Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations. Volume I. Prolegomena to Pure Logic

The article proposes a reconstruction of the Kunstlehre concept, which occupies an important place in the structural and disciplinary section of Husserl's phenomenology. The key point of the presented reconstruction is its separation from the traditional interpretation of Kunstlehre criticized by Husserl and the advancement of a new project that coordinates three levels – theoretical, normative and practical. The theoretical level (pure logic), being complementary to the normative level (pure norms of reason), forms the basis of the disciplines represented by the program of science of knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre). The scientific study program falls on the period of the so- called logicism of Husserl, regarding which there is an opinion in the research literature that it was interrupted by the founder of phenomenology immediately after the writing of the first volume of “Logical Investigations”. However, on the basis of textual arguments, we show that this program was extended by Husserl up to his last works. The nature of this expansion is related to the practical level of Kunstlehre (transcendental phenomenology). The main task of this level was to provide science and scientists with noetic conditions, i.e. skills of transcendental criticism of consciousness. It is suggested that the presented reconstruction of Kunstlehre shows the permanent development of the program of logicism by Husserl, and also demonstrates the connection of this program with transcendental phenomenology.

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What Would a Phenomenology of Logic Look Like?

Mind ◽

10.1093/mind/fzaa031 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 129 (516) ◽

pp. 1009-1031

Author(s):

James Kinkaid

Keyword(s):

Logical Consequence ◽

Philosophy Of Logic ◽

Contemporary Philosophy ◽

Consequence Relations ◽

Consequence Relation ◽

If Logic ◽

Pure Logic ◽

Logical Investigations ◽

Normative Status ◽

Selection Of

Abstract The phenomenological movement begins in the Prolegomena to Husserl’s Logical Investigations as a philosophy of logic. Despite this, remarkably little attention has been paid to Husserl’s arguments in the Prolegomena in the contemporary philosophy of logic. In particular, the literature spawned by Gilbert Harman’s work on the normative status of logic is almost silent on Husserl’s contribution to this topic. I begin by raising a worry for Husserl’s conception of ‘pure logic’ similar to Harman’s challenge to explain the connection between logic and reasoning. If logic is the study of the forms of all possible theories, it will include the study of many logical consequence relations; by what criteria, then, should we select one (or a distinguished few) consequence relation(s) as correct? I consider how Husserl might respond to this worry by looking to his late account of the ‘genealogy of logic’ in connection with Gurwitsch’s claim that ‘[i]t is to prepredicative perceptual experience … that one must return for a radical clarification and for the definitive justification of logic’. Drawing also on Sartre and Heidegger, I consider how prepredicative experience might constrain or guide our selection of a logical consequence relation and our understanding of connectives like implication and negation.

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Husserl's Logical Investigations: The Phenomenological Revolution

Elements ◽

10.6017/eurj.v3i2.9003 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 3 (2) ◽

Author(s):

Alex Yiannopoulos

Keyword(s):

Jacques Derrida ◽

Philosophy Of Language ◽

Edmund Husserl ◽

Western Philosophy ◽

Old Order ◽

Traditional Account ◽

Logical Investigations

The view that language is a vehicle for the communication of (immaterial) "concepts," in opposition with the (physical) "words" that carry them, is the foundation of Western philosophy of language, and perhaps the foundation of Western philosophy in general. As Edmund Husserl and Jacques Derrida confront this relationship between ideality and reality in language, the old order promulgating this binary comes into question. The following essay explores this challenge to the traditional account of language as well as its wider implications for ontology and subjectivity.

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A crise dos fundamentos das ciências modernas: Uma leitura a partir de Edmund Husserl

Pensando - Revista de Filosofia ◽

10.26694/pensando.v7i14.3907 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 7 (14) ◽

pp. 27

Author(s):

Rogério Miranda de Almeida ◽

Irineu Letenski

Keyword(s):

20Th Century ◽

Edmund Husserl ◽

Modern Science ◽

Subject Knowledge ◽

Starting Point ◽

The World ◽

Logical Investigations ◽

The Subject ◽

Scientific Positivism

Estas reflexões têm como objetivo principal analisar a crise dos fundamentos das ciências modernas na perspectiva de Edmund Husserl. Com efeito, na primeira metade do século XX, o autor das Investigações lógicas levanta o brado em torno da existência de uma crise científica e, ao mesmo tempo, procura diagnosticar as causas e remediar os males que acarretaram tal crise. Mais precisamente, o pensamento husserliano tem como ponto de partida a crítica aos limites e à possibilidade do conhecimento proposto pelas filosofias de Descartes e de Kant. Mas Husserl ataca igualmente o espírito reducionista do positivismo científico – com o desenvolvimento e a sofisticação de suas técnicas – assim como a imposição não menos reducionista do historicismo que, ao afastarem o “sujeito do mundo”, romperam suas “relações primigênias”, espoliando assim o papel do sujeito na construção do conhecimento.Abstract: These reflections aim principally at analyzing the crisis of the modern science foundations from Edmund Husserl’s perspective. Indeed, at the first half of the 20th century, the author of Logical Investigations points vehemently out to the existence of a scientific crisis and tries, at the same time, to diagnose the causes and to show a solution to the disadvantages that brought about such a crisis. More precisely, the Husserlian thought has as its starting point the critique against the limits and the possibilities of knowledge proposed by the philosophies of Descartes and Kant. However, Husserl also attacks the reducing spirit of scientific positivism – together with the development and sophistication of its techniques – as well as the no less reducing and imposing historicism. Both trends have not only removed the “world subject”, but also disrupted its “primeval relations” having, thus, deprived the role of the subject in the construction of knowledge.Keywords: Husserl, crisis, sciences, subject, knowledge.

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Sobre a relação entre os níveis de lógica doutrinária nos Prolegômenos à lógica pura de E. Husserl

Problemata ◽

10.7443/problemata.v11i5.50428 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 11 (5) ◽

pp. 228-254

Author(s):

Ícaro Miguel Ibiapina Machado

Keyword(s):

Research Methods ◽

Pure Logic ◽

Logical Investigations ◽

Normative Logic ◽

Specific Part ◽

Do So

Focusing on the introductory volume of Logical Investigations, by E. Husserl (Prolegomena to Pure Logic), the present paper aims to clarify the interactions between his conceptions of Logic as a discipline. This task was performed, mainly, by exposing their respective positions before the layers of Science, also extracted from the work. In this sense, it has been found that each of these disciplines relates to a specific part of Science. Thus (simply) Normative Logic has its sentences directed to Knowledge, understood in a subjective and ideal way. Pratical Logic turns to research methods, thus regulating human scientific activities. However, what is most significant for all these disciplines is that they do so in a general way, comprehending globally their corresponding areas of science. Hereupon, it is found, starting from the notion that knowledge is subjectivation of objectivity, that these disciplines are subordinated to the Pure Logic, which, in turn, have formal laws directed, in the most general way, towards all the objectivity of science. In this sense, the main contribution brought by the research is the idea of a hierarchical flow throughout each doctrine, which emanates from Pure Logic until it reaches, by way of Normative Logic, Technological Logic.

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The Logic of “Validity”

Questions of Phenomenology ◽

10.5422/fordham/9780823233731.003.0001 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Françoise Dastur ◽

Robert Vallier

Keyword(s):

Martin Heidegger ◽

Final Stage ◽

Edmund Husserl ◽

Theory Of Knowledge ◽

Husserlian Phenomenology ◽

Winter Semester ◽

Theory Of Ideas ◽

Logical Investigations

This chapter examines R. Hermann Lotze's interpretation of the theory of ideas and how it influenced the development of Husserlian phenomenology by offering a reading of Lotze's third book of his Logic. It suggests that, although he had assimilated Lotze's theory of validity (Geltung) and theory of ideas, Edmund Husserl proposes a theory of knowledge that is different from Lotze's. It argues that, as Martin Heidegger did in his Winter Semester 1925–1926 course, Husserl rejoins Aristotle's theory of the reciprocal opposition of the known and the knower, and thus begins to escape the impasse to which the modern notion of object leads at the level of the sixth of his Logical Investigations. For, as Heidegger claims, with the Lotzian theory of Geltung, the final stage of the decadence of the question of truth is not yet achieved.

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