Museum of Outstanding Figures in Ukrainian Culture

This paper deals with a famous problem of epistemic logic – logical omniscience. Logical omniscience occurs in the logical systems where the axiomatics is complete and consequently an agent using inference rules knows everything about the system. Logical omniscience is a major problem due to complexity problems and the inability for adequate human reasoning modeling. It is studied both informal logic and philosophy of psychology (bounded rationality). It is important for bounded rationality because it reflects the problem of formal characterization of purely psychological mechanisms. Paper proposes to solve it using the ideas from the philosophical bounded rationality and intuitionistic logic. Special regions of deductible formulas developed according to psychologistic criterion should guide the deductive model. The method is compared to other ones presented in the literature on logical omniscience such as Hintikka’s and Vinkov and Fominuh. Views from different perspectives such as computer science and artificial intelligence are also provided.

Discovering Warrants in Political Argumentation

Philosophers deny a proposal for actions can be deduced from arguments for or against the proposal because they may be incompatible. Nevertheless, people in general, and politicians especially, make decisions and present arguments they believe are convincing. We studied politicians who made decisions in complex situations. They spoke about possible actions, their consequences, the probabilities of these consequences and their evaluations, but rarely indicated why their arguments led to their choice. We hypothesized implicit argumentation rules involved and checked whether they predicted those choices. We found seven implicit informal logic rules involved. We also found a random sample of people made the same choices based on the same arguments, suggesting basic warrants by which people argue about decisions.

What can we know about the future? Epistemology and the credibility of claims about the world ahead

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the results of futures studies are knowledge or if not, what it is that futures studies actually produce. Five types of representations of the future are the result of these studies. As the value of futures studies depends on no small measure of their credibility, the standards for carrying out and reporting these studies are identified along with a description of how Toulmin’s model of informal logic can be used to best improve their credibility. Design/methodology/approach This paper is based on a multi-disciplinary literature review and integrative analysis. Findings Using epistemological criteria for knowledge as truth, belief and rationale, the results of futures studies are not and cannot be knowledge. Instead, futures studies produce five kinds of “representations of the future”: predictions, projections and forecasts, scenarios, visions and structures for action. Six standards for conducting and reporting the results of futures studies are provided which will increase the credibility of these studies. Toulmin’s informal logic format will provide the foundation for the most persuasive basis of such studies. Practical implications Futurists will understand that the products of their studies are not knowledge and why this is the case. They will also understand that the type of futures studies they are conducting are either conditional, contingent propositions or normative prescriptions in nature. There are six guidelines for carrying out and reporting futures studies which can also be used to assess the quality of published studies. They will see how the use of a certain kind of informal logic can establish the most credible foundations for their studies. Originality/value As an integrative literature review, it incorporates and simplifies widely disparate existing contributions to the topic of the nature of knowledge regarding futures studies and the criteria for making such studies as credible as possible.

Is Aristotle the Forefather of Informal Logic?

I argue that Aristotle takes a ‘natural language semantics’ approach to logic, which is consistent with the general attitudes one finds in informal logic today. Although his position is complex, Aristotle emphasizes the intensional rather than the extensional side of argument evaluation. He does not take a truth-functional approach to semantics, but an approach that elucidates the illative mechanism through an understanding of natures. This comes close to what informal logicians insist on. The informal logic movement was, to a very large extent, a Canadian initiative, prominently featuring authors such as Johnson, Blair, Govier, and many others.

Rhetoric of Science

This contribution examines the status of the rhetoric of science in two contexts. The first one is the effect that the changing interpretation of logic (the changing 'image of logic') has had on the status of the rhetoric of science. The second is the role that imagery has in scientific discourse. It is argued that the very possibility of a rhetorical interpretation of science depends on how the logic of science is understood. Informal logic, which acts here as a variant of argumentation theory or a logic of argumentation, is proposed as such a logic. This leads to a revision of the nature of justification in science in general, the substitution of apodictic logic for a logic of argumentation as a principal tool, and the consideration of strict formal ways of material implication-based justification as mere individual cases of a logic of argumentation. The role of imagery in scientific discourse is analysed. It is demonstrated that the situation of rhetoric and perception of imagery is paradoxical: although using rhetorical mechanisms in scientific communication is unavoidable, rhetoric has been criticised for many centuries. It is shown that the negative attitude to using rhetorical elements in scientific texts has long historical roots going back to ancient philosophical thought, namely, Socrates's criticism of eloquence and sophistic rhetoric. Analysis of the functions of imagery in scientific discourse suggests that imagery is an inalienable mechanism of both professional communication and the creation of theoretical models of knowledge.

LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY: LINES OF INTERACTION

In this paper, we argue in favour of the applicability of logical tools for the analysis of various philosophical issues. Different systems of the modern non-classical (philosophical) logic are considered, and a promising approach of research represented by informal logic. We conclude with some remarks about the prospects for a fruitful interaction of modern formal and informal logic with philosophical knowledge.

Adding limits to argumentative reconstruction: the case of taste in argumentation

This paper questions the use of the argumentative reconstruction technique as a criterion for identifying arguments. To perform this, I stress a type of argument that appeals to taste. I proceed as follows: first, I relate such a technique to the ways in which pragma-dialectics and informal logic have defined argumentation. Second, I present some borderline cases to reconstruction technique such as argumentation through directives, expressives and commissives speech acts, narrative argumentation, and visual argumentation. Third, I add to these cases that of an argumentation that appeals to taste by analyzing a dialogue. Fourth, I conclude the article by offering reasons to study cases such as the one presented and by introducing some problems derived from the present study.

John Woods y Brent Hudak: Por paridad de razonamiento

Traducción al español del artículo publicado por John Woods y Brent Hudak en Informal Logic, Vol. 11, Nº 3, en 1989. Frente a las propuestas que interpretan el argumento por analogía en términos de semejanza de propiedades, los autores proponen aquí una concepción metaargumentativa, es decir, una en la que los objetos de comparación son argumentos. Esto les permite interpretar la noción de semejanza en términos de identidad de razones, dar cuenta de algunas características del argumento por analogía en oposición, por ejemplo, a la predicación analógica y explorar su dimensión dialéctica en la solución de lo que denominan un stand-off o punto muerto discursivo. La traducción se acompaña de una presentación del texto realizada por el traductor.

Reconstruction of the Stagirite argument against the fatalism of future events

The question of free will and determinism is one of the most discussed in analytic philosophy. This is because interdisciplinary research has entered the field of studying the brain and consciousness – and often, consciousness is presented as an invention, an epiphenomenon. One of the attributes of consciousness is free will. The prehistory of modern research in the field of free will is the discussion about the need for future events, which was first analyzed by Stagirite in chapter 9, "On Interpretation". Despite all the analyticity and consistency of Aristotle's works, this work is full of gaps in argumentation and formulations ambiguity. In this regard, over two thousand years, philosophers have described many reconstructions in this chapter's argumentation and interpretations. Conventionally, the question of fatalism can be divided into two intersecting directions: logical fatalism and theological fatalism. This article examines the first direction and will relate to the understanding of fatalism and arguments against it in the context of the development of logic and theory of argumentation in the 20th century. The first logician who radically revised the foundations of logic to build an argument against future events' fatalism was Jan Lukasiewicz. We can say that all his life Lukasiewicz fought against determinism and tried to find a logical basis for human freedom of will. However, the main discussion on this issue took place in the middle of the 20th century between the logicians whose work will be considered in this article: Linsky Leonard, Butler Ronald, Storrs McCall, and others. The discussion was conducted around understanding such philosophical concepts and their ontological status: time, truth, a necessity. Also, in the wake of Lukasiewicz, they clarified such logical concepts as bivalence and the law of the excluded third. Of particular interest was the emergence of logical modalities, true/false, which can change their meaning over time, which led to the emergence of new informal logic.

Libri ad Nauseam: The Critical Thinking Textbook Glut

Critical thinking instructors are faced with an overwhelming number of textbooks to choose from for their courses. Many of these texts do not reflect an awareness of current scholarship in critical thinking and informal logic. I argue that instructors should only adopt textbooks that reflect a sound theoretical understanding of the topic by acknowledging the central role of critical thinking dispositions, offering a more nuanced approach to the teaching of fallacies and of inference, stressing dialectic and argument revision, focusing on the analysis and evaluation of real arguments, and broadening the scope of critical thinking beyond argument analysis and evaluation. To support instructors in this regard, I critique one popular textbook now in its sixth edition that does not satisfy many of these criteria, Munson and Black (2012), and applaud one new textbook that I find does succeed on many of these fronts, Bailin and Battersby (2010).