Applied Fisheries Management Plans: Individual Transferable Quotas and Input Controls

1989 ◽  
pp. 153-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Wesney ◽  
Peder Andersen
2010 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 212-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Gårdmark ◽  
Anders Nielsen ◽  
Jens Floeter ◽  
Christian Möllmann

Abstract Gårdmark, A., Nielsen, A., Floeter, J., and Möllmann, C. 2011. Depleted marine fish stocks and ecosystem-based management: on the road to recovery, we need to be precautionary. – ICES Journal of Marine Science, 68: 212–220. Precautionary management for fish stocks in need of recovery requires that likely stock increases can be distinguished from model artefacts and that the uncertainty of stock status can be handled. Yet, ICES stock assessments are predominantly deterministic and many EC management plans are designed for deterministic advice. Using the eastern Baltic cod (Gadus morhua) stock as an example, we show how deterministic scientific advice can lead to illusive certainty of a rapid stock recovery and management decisions taken in unawareness of large uncertainties in stock status. By (i) performing sensitivity analyses of key assessment model assumptions, (ii) quantifying the uncertainty of the estimates due to data uncertainty, and (iii) developing alternative stock and ecosystem indicators, we demonstrate that estimates of recent fishing mortality and recruitment of this stock were highly uncertain and show that these uncertainties are crucial when combined with management plans based on fixed reference points of fishing mortality. We therefore call for fisheries management that does not neglect uncertainty. To this end, we outline a four-step approach to handle uncertainty of stock status in advice and management. We argue that it is time to use these four steps towards an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management.


1995 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dale Squires ◽  
James Kirkley ◽  
Clement A. Tisdell

Author(s):  
Rashid Sumaila

The economic tool of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) gives their owners exclusive and transferable rights to catch a given portion of the total allowable catch (TAC) of a given fish stock. Authorities establish TACs and then divide them among individual fishers or firms in the form of individual catch quotas, usually a percentage of the TAC. ITQs are transferable through selling and buying in an open market. The main arguments by proponents of ITQs is that they eliminate the need to “race for the fish” and thus increase economic returns while eliminating overcapacity and overfishing. In general, fisheries’ management objectives consist of ecological (sustainable use of fish stocks), economic (no economic waste), and social (mainly the equitable distribution of fisheries benefits) issues. There is evidence to show that ITQs do indeed reduce economic waste and increase profits for those remaining in fisheries. However, they do not perform well in terms of sustainability or socially. A proposal that integrates ITQs in a comprehensive and effective ecosystem-based fisheries management system that is more likely to perform much better than ITQs with respect to ecological, economic, and social objectives is presented in this article.


<em>Abstract</em>.—Effective means to directly engage the public in determining reservoir fishery management objectives and strategies is a common challenge to managers. This paper examines the experiences and lessons acquired from three separate situations in which citizen advisory committees were used to assist fishery management biologists in resolving conflicts and setting management objectives for three lakes in Arkansas. Benefits included a better understanding on both the part of anglers and agency biologists of their respective motivations and preferences, a greater sense of shared ownership of solutions, and a well-defined but flexible management plan. The effectiveness of citizen advisory committees was challenged by dissent and mistrust among advisory committee members, failure of committee members to communicate management plans outside the committee proper, political intervention, and the threat to agency credibility if the agreed plans fail to be implemented. Citizen advisory committees can be an effective tool for crafting reservoir fishery management plans.


<em>Abstract</em>.—As commercial paddlefish <em>Polyodon spathula </em>fisheries shifted from primarily flesh to almost exclusively roe harvest, agencies had to change their management strategies. Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee were the only states within the Mississippi River basin that were open to commercial paddlefish harvest in 2006. These seven states were surveyed in 2006 to summarize commercial paddlefish fisheries management in North America. Although commercial fishing license sales declined in most states since the mid-1980s, the number of commercial fishers targeting paddlefish steadily increased since the late 1990s. Total license fees for a resident commercial fisher to set 10 gill nets for paddlefish ranged from US$70.35 to $1,200, and those fees ranged from $242.35 to $2,500 for nonresidents (in the five states that allowed nonresidents). Management strategies employed in these seven states varied greatly in 2006. Arkansas, Mississippi, and Tennessee managed their fisheries with statewide seasons, and Kentucky had seasons for two of three major fisheries. Arkansas, Missouri, Kentucky, and Tennessee had minimum eye-to-fork length limits on all or some of their fisheries. There were numerous gear restrictions in the seven states, including minimum mesh size restrictions, net length limits, and net attendance requirements. Most states had a mandatory harvest report, but the information collected on these reports differed among states. The vastly different management strategies that were employed in the commercial fisheries throughout the Mississippi River basin have resulted in new problems as roe values increase. Future management will likely focus on development of management plans for biologically relevant areas. These management plans should include measures to prevent recruitment overfishing and minimize bycatch mortality. Interjurisdictional management and continued information sharing are necessary to effectively manage paddlefish fisheries in the future.


2008 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 132-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Will J. F. Le Quesne

Abstract Le Quesne, W. J. F. 2009. Are flawed MPAs any good or just a new way of making old mistakes? – ICES Journal of Marine Science, 66: 132–136. The case for Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) is often supported by the observation that present fisheries management has failed. This overlooks the fact that, often, management plans are not implemented in accordance with advice and that subsequent regulations are frequently violated. Evidence is emerging that MPAs may be equally open to mismanagement, either because MPAs are smaller than recommended or through lack of compliance. Therefore, it is interesting to ask whether MPAs would also fail if they are not properly implemented or enforced. A population model was used to examine this question. The model demonstrates that biomass and yield are reduced, and can collapse under “bad” MPA management. When illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing occurred within the MPA, yield and biomass declined almost linearly with increasing poaching pressure. Yield was more robust than biomass to the effects of making MPAs smaller than the optimum size for limited reductions in MPA size. Varying the degree of mobility had little impact on the response of yield and biomass. This analysis demonstrates the vulnerability of MPAs to design and governance failings, and the importance of considering enforcement during MPA design.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 64-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Axelrod

This article explores the conditions under which regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) adopt climate actions. I test a series of hypotheses to explain when RFMOs move beyond their classic management approaches—assignment of property rights, catch limits, and gear restrictions—to include climate change in their research and management plans. I introduce a new data set that compares fisheries-climate linkages since 1992 in all available RFMO annual reports and meeting minutes. The analysis reveals a series of patterns surrounding linkage politics in RFMOs. Importantly, this study finds that climate linkages in RFMOs do not simply follow scientific knowledge or regional climate vulnerability. Instead, climate action coincides with member country efforts to avoid catch regulations, and secretariat efforts to exhibit organizational relevance.


<em>Abstract.</em>—Fisheries managers have stewardship responsibility for aquatic resources. This means making decisions that are ecologically sound, economically sensible, and socially acceptable. The vexing problem lies in balancing ecological, economic, and sociologic ideals with ethical and moral (professional) stewardship responsibilities. Foresighted fisheries management has seven practical elements: (1) thoroughly inventory ecological and habitat characteristics of watersheds; (2) manage for native or wild fish wherever possible; (3) determine genetic strengths of broodstocks so their offspring are used where they are suited; (4) manage according to the fish production limits of waters; (5) stock only waters where trout reproduction is limited or absent; (6) develop fisheries management plans by drainage basin; (7) establish fisheries management programs based on recognition of all public desires, not just the utilitarian aspect. Once public, including angler, desires are understood, fisheries managers must work to instill in the public a sound resource philosophy and then integrate that public awareness with ecological technology to progress in fisheries management.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document