Schiller's Critique of Kant's Moral Psychology: Reconciling Practical Reason and an Ethics of Virtue

1997 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey A. Gauthier
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Friedrich Schiller ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Kantian Morality ◽  
Kantian Moral Theory

Mention of the name of Friedrich Schiller among both critics and defenders of Kant's moral philosophy has most often been with reference to the well known quip:“Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure.Hence I am plagued with doubt that I am not a virtuous person.““Sure, your only resource is to try to despise them entirely,And then with aversion to do what your duty enjoins you.''This attention, however, has served to obscure the fact that Schiller truly intended his remark as a joke, representing a serious, if understandable, misinterpretation of Kantian morality. Though Schiller's various attempts to articulate a theory of moral motivation include important divergences from Kant's account, they represent a response to a set of problems that arise in the context of Kantian moral theory. As such, they may be of greatest interest to moralists who are working within the Kantian tradition. In this paper, I clarify certain points of Schiller's critique of Kant's account of moral motivation and place them in the context of his broader project of reconciling Kantianism and an ethics of virtue.

Nietzsche and Contemporary Ethics

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Robertson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Critical Assessment ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Ethical Thought ◽  
Normative Authority ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Principal Parts

Nietzsche is one of the most subversive ethical thinkers of the Western canon. This book offers a critical assessment of his ethical thought and its significance for contemporary moral philosophy. It develops a charitable but critical reading of his thought, pushing some claims and arguments as far as seems fruitful while rejecting others. But it also uses Nietzsche in dialogue with, so to contribute to, a range of long-standing issues within normative ethics, metaethics, value theory, practical reason, and moral psychology. The book is divided into three principal parts. Part I examines Nietzsche’s critique of morality, arguing that it raises well-motivated challenges to morality’s normative authority and value: his error theory about morality’s categoricity is in a better position than many contemporary versions; and his critique of moral values has bite even against undemanding moral theories, with significant implications not just for rarefied excellent types but also us. Part II turns to moral psychology, attributing to Nietzsche and defending a sentimentalist explanation of action and motivation. Part III considers his non-moral perfectionism, developing models of value and practical normativity that avoid difficulties facing many contemporary accounts and that may therefore be of wider interest. The discussion concludes by considering Nietzsche’s broader significance: as well as calling into question many of moral philosophy’s deepest assumptions, he challenges our usual views of what ethics itself is—and what it, and we, should be doing.

Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Simon Robertson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Ethical Thought ◽  
Ethical Project

This opening chapter explains the book’s overarching aims, themes, structure, and approach. The book’s aim is to critically assess Nietzsche’s ethical thought and its significance for contemporary (broadly analytic) moral philosophy. It does this in two main ways: by developing a charitable but critical reconstruction of his ethics; and by using Nietzsche to contribute to a range of longstanding issues within normative ethics, metaethics, value theory, practical reason, and moral psychology. The chapter locates Nietzsche’s ethical project in his ‘revaluation of all values’, outlining a variety of interpretive and philosophical puzzles this raises. It then gives a chapter-by-chapter overview of the book’s topics and direction, and addresses some methodological matters bearing on its interpretive and philosophical ambitions.

scholarly journals What Can Philosophers Learn from Psychopathy?

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heidi L. Maibom
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Current Evidence ◽  
Secondary Psychopathy

Many spectacular claims about psychopaths are circulated. This contribution aims at providing the reader with the more complex reality of the phenomenon (or phenomena), and to point to issues of particular interest to philosophers working in moral psychology and moral theory. I first discuss the current evidence regarding psychopaths’ deficient empathy and decision-making skills. I then explore what difference it makes to our thinking whether we regard their deficit dimensionally (as involving abilities that are on or off) and whether we focus on primary or secondary psychopathy. My conclusion is that most grand claims about psychopathy settling long-standing debates in moral philosophy and psychology are overblown, but there is much to be learnt from this disorder when it comes to formulating modern theories of moral psychology.

Simplicity and Authority: Reflections on Theory and Practice in Kant's Moral Philosophy

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Timmermann
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Philosopher ◽  
The Voice ◽  
Ethical Systems

AbstractWhat is the proper task of Kantian ethical theory? This paper seeks to answer this question with reference to Kant's reply to Christian Garve in Section I of his 1793 essay on Theory and Practice. Kant reasserts the distinctness and natural authority of our consciousness of the moral law. Every mature human being is a moral professional—even philosophers like Garve, if only they forget about their ill-conceived ethical systems and listen to the voice of pure practical reason. Normative theory, Kant argues, cannot be refuted with reference to alleged experience. It is the proper task of the moral philosopher to emphasize this fact. The paper also discusses Kant's attempts to clarify his moral psychology, philosophy of value and conception of the highest good in the course of replying to Garve's challenge.

scholarly journals Shame and Contempt in Kant's Moral Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krista K. Thomason
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Kantian Morality ◽  
Kantian Moral Theory

AbstractAttitudes like shame and contempt seem to be at odds with basic tenets of Kantian moral theory. I argue on the contrary that both attitudes play a central role in Kantian morality. Shame and contempt are attitudes that protect our love of honour, or the esteem we have for ourselves as moral persons. The question arises: how are these attitudes compatible with Kant's claim that all persons deserve respect? I argue that the proper object of shame and contempt is not the humanity within a person, but rather her self-conceit, or the false esteem that competes with love of honour.

“May You Live in Interesting Times”: Moral Philosophy and Empirical Psychology

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-353
Author(s):  
Nancy E. Snow
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Empirical Psychology ◽  
Philosophical Writing ◽  
Gilbert Harman

The Moral Psychology Handbook is a contribution to a relatively new genre of philosophical writing, the “handbook.” In the first section, I comment on an expectation about handbooks, namely that handbooks contain works representative of a field, and raise concerns about The Moral Psychology Handbook in this regard. In the rest of the article I comment in detail on two Handbook articles, “Moral Motivation” by Timothy Schroeder, Adina Roskies, and Shaun Nichols, and “Character” by Maria W. Merritt, John M. Doris, and Gilbert Harman. Both articles illustrate the perils as well as the promise of reliance on empirical studies for philosophers who work in moral psychology.

scholarly journals The Moral Philosophy of Maria Montessori

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
PATRICK FRIERSON
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Social Solidarity ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
Maria Montessori ◽  
Individual Character ◽  
Individual Self ◽  
Shared Agency

Abstract This paper lays out the moral theory of philosopher and educator Maria Montessori (1870–1952). Based on a moral epistemology wherein moral concepts are grounded in a well-cultivated moral sense, Montessori develops a threefold account of moral life. She starts with an account of character as an ideal of individual self-perfection through concentrated attention on effortful work. She shows how respect for others grows from and supplements individual character, and she further develops a notion of social solidarity that goes beyond cooperation toward shared agency. Partly because she attends to children's ethical lives, Montessori highlights how character, respect, and solidarity all appear first as prereflective, embodied orientations of agency. Full moral virtue takes up prereflective orientations reflectively and extends them through moral concepts. Overall, Montessori's ethic improves on features similar to some in Nietzschean, Kantian, Hegelian, or Aristotelian ethical theories while situating these within a developmental and perfectionist ethics.

scholarly journals A Crítica da razão prática e o estoicismo

DoisPontos ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Valério Rohden
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Precise Determination ◽  
Ancient Ethics ◽  
The Subject

No presente trabalho será demonstrada a estreita, embora discreta, relação da filosofia moral de Kant com a ética antiga, especialmente com o estoicismo de Cícero. O tema será explicitado mediante uma aproximação entre as obras da Crítica da razão prática e Sobre os fins (De finibus), respectivamente de cada um desses autores. Será destacada a crítica de Kant à identificação entre virtude e felicidade e sua reformulação sintética no conceito de “sumo bem”. Na conclusão se torna claro que a realização moral da razão, reivindicada por Cícero, encontra na reformulação de Kant sua determinação mais precisa. The crises of practical reason and stoicism Abstract The present paper shows the close albeit subtle relation of Kant’s moral philosophy to ancient ethics, especially Cicero’s Stoicism. The subject is made explicit by means of a rapprochement between the Critique of practical reason and De finibus, so as to be highlight Kant’s criticism of the classical identifying of virtue and happiness and his synthetical recasting of the concept of the supreme good. The essay concludes by making clear that the moral actualization of reason, reclaimed by Cicero, finds in Kant’s reformulation its most precise determination.

scholarly journals Between Kantian Rationalism and Moral Mysticism: The Search for the Grounding of Morality in the Philosophy of A. Jokubaitis

Politologija ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 73-94
Author(s):  
Aistė Noreikaitė
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
First Person ◽  
The Third ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Moral Subject ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
The One ◽  
Implicit Normativity

Although it is common to associate the thought of A. Jokubaitis with political philosophy, this article argues that his texts also allow us to talk about a specific moral philosophy of A. Jokubaitis. At the center of it we find an attempt to articulate and discuss the grounding ideas of morality. The article argues that the first two ideas – an idea of unconditional character of morality and an idea of ontological grounding – are related to Kant’s influence on A. Jokubaitis philosophy. These two ideas allow us to explain morality as an autonomous part of reality, which is different from the empirical one but nonetheless real. This part of reality is grounded in the first-person perspective of a moral subject and can be characterized by implicit normativity and unconditionality. The first-person perspective structures a radically different relation to our reality, which allows us to be agents, not simply spectators. Such an interpretation of Kant allows to associate A. Jokubaitis with his contemporary Kantians, such as Ch. Korsgaard, B. Herman, O. O’Neill, and A. Reath. However, the third idea, the one of a person, which becomes more visible in his book Politinis idiotas, transcends the Kantian conception of practical reason and encourages to perceive morality and its grounding in a much wider context. The concept of a person allows A. Jokubaitis to distance himself from Kantian rationalism and integrate social and mystical aspects of morality, which he has always found important.

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