Practical reason or metapreferences? an undogmatic defense of kantian morality

1991 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Nida-Rümelin
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Kantian Morality

Schiller's Critique of Kant's Moral Psychology: Reconciling Practical Reason and an Ethics of Virtue

1997 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey A. Gauthier
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Friedrich Schiller ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Kantian Morality ◽  
Kantian Moral Theory

Mention of the name of Friedrich Schiller among both critics and defenders of Kant's moral philosophy has most often been with reference to the well known quip:“Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure.Hence I am plagued with doubt that I am not a virtuous person.““Sure, your only resource is to try to despise them entirely,And then with aversion to do what your duty enjoins you.''This attention, however, has served to obscure the fact that Schiller truly intended his remark as a joke, representing a serious, if understandable, misinterpretation of Kantian morality. Though Schiller's various attempts to articulate a theory of moral motivation include important divergences from Kant's account, they represent a response to a set of problems that arise in the context of Kantian moral theory. As such, they may be of greatest interest to moralists who are working within the Kantian tradition. In this paper, I clarify certain points of Schiller's critique of Kant's account of moral motivation and place them in the context of his broader project of reconciling Kantianism and an ethics of virtue.

OS POSTULADOS DA RAZÃO PRÁTICA PURA E O CRISTIANISMO

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (135) ◽  
pp. 99
Author(s):  
Gabriel Almeida Assumpção
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Highest Good ◽  
Immortality Of The Soul ◽  
Kantian Morality

Resumo: A leitura da Crítica da Razão Prática permite perceber que a moral kantiana não consiste em mero formalismo, abrindo espaço para uma discussão sobre os fins morais. O fim último a que o ser racional cuja vontade é determinada pela lei moral se propõe a produzir é o conceito de sumo Bem, ligação sintética a priori entre virtude como causa e felicidade moralmente condicionada como efeito. Ciente das dificuldades para a produção do objeto proposto, Kant recorre aos postulados da razão prática pura (liberdade, imortalidade da alma e existência de Deus) e estabelece um contraponto entre o cristianismo e escolas pagãs da antiguidade que não aceitariam tais pressuposições (na visão de Kant), os estóicos e os epicuristas. Buscamos mostrar, com o presente estudo, a fecundidade do diálogo entre Kant e o cristianismo, bem como o esforço kantiano de tentar fazer jus a diferentes dimensões do ser humano: tanto a afetividade quanto a moralidade.Abstract: Reading the Critique of Practical Reason enables us to realize that Kantian morality is not mere formalism, but is rather an opening to discuss moral ends. The ultimate goal of the rational being, whose will is determined by moral law, is the concept of the Highest Good, the a priori synthetic connection between virtue as a cause and a morally conditioned happiness as an effect. Aware of the difficulties related to the proposed object, Kant resorts to the postulates of practical reason (freedom, immortality of the soul and the existence of God) and counterpoints Christianity with two ancient pagan schools, the Stoics and the Epicureans, which, according to the philosopher, would not accept such assumptions. The present study aims to show there is a fecund dialogue between Kant and Christianity, as well as the author’s attempt to do justice to the following dimensions of the human being: affectivity and morality.

scholarly journals La conception ricoeurienne de la raison pratique: dialectique ou éclectique?

2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 156-171
Author(s):  
Laurent Jaffro
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Paul Ricoeur ◽  
Paul Ricœur ◽  
Aristotelian Ethics ◽  
Kantian Morality

This article examines and discusses the presuppositions behind the answer that Paul Ricœur brought to the question “What is practical reason?” in a series of studies that led to the “little ethics” of Oneself as Another.  The conception defended by Ricœur is presented as a sort of reconciliation, or composition, of Aristotelian ethics and Kantian morality. Two problems in particular are raised: the first is raised by the questionable nature of Ricœur’s interpretation of the positions that he synthesizes; the second concerns the model - dialectic or eclectic – of this synthesis.

FILSAFAT RUMAH TANGGA: TELAAH PEMIKIRAN KHAWAJAH NASHIRUDDIN ATH-THUSI

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 32
Author(s):  
Itmam Aulia Rakhman
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Mutual Respect ◽  
Complex Society ◽  
The Family ◽  
The Mind

Ath-Thusi uses Aristotle's understanding of the practical reason of the theory of surgery. According to Ath-Thusi, the cause of deviation is anything excessive. Thus, the unbalanced state of the soul is caused by the advantages, disadvantages, or morbidity of the mind. Diversity in a society is a necessity, a household, as the smallest community of a complex society and full of differences, it is certainly necessary to be based on the building of togetherness and mutual respect between one another. This article will describe the creative ideas of Khawajah Nashiruddin Ath-Thusi related to the philosophy of the household in order to answer the present-day problematic of the family.

Neither Humean nor (Fully) Kantian Be

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey Siegel
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Educational Ideal

This chapter offers a reply to Stefaan Cuypers’ explication and critique of the views of rationality and critical thinking laid out in the previous chapters and in earlier work (see his “Critical Thinking, Autonomy and Practical Reason,” 2004). While Cuypers’ discussion is praiseworthy in several respects, it (1) mistakenly attributes to those views a Humean conception of (practical) reason, and (2) unsuccessfully argues that the positions articulated and defended in those earlier chapters lack the resources required to defend the basic claim that critical thinking is a fundamental educational ideal. Cuypers’ analysis also raises deep issues about the motivational character of reasons; I briefly address this matter as well.

The Interplay of Intention and Reason

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael E. Bratman
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Rationality ◽  
Special Role ◽  
Pragmatic Theory ◽  
Related Idea ◽  
David Gauthier ◽  
Extended Agency ◽  
Extended Life

In a series of essays—in particular, his 1994 essay “Assure and Threaten”—David Gauthier develops a two-tier pragmatic theory of practical rationality and argues, within that theory, for a distinctive account of the rationality of following through with prior assurances or threats. His discussion suggests that certain kinds of temporally extended agency play a special role in one’s temporally extended life going well. I argue that a related idea about diachronic self-governance helps explain a sense in which an accepted deliberative standard can be self-reinforcing. And this gives us resources to adjust Gauthier’s theory in response to a threat of what Kieran Setiya has called a “fragmentation of practical reason.”

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