam

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-315
Author(s):  
Marcin Koszowy ◽  
Douglas Walton

Abstract The aim of this paper is to elaborate tools that would allow us to analyse arguments from authority and guard against fallacious uses of them. To accomplish this aim, we extend the list of existing argumentation schemes representing arguments from authority. For this purpose, we formulate a new argumentation scheme for argument from deontic authority along with a matching set of critical questions used to evaluate it. We argue that clarifying the ambiguity between arguments from epistemic and deontic authority helps building a better explanation of the informal fallacy of appeal to authority (argumentum ad verecundiam).

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Walton

In this paper a hybrid model of argument from analogy is presented that combines argumentation schemes and story schemes. One premise of the argumentation scheme for argument from analogy in the model claims that one case is similar to another. Story schemes are abstract representations of stories (narratives, explanations) based on common knowledge about how sequences of actions and events we are familiar with can normally be expected to unfold. Story schemes are used (a) to model similarity between two cases, and (2) as the basis of evidence to support the similarity premise of an argument from analogy. Four examples of argument from analogy are used to test the theory.


1999 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas N. Walton

In this paper, it is shown how formal dialectic can be extended to model multi-agent argumentation in which each participant is an agent. An agent is viewed as a participant in a dialogue who not only has goals, and the capability for actions, but who also has stable characteristics of types that can be relevant to an assessment of some of her arguments used in that dialogue. When agents engage in argumentation in dialogues, each agent has a credibility function that can be adjusted upwards or downwards by certain types of arguments brought forward by the other agent in the dialogue. One type is the argument against the person or argumentum ad hominem, in which personal attack on one party's character is used to attack his argument. Another is the appeal to expert opinion, traditionally associated with the informal fallacy called the argumentum ad verecundiam. In any particular case, an agent will begin a dialogue with a given degree of credibility, and what is here called the credibility function will affect the plausibility of the arguments put forward by that agent. In this paper, an agent is shown to have specific character traits that are vital to properly judging how this credibility function should affect the plausibility of her arguments, including veracity, prudence, sincerity and openness to opposed arguments. When one of these traits is a relevant basis for an adjustment in a credibility function, there is a shift to a subdialogue in which the argumentation in the case is re-evaluated. In such a case, it is shown how the outcome can legitimately be a reduction in the credibility rating of the arguer who was attacked. Then it is shown how the credibility function should be brought into an argument evaluation in the case, yielding the outcome that the argument is assigned a lower plausibility value.


Author(s):  
Fabrizio Macagno ◽  
Douglas Walton

AbstractIn this paper it is shown how certain defeasible argumentation schemes can be used to represent the logical structure of the most common types of argument used for statutory interpretation both in civil and common law. The method is based on an argumentation structure in which the conclusion, namely, the meaning attributed to a legal source, is modeled as a claim that needs that is be supported by pro and con defeasible arguments. The defeasible nature of each scheme is shown by means of critical questions, which identify the default conditions for the accepting interpretative arguments and provide a method for evaluating a given argument as weak or strong.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Ryan Phillip Quandt ◽  
John Licato

Argumentation schemes bring artificial intelligence into day to day conversation. Interpreting the force of an utterance, be it an assertion, command, or question, remains a task for achieving this goal. But it is not an easy task. An interpretation of force depends on a speaker’s use of words for a hearer at the moment of utterance. Ascribing force relies on grammatical mood, though not in a straightforward or regular way. We face a dilemma: on one hand, deciding force requires an understanding of the speaker’s words; on the other hand, word meaning may shift given the force in which the words are spoken. A precise theory of how mood and force relate helps us handle this dilemma, which, if met, expands the use of argumentation schemes in language processing. Yet, as our analysis shows, force is an inconstant variable, one that contributes to a scheme’s defeasibility. We propose using critical questions to help us decide the force of utterances.


2021 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-578
Author(s):  
Geoff Goddu

While there has been in depth discussion of many particular argumentation schemes, some lament that there is little to no theory underpinning the notion of an argumentation scheme. Here I shall argue against the utility of argument schemes, at least as a fundamental part of a complete theory of arguments.  I shall also present and defend a minimalist theory of their nature—a scheme is just a set of proposition expressions and propositional functions. While simple, the theory contravenes several typical desiderata of argumentation schemes such as (i) aiding in the identification of enthymemes and (ii) keeping arguments constrained to a manageable taxonomy. So much the worse for the desiderata. Instead, I shall recommend focusing less on schemes and more on the component propositional functions.


2001 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Walton

Current practice in logic increasingly accords recognition to abductive, presumptive or plausible arguments, in addition to deductive and inductive arguments. But there is uncertainty about what these terms exactly mean, what the differences between them are (if any), and how they relate. By examining some analyses ofthese terms and some of the history of the subject (including the views of Peirce and Cameades), this paper sets out considerations leading to a set of definitions, discusses the relationship of these three forms of argument to argumentation schemes and sets out a new argumentation scheme for abductive argument.


2018 ◽  
Vol 143 ◽  
pp. 119-133
Author(s):  
Bartosz Buć

Um Textpassagen in Bezug auf ihre argumentative Funktion zu untersuchen, braucht man geeignete Werkzeuge, die als argumentative Indikatoren verstanden werden können. Ihre Rolle als wirksames Mittel der Argumentationsanalyse wurde in einigen Beiträgen beschrieben. Allerdings ist die Frage, ob sie in verschiedenen Sprachen anwendbar sind, noch nicht beantwortet. Nach der Pragma-Dialektik kann jede Argumentation auf ein bestimmtes Argumentationsschema zurückgeführt werden. Darum kann die Argumentation auf einer Analogie, einem Kausalverhältnis und einem symptomatischen Verhältnis beruhen. Darüber hinaus gibt es typische Argumentationsschemata, die angewendet werden können, um festzustellen, welche Art von Argument verwendet wird. Im Mittelpunkt dieser Arbeit steht die Zusammenstellung von Indikatoren für drei Argumentationsschemata. So wird versucht, auf der Grundlage der Analyse von Interviews zu bestimmen, welche Wörter und Phrasen für die Identifizierung der Art der Argumentation nützlich sein können.Argumentative indicators in German, Polish and English interviews. Attempt of a comparative analysis according to the pragma-dialectical typology of the argumentation schemesTo examine passages of text in terms of its argumentative function one needs appropriate tools understood as argumentative indicators. Their role as an effective means of the argumentation analysis has been described in some contributions. However, the question if they are applicable in different languages, has not been answered yet. According to the pragma-dialectics every argumentation can be attributed to a specific argumentation scheme. Therefore, argumentation can be based on: a relation of analogy, a causal relation and a symptomatic relation. Furthermore, there are typical argumentative models that can be applied in order to determine what type of argument is used. The focus of this paper is to compile indicators of three argumentation schemes. Thus, it is attempted to determine on the basis of the analysis of interviews, which words and phrases can be useful for identifying the type of argumentation.


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