„Sierp”, „Młot”, „Trybuna Radziecka”: tytuły polskojęzycznej prasy wydawanej w międzywojennym ZSRR

Sierp (The Sickle), Młot (The Hammer), Trybuna Radziecka (The Soviet Tribune): Titles of the Polish-Language Press Published in the Interwar USSRThis study is devoted to the titles of newspapers and magazines published in Polish in the USSR in 1918–1939. These periodicals are a reflection of a unique period – they were issued during the first decades after the 1917 revolution, under the conditions of state monopoly on information. The titles of newspapers and magazines had to conform to the single party line and ideology enforced in the USSR. The vocabulary used in the titles under scrutiny is discussed in the context of the features of Russian political propaganda at the time, as well as those of the Polish-language propaganda created on its basis. „Sierp”, „Młot”, „Trybuna Radziecka”: tytuły polskojęzycznej prasy wydawanej w międzywojennym ZSRRPrzedmiotem badania są tytuły gazet i czasopism publikowanych w języku polskim w latach 1918–1939 na terenie ZSRR. Periodyki te stanowią świadectwo szczególnej epoki – ukazywały się w pierwszych dekadach po rewolucji 1917 roku w warunkach państwowego monopolu informacyjnego. Tytuły gazet i czasopism zostały dostosowane do jednej linii politycznej i ideologicznej obowiązującej w ZSRR. Słownictwo wykorzystane w badanych tytułach prasowych zostało omówione na tle właściwości ówczesnej rosyjskiej propagandy politycznej i kształtującej się na jej wzór propagandy polskojęzycznej.

Promoting Connections Through Creative Approaches to Research Engagement for Older African Americans

This presentation will feature innovative retention approaches that contributed to sustaining connections to older Black participants in the long-standing Healthier Black Elders Center (HBEC). The HBEC aims to address and reduce health disparities through research and education. In 2020, this outreach has included a telephone outreach program and a weekly social group, “The Party Line,” to promote connections and collect data on mental health, coping mechanisms and newly acquired skills, as well as health care access including access to masks, testing and tele-health. The presentation will also describe tailored approaches to initiating a Community Advisory Board and programming in Flint, MI and creative efforts to retain participants in Detroit, MI, thus ensuring the relationships between researchers and older community members are sustained despite program modifications.

The Unmasked Electorate: Co-Partisanship, Personal Experience, and Perceptions of COVID-19 Risk in Mexico

Research suggests partisanship influences individual perceptions of COVID-19 risk and preventative behaviors. We ask a distinct but equally urgent question: what factors are associated with variation in risk perception among co-partisans? Even among members of the same party, some individuals’ risk perceptions reflect the party line while others deviate from it. We explore this question in Mexico, where the president utilized his rhetoric to downplay the severity of the pandemic. Why do some of the presidents’ co-partisans perceive COVID-19 as a serious risk (despite partisan appeals to the contrary), while others do not? Drawing on theories of risk perception, we hypothesize that this variation is associated with personal risk experience, like knowing someone who contracted COVID-19. We test this hypothesis via a large-n survey of MORENA supporters. We find that personal experiences are consistently associated with variation in risk perception. Strength of partisan ties, meanwhile, is only activated when paired with risk experience.

Women in Mozambique

Mozambique is divided into matrilineal north and patrilineal south, while the central part of the country has a mixture of the two. Both types of kinship organization have important implications for the situation of women. Women in matrilineal societies could access land and political and decision-making power. They had their own property and their children belonged to their matrikin. In patrilineal societies, women depended on their husbands and their kin groups in order to access farmland. Children and property belonged to the husband’s clan. During the colonial period (c. 1890–1975), women’s position in Mozambique was affected by the Indigenato regime (1917–1961). The native African population (classified as indígenas) were denied the rights of Portuguese citizenship and placed under the jurisdiction of local “traditional habits and customs” administered by the appointed chiefs. Despite the fact that Portuguese citizenship was extended to all independent of creed and race by the 1961 Overseas Administrative Reform, most rural African areas remained within the Indigenato regime until the end of colonialism in 1974. Portuguese colonialism adopted an assimilationist and “civilizing” stance and tried to domesticate African women and impose a patriarchal Christian model of family and gender relations. Women were active in the independence struggle and liberation war (1964–1974), contributing greatly to ending colonialism in Mozambique. In 1973, Frelimo launched a nationwide women’s organization, Organização da Mulher Moçambicana (Organization of Mozambican Women, OMM). Although women were encouraged to work for wages in the first decade after independence, they remained largely limited to the subsistence economy, especially in rural areas. The OMM upheld the party line describing women as “natural” caregivers. Only with the political and economic liberalizations of the 1990s were many women able to access new opportunities. The merging of various women’s organizations working in the country during this period helped to consolidate decades-long efforts to expand women’s political and legal rights in independent Mozambique. In the early 2000s, these efforts led to the reform of the family law, which was crucial for the improvement of women’s rights and conditions in Mozambique.

China’s viral villages: Digital nationalism and the COVID-19 crisis on online video-sharing platform Bilibili

When the COVID-19 virus broke out in China, foreign observers speculated whether the Chinese leadership was facing its ‘Chernobyl Moment’. China’s leadership, however, defied foreign expectations about its ostensibly floundering legitimacy and instead turned the crisis into a national success story. This article explores the role that digital media played in cementing this success, specifically how various actors mobilized nationalist sentiments and discourses on the online video-sharing platform Bilibili. By focusing on visual discourses, online commentaries, and the affordances of the digital platform, the article analyses the role that ‘hip’ and youthful content played in the authorities’ attempts to guiding online audiences to rally around the flag. The results of these efforts were viral villages of community sentiment that created strong incentives for conformity, and in which the official party line was able to reverberate with pop-culture memes and popular nationalism.

Party-State Capitalism in China

China’s economic model, commonly described as “state capitalist,” is now better characterized as party-state capitalism, in which the political survival of the Communist Party trumps developmental goals. Its tools for managing the economy include not only state ownership and market interventions, but increasing use of party-state power to discipline private capital. China’s entrepreneurs are now expected to adhere to the party line, as are foreign corporations operating in the country. The shift is fueling a backlash from foreign governments that view the fusion of state and private interests in China as a threat to their own national security.

The Party-Line Pandemic: A Closer Look at the Partisan Response to COVID-19

ABSTRACT The response to the coronavirus pandemic in the United States has shown that even a serious public health crisis cannot escape the lens of partisanship. The literature shows that most Republicans have viewed the coronavirus as less serious than their Democratic counterparts. This study demonstrates that this partisan gap extends to the real behavior of the public during, and after, the coronavirus state lockdowns. Using location data from mobile phones, we find that county-level partisanship predicts compliance with state shutdown orders, even when controlling for local COVID-19 intensity. Further, the magnitude of this effect is stronger than that of other explanatory variables, such as age, education, and population density. These results show that partisan beliefs can affect behavior regarding issues that are not overtly political, even behaviors that could put one or others at risk.