Heterogeneous Patience, Bargaining Power and Investment in Future Public Goods

2018 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 1101-1107
Author(s):  
Ram Fishman
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 443-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hülya Eraslan ◽  
Kirill S. Evdokimov

This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the extensions to bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic surplus; bargaining over public goods; legislative bargaining with alternative bargaining protocols in which players make demands, compete for recognition, or make counterproposals; and legislative bargaining with cheap talk communication.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristian A. Rojas ◽  
Joshua Cinner ◽  
Jacqueline Lau ◽  
Cristina Ruano-Chamorro ◽  
Francisco J. Contreras-Drey ◽  
...  

AbstractPro-social behavior is crucial to the sustainable governance of common-pool resources such as fisheries. Here, we investigate how key socioeconomic characteristics influence fishers’ pro-social and bargaining behavior in three types of experimental economic games (public goods, trust, and trade) conducted in fishing associations in Chile. Our games revealed high levels of cooperation in the public goods game, a high degree of trust, and that sellers rather than buyers had more bargaining power, yet these results were strongly influenced by participants’ socioeconomic characteristics. Specifically, gender, having a secondary income source, age, and being the main income provider for the household all had a relationship to multiple game outcomes. Our results highlight that engagement in pro-social behaviors such as trust and cooperation can be influenced by people’s socioeconomic context.


2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig Parks ◽  
Blythe Duell ◽  
Larry Sanna
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Agnar Sandmo
Keyword(s):  

2005 ◽  
pp. 131-141
Author(s):  
V. Mortikov

The basic properties of international public goods are analyzed in the paper. Special attention is paid to the typology of international public goods: pure and impure, excludable and nonexcludable, club goods, regional public goods, joint products. The author argues that social construction of international public good depends on many factors, for example, government economic policy. Aggregation technologies in the supply of global public goods are examined.


2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kjell Hausken ◽  
Mthuli Ncube

We consider revolutions and civil war involving an incumbent, a challenger, and the population. Revolutions are classified into eight outcomes. In four outcomes incumbent repression occurs (viewed as providing sub-threshold benefits such as public goods to the population). Accommodation occurs in the other four outcomes (benefits provision above a threshold). The incumbent and challenger fight each other. The incumbent may win and retain power or else lose, thereby causing standoff or coalition. In a standoff, which is costly, no one backs down and uncertainty exists about who is in power. In a coalition, which is less costly, the incumbent and challenger cooperate, compromise, and negotiate their differences. If the population successfully revolts against the incumbent, the challenger replaces the incumbent. Eighty-seven revolutions during 1961–2011, including the recent Arab spring revolutions, are classified into the eight outcomes. When repressive, the incumbent loses 46 revolutions, remains in power through 21 revolutions, and builds a coalition after 12 revolutions. When accommodative, the incumbent loses seven revolutions and builds a coalition after one revolution. The 87 revolutions are classified across geographic regions and by time-period.


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