Aspects of Regret Theory and Disappointment Theory As Alternatives to the Expected Utility Hypothesis

1991 ◽  
pp. 95-103
Author(s):  
Ole Fugleberg
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Regret Theory ◽  
Disappointment Theory

scholarly journals Risk Route Choice Analysis and the Equilibrium Model under Anticipated Regret Theory

2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-43
Author(s):  
Pengcheng Yuan ◽  
Zhicai Juan
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Equilibrium Model ◽  
Route Choice ◽  
Real Data ◽  
User Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Regret Theory ◽  
Anticipated Regret ◽  
Choice Behaviour ◽  
The Real

The assumption about travellers’ route choice behaviour has major influence on the traffic flow equilibrium analysis. Previous studies about the travellers’ route choice were mainly based on the expected utility maximization theory. However, with the gradually increasing knowledge about the uncertainty of the transportation system, the researchers have realized that there is much constraint in expected util­ity maximization theory, because expected utility maximiza­tion requires travellers to be ‘absolutely rational’; but in fact, travellers are not truly ‘absolutely rational’. The anticipated regret theory proposes an alternative framework to the tra­ditional risk-taking in route choice behaviour which might be more scientific and reasonable. We have applied the antici­pated regret theory to the analysis of the risk route choosing process, and constructed an anticipated regret utility func­tion. By a simple case which includes two parallel routes, the route choosing results influenced by the risk aversion degree, regret degree and the environment risk degree have been analyzed. Moreover, the user equilibrium model based on the anticipated regret theory has been established. The equivalence and the uniqueness of the model are proved; an efficacious algorithm is also proposed to solve the model. Both the model and the algorithm are demonstrated in a real network. By an experiment, the model results and the real data have been compared. It was found that the model re­sults can be similar to the real data if a proper regret degree parameter is selected. This illustrates that the model can better explain the risk route choosing behaviour. Moreover, it was also found that the traveller’ regret degree increases when the environment becomes more and more risky.

Probability Dominance

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (5) ◽  
pp. 1006-1020
Author(s):  
Enrico Diecidue ◽  
Haim Levy ◽  
Moshe Levy
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Cumulative Prospect Theory ◽  
Economic Consequences ◽  
Regret Theory ◽  
Decisions Under Risk ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Probability Dominance

The most commonly employed paradigms for decision making under risk are expected utility, prospect theory, and regret theory. We examine the simple heuristic of maximizing the probability of being ahead, which in some natural economic situations may be in contradiction to all three of the above fundamental paradigms. We test whether this heuristic, which we call probability dominance (PD), affects decisions under risk. We set up head-to-head situations where all preferences of a given class (expected utility, original or cumulative prospect theory, or regret theory) favor one alternative yet PD favors the other. Our experiments reveal that 49% of subjects' choices are aligned with PD in contradiction to any form of expected utility or prospect theory maximization; 73% are aligned with PD as opposed to preferences under risk aversion and under original and cumulative prospect theory preferences; and 68% to 76% are aligned with PD contradicting preferences under regret theory. We conclude that probability dominance substantially affects choices and should therefore be incorporated into decision-making models. We show that PD has significant economic consequences. The PD heuristic may have evolved through situations of winner-take-all competition.

scholarly journals Towards a Sociology of Regret

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 9-46
Author(s):  
Mikhail Sokolov
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Regret Theory ◽  
Anticipated Regret ◽  
Collective Actions ◽  
Sunk Cost ◽  
Human Decision ◽  
Future Self ◽  
Anticipate Regret

The paper looks into sociological implications of two discussions currently developing in behavioral economics and organizations theory: (1) regret theory, exploring the proposition that human decision making is governed by avoiding anticipated regret, rather than maximizing expected utility, and (2) studies of sunk cost fallacy, consisting in making decisions aimed at justifying previous decisions. We argue that these two areas of theorizing, presently isolated, are dealing with essentially the same phenomenon. This becomes evident if we recognize that choices are organized in sequences, with the merits of each particular choice being evaluated in the light of outcomes of the whole sequence. We then explore some general conditions of the ability to anticipate regret: interaction with one’s future Self and sequential organizations of states an individual find him/herself. We then discuss some widely spread forms of individual adaptations to the threat of experiencing regret: dissonance avoidance, prospective rationalization, cultivation of prescience, de-sequencing and open endings. We further explore various forms of collective actions involving regret avoidance, using the development of the sociological discipline as an example.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document