Two Models of Foundation in the Logical Investigations

The article proposes a reconstruction of the Kunstlehre concept, which occupies an important place in the structural and disciplinary section of Husserl's phenomenology. The key point of the presented reconstruction is its separation from the traditional interpretation of Kunstlehre criticized by Husserl and the advancement of a new project that coordinates three levels – theoretical, normative and practical. The theoretical level (pure logic), being complementary to the normative level (pure norms of reason), forms the basis of the disciplines represented by the program of science of knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre). The scientific study program falls on the period of the so- called logicism of Husserl, regarding which there is an opinion in the research literature that it was interrupted by the founder of phenomenology immediately after the writing of the first volume of “Logical Investigations”. However, on the basis of textual arguments, we show that this program was extended by Husserl up to his last works. The nature of this expansion is related to the practical level of Kunstlehre (transcendental phenomenology). The main task of this level was to provide science and scientists with noetic conditions, i.e. skills of transcendental criticism of consciousness. It is suggested that the presented reconstruction of Kunstlehre shows the permanent development of the program of logicism by Husserl, and also demonstrates the connection of this program with transcendental phenomenology.

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A recepção das Investigações Lógicas por Paul Natorp

Phainomenon ◽

10.2478/phainomenon-2008-0014 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 16-17 (1) ◽

pp. 55-80

Author(s):

Carlos Morujão

Keyword(s):

Strong Influence ◽

Special Kind ◽

Central Theme ◽

Logical Investigations ◽

And Function ◽

Point Of Reference

Abstract The paper offers a survey of the debate between Husserl and Paul Natorp that followed the publication, by the former, of Logical Investigations, in 1900-1901. Beyond a general agreement on the nature of psychologism and the ways to struggle against it, Husserl and Natorp disagreed, at the time, on the nature and function of consciousness. As Natorp defended, since his Introduction to Psychology of 1888, that the objective contents of consciousness are distinct from the I as the subjective (and unobjectifiable) point of reference of them all, Husserl remarks the inner contradiction of these argument; as long as philosophy pretends to speak of such an I it has to be treated as an object, albeit of a special kind. In the Logical Investigations, nevertheless, Husserl stresses that it is not even necessary to admit the existence of such an I to explain the acts of consciousness. However, and that is the central theme of the paper, the later evolution of Husserl’s thought and finally his «transcendental turn» can only be fully comprehensible from the admission of a strong influence of the previous criticized thesis of Natorp.

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