An empirical note on the impact of federal deposit insurance on bank failures in the U.S.

1997 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Cebula ◽  
Willie J. Belton
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Bank Failures ◽  
Empirical Note ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The U.S

scholarly journals FDICIA and Risk Shifting 1n the Banking Industry

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-116
Author(s):  
Seok-Weon Lee
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Systematic Risk ◽  
Full Sample ◽  
Risk Taking Behavior ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance ◽  
Asset Size ◽  
The U.S

This is an empirical study that examines how the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 in the U.S. banking industry affects the moral hazard risk-taking incentives of banks. We find that FDICIA appears to be effective in significantly reducing the systematic risk-taking incentives of the banks. Considering that the banks' asset portfolios are necessarily largely systematic risk-related, the significant decrease in their systematic risk-taking incentives provides some evidence of the effectiveness of FDICIA. However, with respect to the nonsystematic risk-taking behavior, the results generally indicate statistically insignificant decreases in the risk-taking incentives after FDICIA. To well-diversified investors who can diversify nonsystematic risk away, nonsystematic risk may not be a risk any more. However, to maintain a sound banking environment and to reduce the risk to individual banks, this result implies that regulatory agents should monitor the banks’ nonsystematic risk-taking behavior more closely, as long as it is positively related to the banks’ failures. We further test the change in the risk-taking incentives by partitioning the full sample into two groups: Banks with higher moral hazard incentives as those with larger asset size and lower capital ratio and banks with lower moral hazard incentives as those with smaller asset size and higher capital ratio. The main result for this test is that, with FDICIA, the decrease in the risk-taking incentives of the banks with higher moral hazard incentives (larger asset-size and lower capital-ratio banks) is less than that of the banks with lower moral hazard incentives (smaller asset-size and higher capital-ratio banks), with respect to both systematic and nonsystematic risk-taking measures. Furthermore, the change in the nonsystematic risk-taking incentives of the banks with higher moral hazard incentives is rather mixed, while their systematic incentives are decreased. These findings imply that the regulatory agents should allocate more time and effort toward monitoring the banks with higher moral hazard incentives with particular emphasis on their nonsystematic risk-taking behavior.

scholarly journals Examining the Relationship between Land Values and Credit Availability

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Ana Claudia Sant’Anna ◽  
Cortney Cowley ◽  
Ani L. Katchova
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Land Values ◽  
County Level ◽  
Macroeconomic Factors ◽  
Credit Availability ◽  
Regulatory Changes ◽  
Panel Fixed Effects ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Increased credit availability facilitates land acquisition, but higher land values also hinder it. We investigate the impact of credit availability on land values, after regulatory changes in the lending system. We build an index of increased credit availability using Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation data. County-level panel fixed effects estimations are performed controlling for land value determinants, credit availability, and county-level macroeconomic factors. We find that estimating the effects of credit availability separately masks its total effect. Results show a 0.1 change in the index for increased credit availability is associated with 1.64–1.96% increase in land values.

Factors related to the failure of FDIC-insured US banks

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Jordi Maura-Pérez ◽  
Herminio Romero-Perez
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Capital Adequacy ◽  
Bank Failures ◽  
Main Hypothesis ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Explanatory Factors ◽  
Selection Strategies ◽  
Capital Ratios ◽  
The 2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance

Purpose This study aims to analyze the factors related to the failure of 535 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)-Insured United States banks in conjunction with the 2008 financial crisis. Design/methodology/approach The research consists of an analysis of the following three five-year partitions: pre-crisis (2002–2006), crisis (2007–2011) and post-crisis (2012–2016). The main hypothesis is that the factors explaining bank failures vary by period. Using logistic regression analysis, the authors identify the desirable models by period based on three model selection strategies. Findings Liquidity and non-risk-based capital ratios are important explanatory factors in all three periods. As the authors can see from the results, when comparing the full period (2002–2016) and the three five-year period partitions (2002–2006, 2007–2011 and 2012–2016), the ratios change from period to period, but they measure the same financial areas of concern in different contexts as follows: liquidity, leverage/risk exposure and capital adequacy. Risk-based capital ratios are not effective predictors of bank failures. Originality/value Recent academic studies have analyzed bank failures during periods that cover the years before, during and after the crisis, but most of these studies discuss bank failures in the forecasting context only. This study includes an analysis of failure determinants during pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis subperiods based on the FDIC monitoring system of bank failures and identifies what ratios are more relevant during each period and how they change from period to period.

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