Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation

1994 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Mehta ◽  
Chris Starmer ◽  
Robert Sugden
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Investigation ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Focal Points

Meeting at Penn Station

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Cronk ◽  
Beth L. Leech
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Real World ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Focal Points ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
Battle Of The Sexes ◽  
Penn Station ◽  
Thomas Schelling

This chapter discusses coordination problems in relation to cooperation. Coordination problems are essentially problems of information: although people would benefit from coordinating their activities, they lack common knowledge about how to do so. Even worse, they may actually have common knowledge about how to solve the problem but not know it. Thomas Schelling recognized one way to overcome this problem: focus on prominent, salient focal points that others are also likely to focus on. The chapter first examines the so-called “Theory of Mind” or “mentalizing” before explaining how collective action dilemmas can become coordination problems. It also explores trust and conflict in coordination games such as Stag Hunt Games and the Battle of the Sexes Game, concluding with anti-coordination games and how coordination operates in the real world.

scholarly journals Efficiency, Equality, and Labeling: An Experimental Investigation of Focal Points in Explicit Bargaining

2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (10) ◽  
pp. 3256-3287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Isoni ◽  
Anders Poulsen ◽  
Robert Sugden ◽  
Kei Tsutsui
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Investigation ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Strong Tendency ◽  
Focal Points ◽  
Bargaining Games ◽  
Spatial Cues ◽  
Or Efficiency ◽  
Distributional Effects ◽  
Experimental Games ◽  
Spatial Locations

We investigate Schelling's hypothesis that payoff-irrelevant labels (“cues”) can influence the outcomes of bargaining games with communication. In our experimental games, players negotiate over the division of a surplus by claiming valuable objects that have payoff-irrelevant spatial locations. Negotiation occurs in continuous time, constrained by a deadline. In some games, spatial cues are opposed to principles of equality or efficiency. We find a strong tendency for players to agree on efficient and minimally unequal payoff divisions, even if spatial cues suggest otherwise. But if there are two such divisions, cues are often used to select between them, inducing distributional effects. (JEL C78, D63, D83)

scholarly journals On David Gauthier’s Theories of Coordination and Cooperation

Dialogue ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 713-737
Author(s):  
ROBERT SUGDEN
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Focal Points ◽  
Team Reasoning ◽  
Original Analysis ◽  
Constrained Maximization ◽  
Rational Players

In 1975, Gauthier discussed Schelling’spure coordination gamesand Hodgson’sHi-Lo game. While developing an original analysis of how rational players coordinate on ‘focal points,’ Gauthier argued, contrary to Schelling and Hodgson, that successful coordination in these games does not depend on deviations from conventional principles of individually rational choice. I argue that Gauthier’s analysis of constrained maximization inMorals by Agreement, which famously deviates from conventional game theory, has significant similarities with Schelling’s and Hodgson’s analyses of coordination. Constrained maximization can be thought of as a pragmatic and contractarian variant of the team-reasoning approach pioneered by Hodgson.

Dynamic focal points in N-person coordination games

1996 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Kramarz
Keyword(s):  
Coordination Games ◽  
Focal Points
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