Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

An evolutionary game analysis of user-pay public–private partnership projects

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Danrong Song ◽  
Jinbo Song ◽  
Hehui Yuan ◽  
Yu Fan
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Public

PurposeWith the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the payment for use and the private sector is concerned with its return on investment, the public sector pays more attention to the efficient utilization of public funds. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to join PPP-UP, an evolutionary game model involving the three parties is constructed.Design/methodology/approachAn evolutionary game model is established that considers the users and the public and private sectors in user-pay public-private-partnership projects (PPP-UP). Eight scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. A situation where all three players are willing to cooperate in theory is also examined. The key influencing parameters that affect cooperation behaviors are further discussed.FindingsFirst, the results illustrate that by properly adjusting the influencing factors, the cooperation status among the three parties can be changed along with certain evolutionary trends. Second, it is hard to modify unsatisfactory evolutionary stability by small changes in both the price compensation of and the construction and operation compensation. Third, it is necessary to involve the users in the decision-making process in PPP-UP and take their demands regarding benefits and payments into account.Originality/valueIn this paper, we focus on PPP-UP to research interactions among the public and private sectors and the users. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, to facilitate the successful implementation and development of a project, several conditions are needed to ensure tripartite cooperation. Several recommendations are then proposed for decision-makers in PPP-UP.

scholarly journals Multi-Player Evolutionary Game of Network Attack and Defense Based on System Dynamics

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (23) ◽  
pp. 3014
Author(s):  
Pengxi Yang ◽  
Fei Gao ◽  
Hua Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Network Attack ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategies ◽  
Player Game ◽  
Attack And Defense ◽  
Mathematical Derivation

We formalize the adversarial process between defender and attackers as a game and study the non-cooperative evolutionary game mechanism under bounded rationality. We analyze the long-term dynamic process between the attacking and defending parties using the evolutionary stable strategies derived from the evolutionary game model. First, we construct a multi-player evolutionary game model consisting of a defender and multiple attackers, formally describe the strategies, and construct a three-player game payoff matrix. Then, we propose two punishment schemes, i.e., static and dynamic ones. Moreover, through the combination of mathematical derivation with simulation, we obtain the evolutionary stable strategies of each player. Different from previous work, in this paper, we consider the influence of strategies among different attackers. The simulation shows that (1) in the static punishment scheme, increasing the penalty can quickly control the occurrence of network attacks in the short term; (2) in the dynamic punishment scheme, the game can be stabilized effectively, and the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the change of the initial values.

scholarly journals Evolutionary game analysis of Chinese cross border logistics enterprises adopting blockchain technology in supply chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 275 ◽  
pp. 03078
Author(s):  
KunYang Liu ◽  
Yong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Technological Revolution ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Technical Ability ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Logistics Enterprises ◽  
Mathematical Derivation

Blockchain technology is considered to be the representative technology of the fourth technological revolution, and logistics and supply chain field has been considered as the main application direction in the next step by industry and academia. In order to study the behavior and intention of Chinese cross-border logistics enterprises to introduce blockchain into internal supply chain, this paper constructs a model of cross-border logistics enterprises adopting blockchain technology on the basis of bounded rationality based on the game model, this paper attempts to find out the factors that affect the introduction of blockchain into the internal supply chain through mathematical derivation and numerical analysis. The game results show that the willingness of cross-border logistics enterprises to adopt blockchain is closely related to the technical ability of blockchain, the incremental performance after the introduction of blockchain, the conversion cost of blockchain technology, and other factors. Enterprises should coordinate various factors and choose to adopt blockchain technology according to their own situation.

scholarly journals Can Status Inequality Organize Cooperation in Multi-leader Systems? An Evolutionary Theory

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsuan-Wei Lee ◽  
Yen-Ping Chang ◽  
Yen-Sheng Chiang
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Task Groups ◽  
Cooperative Interactions ◽  
Evolutionary Function ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Status Inequality ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Multiple Leaders

Abstract Status hierarchies often emerge in small collective task groups. In these groups, clearly defined hierarchies facilitate and stabilize structured cooperative interactions among group members, supporting their evolutionary function in the real world. What the existing research in this field has failed to consider, however, is that cooperation matters in these hierarchies with clear status inequality, as well as in other more realistic, multiple-leader groups with less clear hierarchies. Multi-leadership is ubiquitous but, by definition, flattens status inequality and may, in turn, jeopardize its capacity to sustain cooperation. Leveraging the relationship between multi-leadership and cooperation, our evolutionary game model reveals that hierarchies, in general, promote cooperation in groups with multiple leaders, but these hierarchies only do that up to a point, after which multi-leadership backfires. Accordingly, the model provides not only a theoretical account for how multi-leadership coexists with cooperation but also the conditions under which the coexistence would break.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Model of Stock Price Synchronicity from Investor Behavior

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Yue Dong ◽  
Yuhao Zhang ◽  
Jinnan Pan ◽  
Tingqiang Chen
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Individual Investors ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stock Price Synchronicity ◽  
The Cost

Institutional and individual investors are the two important players in the stock market. Together, they determine the price of the stock market. In this paper, an evolutionary game model that contains the two groups of players is proposed to analyze the stock price synchronicity considering the impacts of investors’ decisions on stock investment. Factors affecting investors’ decisions include the potential revenue or loss, the probability of gain or loss, and the cost of corresponding behavior. The proposed game model is analyzed by replicator dynamics equations and simulation of the evolutionary equilibrium strategy under different circumstances. The analysis shows that the operating cost of institutional investors, the cost of information collection before trading, and the expected loss that may be punished by regulators are the key factors that affect the evolutionary game system between institutional investors and individual investors. In addition, reducing the speculation in the market and increasing the information access of investors through the serious operation mode of institutional investors and the strengthening of the market information disclosure mechanism are beneficial to alleviate price synchronicity in stock market.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Capital-Constrained Supplier’s and Manufacturer’s Financing Schemes

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Suyong Zhang ◽  
Panos. M. Pardalos ◽  
Xiaodan Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Financial Risk ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Interaction Mechanism ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Strategy Selection ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Purchase Order ◽  
Financing Strategy ◽  
Theoretical Results ◽  
Financing Schemes

Purchase order financing (POF) and buyer direct financing (BDF) are both innovative financing schemes aiming to help financial constrained suppliers secure financing for production. In this paper, we investigate the interaction mechanism between suppliers’ financing strategy selection and manufacturers’ loans offering strategy adoption under two innovative financing schemes. We developed an evolutionary game model to effectively investigate the interaction mechanism between suppliers and manufacturers and analyzed the evolutionary stable strategies of the game model. Then we used system dynamics to present the performance of the evolutionary game model and took a sensitivity analysis to verify the theoretical results. The main conclusions are as follows: in the supply chain, to deal with the noncooperation among suppliers and manufacturers on innovative financing schemes, the revenue of manufacturers, the rate of manufacturer loan, and the proper financial risk factor should be relatively high.

The Game Analysis for Financial Fraud Behavior of CPAs under the Shareholder Selecting Pattern

2014 ◽  
Vol 926-930 ◽  
pp. 4032-4036
Author(s):  
Ping Chen ◽  
Shuang Liang Tian
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Financial Fraud ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Audit Independence

CPAs enjoy higher audit independence under the shareholders selecting pattern, which is widely used in developed countries. According to the characteristics of shareholders selecting pattern, as well as that of listing companies’ managers and CPAs, we established asymmetric evolutionary game model between managers and CPAs, and researched the paths and the mechanism which two players’ behavior evolved respectively. Based on this, we discussed the forming conditions of financial fraud.

The Application of MATLAB Simulation Technology on Evolutionary Game Analysis

2014 ◽  
Vol 687-691 ◽  
pp. 1619-1621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Te Zhu ◽  
Cheng Hao Liu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The United States ◽  
Simulation Software ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Engineering Analysis ◽  
Matlab Simulation ◽  
Simulation Technology ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Analysis And Design ◽  
Logistics Enterprises

System simulation software MATLAB is developed by the United States Mays Walker Corporation (Mathwork) for the study of engineering analysis and design process. On the basis of discussion on MATLAB simulation software, this paper introduces the evolutionary game model, and take the evolutionary game model between logistics enterprises and SMEs as an example , Showing the application of MATLAB simulation technology on evolutionary game.

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