The distributional outcomes of rights-based management in fisheries

Fisheries managers have increasingly adopted rights-based management (i.e., “catch shares” or “individual transferable quotas” [ITQs]) to address economic and biological management challenges under prior governance regimes. Despite their ability to resolve some of the symptoms of the tragedy of the commons and improve economic efficiency, catch shares remain controversial for their potentially disruptive social effects. One criticism is that the benefits of rights-based reforms are unequally distributed across vessels and between fishery participants (e.g., crew and hired captains) and that stakeholders that do not receive an allocation of harvest rights may see their remuneration decrease. Yet, empirically assessing these claims is difficult in almost all ITQs due to poor availability of longitudinal cost, earnings, and employment data. This paper evaluates these claims using vessel-level data to characterize impacts of a long-established ITQ program for Alaskan crab fisheries on the level and distribution of payments to claimant groups. We find that the share of vessel proceeds accruing to captains, crew, and vessel owners declined under the catch-share regime to make room for new payments to quota owners. Average daily payments to captains, crew, and vessel owners declined, albeit slightly, yet retained their pre-ITQ premia relative to compensation in other sectors. However, inequality in payments to workers and vessel owners declined after ITQs, as did the interseasonal volatility in compensation to workers, a measure of financial risk. Finally, we find that consolidation-induced increases in leasing costs have had little effect on workers’ remuneration, but have reduced returns to vessel ownership.

Trends in Pacific Canadian groundfish stock status

We assembled estimated biomass (B) time series from stock assessments for 24 Pacific Canadian groundfish stocks and modelled average and stock status through 2020 based on biomass relative to each stock's (1) Limit Reference Point (B/LRP), (2) Upper Stock Reference (B/USR), and (3) biomass at maximum sustainable yield (B/BMSY). The overall mean B/LRP in 2020 was 3.2 (95% credible interval [CI]: 2.6-3.9). The overall mean B/USR and B/BMSY in 2020 was 1.5 (95% CI: 1.3-1.9) and 1.4 (95% CI: 1.1-1.7), respectively. Average stock status declined from 1950 to around 2000 and has remained relatively stable since then. The change around 2000 followed the implementation of ITQs (individual transferable quotas) for the trawl fleet and the commencement of the synoptic trawl surveys. As of their last assessment, four stocks (Strait of Georgia Lingcod [Area 4B], coastwide Bocaccio, and inside and outside Quillback Rockfish) had a greater than 5% probability of being below their LRP (i.e., in the "critical zone"); Pacific Cod in Area 3CD had a 4.6% probability. Roughly one-third of stocks had a greater than 1 in 4 chance of being below their USR (i.e., in the "cautious zone"). Conversely, two-thirds of assessed groundfish stocks had a high (>75%) probability of being above the USR (i.e., in the "healthy zone").

Analysis of Optimal Harvest and Management of Capture Fishery of Lake Ziway, Central Ethiopia

Even if there is fluctuation in fish species diversity and relative abundance of the species, Lake Ziway provides numerous environmental and/or ecosystem services. Despite to its importance, the Lake faces numerous threats because of its public good characteristics. Following the exponentially increased demand for fishes and the resource being public good, magnificent number of individuals are participated in capture fisheries in order to secure their livelihood. Free access to the fisheries, illegal fishing gears and environmental degradation are among the main reasons of decline in fish species and degradation of the Lake. From the current stock assessment survey, the study showed decline in biomass of fish over time. These negative trends in the Lake Ziway fisheries and poor water quality led to loss of livelihoods of many households who are directly or indirectly dependent on the Lake. Therefore, management of Lake Ziway fishery becomes very essential to manage the resource efficiently in a way that maximize fishers present and future benefits otherwise, the fish resource will disappear in the near future. Concerning management practices, most of the fishery regulations in this Lake put emphasis on the restriction of fishing gear, but the application of this instrument with its restrictions is almost zero. Moreover, Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) foster greater transparency and accountability for the management and enhancement of fishery resources by quota owners. In this regard, since it generates a sense of ownership and its versatility in providing a stable and productive market, ITQs are more effective than gear restrictions and in fact, it has major social benefits by controlling overharvesting. Due to this, to ensure the nutritional and food security of the country currently and in the near future, there is a need to enforce fishing gear restriction and set ITQs. Furthermore, there must be strong effort on studying the current stock of fish, and numbers of legal and illegal fishers to set Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) and Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for sustainable fishery management of Lake Ziway.

Flexibility of joint production in mixed fisheries and implications for management

Over the past decade, efforts have been made to factor technical interactions into management recommendations for mixed fisheries. Yet, the dynamics underlying joint production in mixed fisheries are generally poorly captured in operational mixed fisheries models supporting total allowable catch advice. Using an integrated ecological–economic simulation model, we explore the extent to which fishers are likely to alter the species composition of their landings in a mixed fishery managed with individual transferable quotas, the Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery. Our simulations capture three different types of joint production problems, highlighting the flexibility that exists in terms of achievable catch compositions when quota markets provide the economic incentives to adapt fishing practices to quota availability. These results highlight the importance of capturing the drivers of fishing choices when advising TAC decisions in mixed fisheries. We also identify a hierarchy of species in this fishery, with harvest targets set for primary commercial species determining most of its socio-economic performance.

Do efficient small-scale fishers stay active in eras of introducing individual transferable quotas? Evidence from Denmark

Theory suggests the use of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) as a solution to overcapacity and to keep efficient fishers active. While the reduction of overcapacity under ITQ implementation is well documented, empirical evidence on the role of capacity utilisation in adjusting the labour force is scarce. This article analyses whether the capacity utilisation of the vessels that fishers own/work on influences their probability of continuing fishing or whether factors such as fishing income and pension are more important. Danish small-scale fisheries with vessels less than 17 m in length, in which ITQs were introduced in 2007, are studied using a multinomial logit regression based on a unique dataset of individual income and socioeconomic characteristics of Danish fishers in the period 2002-2012 as well as individual vessel data. Together with other relevant socioeconomic variables, vessel capacity utilisation is included in the regression. The latter is identified in a productivity analysis of all commercial active vessels using Data Envelopment Analysis. It is found that increasing vessel capacity utilisation both significantly and positively influences the decision to stay in a small-scale fishery. Increasing income from fisheries also significantly influences the probability of staying in the fishery business. The Danish results provide evidence that the most efficient fishers are those who remain active when ITQs are implemented.

The I, the T or the Q? Which fishing opportunity attributes are associated with sustainable fishing?

While several prominent studies link the use of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) to sustainable fishing, it remains unclear which attributes of this system (i.e., individual, transferable, or quota), or any other system, lead to sustainable outcomes. To test for a linkage between management systems and sustainable fishing, we systematically classified how fishing opportunities are allocated for 443 fish stocks from 1990 to 2018 to produce the largest database of its kind. Using mixed-effects models and a difference-in-differences approach, we tested the occurrence of system attributes against two metrics of sustainable fishing: mortality (i.e., overfishing) and biomass (i.e., overfished). Our results reveal that quota limits and individual allocation reduce the probability of overfishing, but offer no evidence supporting the transferability of fishing opportunities or the length of time they are held for. These results highlight the importance of considering specific attributes in the design of fisheries management systems.

Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ), Rebuilding Fisheries and Short-Termism: How Biased Reasoning Impacts Management

Recent research on global fisheries has reconfirmed a 2006 study that suggested global fisheries would collapse by 2048 if fisheries were not better managed and trends reversed. While many researchers have endorsed rights-based fishery management as a key ingredient for successful management and rebuilding fisheries, in practice the results are mixed and success varies by geographic region. Rights-based approaches such as individual transferable quota (ITQ) provide a necessary help to the important task of rebuilding fisheries, but we assert that they are sometimes less effective due to the human component of the system. Specifically, we examine the issue of setting an appropriate total allowable catch (TAC) in Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) systems. ITQ are designed on the premise that economic ownership is sufficient incentive to entice fishers to be stewards of the resource. However, an excessive short-term orientation and an affective risk response by fishers can overwhelm feelings of ownership. In such cases, fishers and fishing communities can exert sufficient pressure on TAC setting and reduce the effectiveness of ITQ fisheries toward rebuilding fish stocks. Based on our analysis that draws on cognitive psychology, short-termism, and affective risk, we suggest heightened and wider democratic involvement by stakeholders in co-managed ITQ fisheries along with potential pilot tests of government-assisted financial transfers to help in transitioning ITQ fisheries to sustainable states.