From plurality rule to proportional representation

ABSTRACTAccording to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters’ positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate “shirking” by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters’ relative electoral influence resulting from malapportionment. We expect defections in roll call votes to be more likely among legislators elected from overrepresented districts than among those from other districts. We empirically test this claim using data on Argentine legislators’ voting records and a unique dataset of estimates of voters’ and legislators’ placements in a common ideological space. Our findings suggest that even under electoral rules known for promoting unified parties, we should expect strategic defections to please voters, which can be advantageous for the party’s electoral fortunes.

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Equitable Access, Locale, Funding, and the Alignment to Performance Ratings in Texas Gifted Programs

journal for the education of the gifted ◽

10.1177/0162353220978306 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 44 (1) ◽

pp. 3-30

Author(s):

Jaret Hodges ◽

Kacey Crutchfield ◽

Lindsay Ellis Lee

Keyword(s):

Program Evaluation ◽

Hispanic Students ◽

Proportional Representation ◽

Performance Ratings ◽

Future Research ◽

Gifted Children ◽

Gifted Programs ◽

Gifted Program ◽

Self Assessments ◽

Talented Students

Self-assessments utilizing designated, objective standards are critical in program evaluation. Although 2013–2014 Texas policy mandated districts self-assess their gifted programs using the community and student engagement performance rating system, little is known about how districts determined their self-assessment ratings. Following gifted program evaluation guidelines from the Texas State Plan for Gifted/Talented Students and the National Association for Gifted Children Pre-K–Grade 12 Gifted Programming Standards, researchers used logistic ordered regression to examine Texas districts’ 2014–2015 locale, proportional representation, and budgetary allotments in relation to gifted program self-assessed performance ratings. Results indicate proportional representation of Black and Hispanic students in gifted programs did not influence school district self-assessed ratings. On the contrary, locale, proportion of Black and Hispanic students to the overall district population, and budget allocation did relate to self-assessed ratings of gifted programs. Future research directions and implications for the use of self-assessments within gifted program evaluation are discussed.

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Was Duverger Correct? Single-Member District Election Outcomes in Fifty-three Countries

British Journal of Political Science ◽

10.1017/s0007123412000233 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 43 (1) ◽

pp. 201-220 ◽

Cited By ~ 34

Author(s):

Matthew M. Singer

Keyword(s):

Institutional Arrangements ◽

District Level ◽

Party Competition ◽

Plurality Rule ◽

Third Place ◽

Institutional Rules ◽

Large Numbers ◽

Level Data ◽

Number Of Parties ◽

Duverger's Law

In districts where only one seat is contested, the electoral formula (plurality or majority) should be a major determinant of the number of parties that receive votes. Specifically, plurality rule should generate two-party competition while other institutional arrangements should generate electoral fragmentation. Yet tests of these propositions using district-level data have focused on a limited number of cases; they rarely contrast different electoral systems and have reached mixed conclusions. This study analyses district-level data from 6,745 single-member district election contests from 53 democratic countries to test the evidence for Duverger's Law and Hypothesis. Double-ballot majoritarian systems have large numbers of candidates, as predicted, but while the average outcome under plurality rule is generally consistent with two-party competition, it is not perfectly so. The two largest parties typically dominate the districts (generally receiving more than 90 per cent of the vote), and there is very little support for parties finishing fourth or worse. Yet third-place parties do not completely disappear, and ethnic divisions shape party fragmentation levels, even under plurality rule. Finally, institutional rules that generate multiparty systems elsewhere in the country increase electoral fragmentation in single-member plurality districts.

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Designing Electoral Institutions: STV Systems and Their Consequences

Political Studies ◽

10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00755.x ◽

1996 ◽

Vol 44 (1) ◽

pp. 24-43 ◽

Cited By ~ 19

Author(s):

David M. Farrell ◽

Malcolm Mackerras ◽

Ian McAllister

Keyword(s):

Regression Analysis ◽

Party System ◽

Proportional Representation ◽

The Political ◽

Political Systems ◽

Electoral Institutions ◽

Generic Type ◽

Single Transferable Vote ◽

Party Strategies

Although championed by advocates of proportional representation, the single transferable vote form of PR has been used consistently in only a small number of countries – principally Australia, Ireland and Malta. This paper examines the origins and development of STV and its implications for the political systems that use it. The results show that STV varies so widely in its form and application, differing on no less than five major characteristics, that it is impossible to identify any single generic type. These differences are also reflected in the party strategies that are used to maximize the vote under STV. A regression analysis of the various types of STV shows that Malta is the most proportional system, followed by Ireland and Tasmania. Ireland has the largest party system among the countries that use STV, net of other factors.

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