Dynamic focal points in N-person coordination games

1996 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Kramarz



Author(s):  
Lee Cronk ◽  
Beth L. Leech

This chapter discusses coordination problems in relation to cooperation. Coordination problems are essentially problems of information: although people would benefit from coordinating their activities, they lack common knowledge about how to do so. Even worse, they may actually have common knowledge about how to solve the problem but not know it. Thomas Schelling recognized one way to overcome this problem: focus on prominent, salient focal points that others are also likely to focus on. The chapter first examines the so-called “Theory of Mind” or “mentalizing” before explaining how collective action dilemmas can become coordination problems. It also explores trust and conflict in coordination games such as Stag Hunt Games and the Battle of the Sexes Game, concluding with anti-coordination games and how coordination operates in the real world.



1994 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Mehta ◽  
Chris Starmer ◽  
Robert Sugden




Dialogue ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 713-737
Author(s):  
ROBERT SUGDEN

In 1975, Gauthier discussed Schelling’spure coordination gamesand Hodgson’sHi-Lo game. While developing an original analysis of how rational players coordinate on ‘focal points,’ Gauthier argued, contrary to Schelling and Hodgson, that successful coordination in these games does not depend on deviations from conventional principles of individually rational choice. I argue that Gauthier’s analysis of constrained maximization inMorals by Agreement, which famously deviates from conventional game theory, has significant similarities with Schelling’s and Hodgson’s analyses of coordination. Constrained maximization can be thought of as a pragmatic and contractarian variant of the team-reasoning approach pioneered by Hodgson.







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