Bargaining at Retail Stores: Evidence from Vienna

In the West, where posted prices are the norm, it is uncommon to observe consumers receive discounts below the posted price. Nevertheless, we find that when stores are asked, a discount is granted approximately 40% of the time, with a median discount percentage of 10%. Discounts are more likely to be offered by small-scale firms, for higher-priced products, and for nonsale items. More generally, differences in price delegation behavior across firm types serve as an indicator that monitoring costs and employee skills are important drivers of bargaining behavior. This paper was accepted by Duncan Simester, marketing

An experimental look at trust, bargaining, and public goods in fishing communities

Pro-social behavior is crucial to the sustainable governance of common-pool resources such as fisheries. Here, we investigate how key socioeconomic characteristics influence fishers’ pro-social and bargaining behavior in three types of experimental economic games (public goods, trust, and trade) conducted in fishing associations in Chile. Our games revealed high levels of cooperation in the public goods game, a high degree of trust, and that sellers rather than buyers had more bargaining power, yet these results were strongly influenced by participants’ socioeconomic characteristics. Specifically, gender, having a secondary income source, age, and being the main income provider for the household all had a relationship to multiple game outcomes. Our results highlight that engagement in pro-social behaviors such as trust and cooperation can be influenced by people’s socioeconomic context.

Wielding power in multiparty negotiations: the impact of communication medium and assertiveness

Purpose The medium negotiators choose for communication will influence both process and outcome. To understand how medium influences power expression, this paper aims to compare value claiming by asymmetrically powerful negotiators, using face-to-face and computer-mediated messaging across two studies. Following up on long-standing conjectures from prominent coalition researchers, the authors also directly tested the role of the apex negotiator's personality in coalition formation and value expropriation. Design/methodology/approach The authors conducted two laboratory experiments which manipulated communication medium (computer-mediated vs face-to-face) in three- and four-person bargaining. They also varied asymmetry of power so the apex negotiator either could not be left out of a winning coalition (Study 1) or could be (Study 2). The authors measured trait assertiveness along with multiple indicators of hard bargaining behavior. Findings Communicating using instant messages via a computer interface facilitated value claiming for powerful negotiators across both studies. Trait assertiveness correlated with hard bargaining behavior in both studies. An index of hard bargaining behavior mediated the effect of assertiveness on value expropriation but only in the context where the powerful negotiator held a genuine monopoly over coalitions. Originality/value The authors contribute to the literature on multiparty negotiations by demonstrating persistent media effects on power utilization and by finally confirming the conjectures of prominent coalition researchers regarding personality. Though personality traits generate consistent effects on behavior, their influence on negotiation outcomes depends on the power structure. Negotiation theory needs to incorporate structural and situational factors in modelling effects of enduring traits. Negotiation research should move beyond a rigid focus on dyads.

Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce

This article suggests an alternative way of thinking about the role of law at the time of divorce. It is concerned primarily with the impact of the legal system on negotiations and bargaining that occur outside the courtroom. One sees the primary function of contemporary divorce law not as imposing order from above, but rather as providing a framework within which divorcing couples can themselves determine their postdissolution rights and responsibilities. This process by which parties to a marriage are empowered to create their own legally enforceable commitments is a form of “private ordering.” Whether or not one accepts the desirability of private ordering, it is clear that most divorcing couples do not require adjudication of their disputes. The article then analyzes how the legal system affects the bargaining behavior of divorcing couples, before presenting a theory of divorce bargaining. It also considers the role of lawyers and courts in divorce.

Emotional Intelligence and Bargaining Behavior

In this experiment, we examined how trait Emotional Intelligence (EI) related tobehavior in social bargaining tasks. EI is theoretically related to both higher trait levels of empathy and better emotional regulation. More empathetic people may act more generously toward a bargaining partner. Subjects with better emotional regulation may be better at controlling their emotions in bargaining situations, which may help them make more self-interested choices. We used the Ultimatum and Dictator games to measure whether higher EI individuals behaved more generously or selfishly. These games are played between two people, where one person receives an endowment from the experimenter and decides how much to share with a recipient. The Ultimatum Game allows the recipient to reject offers, which forces the proposer to give his money back to the experimenter. In the Dictator Game, the recipient is unable to reject the proposer's offer. To maximize earnings, the most strategic thing to do in the Ultimatum Game is to make offers closer to even splits to avoid getting rejected by one's partner and to keep the whole endowment in the Dictator Game where there is no threat of retribution. Conversely, if a subject is motivated by fairness, they would make fair offers in both games. We found that subjects with higher EI acted strategically by being fair in the Ultimatum Game and selfish in the Dictator Game. These findings suggest that EI predicts more self interested behavior in bargaining situations.

Personality Traits as a Partial Explanation for Gender Wage Gaps and Glass Ceilings

This paper investigates whether personality traits can explain glass ceilings (increasing gender wage gaps across the wage distribution). Using longitudinal survey data from Germany, I combine unconditional quantile regressions with wage gap decompositions to identify the effect of personality traits on gender gaps and investigate potential channels of the effect. The results suggest that the impact of personality traits on wage gaps increases across the wage distribution. Personality traits explain up to 14% of the overall gender wage gap at the top of the wage distribution and around 7-9% at the mean. The effect is mostly driven by direct wage effects (potentially through productivity or bargaining behavior) of certain traits that differ between men and women, while access to jobs and discrimination of women based on personality traits play a minor role.

Analysis of Complex Dynamics in Different Bargaining Systems

This paper focuses on the bargaining behavior of supply chain members and studies the stability of the bargaining system. There are two forms of bargaining in the process of negotiation. One is separate bargaining, and the other is that the automobile manufacturers form an alliance and bargain with the supplier collectively. We explore the influence of bargaining power and adjustment speed on the stability of the dynamic system and find that both of the factors need to be small to maintain the stability of the supply chain. After comparing the two forms of bargaining in terms of profits and stable regions, we find that the collective bargaining is a pattern with the existence of risk and benefit simultaneously. In order to control chaos in collective bargaining to lower the risk, we adopt the delay feedback control method. With the introduction of the control factor, the system tends to be stable finally.

Factors affecting consumer’s bargaining behavior: The case of fashionable clothing

Shopping is one of the current trends of the Vietnamese. According to Nielsen’s research results about consumer confidence in the fourth quarter of 2017, more than half of Vietnamese people (51%) use their spare money to buy new clothes at modern business models such as supermarkets, shopping centers, or at very traditional models like street vendors and wet markets where haggling (also known as bargaining) is considered as a common habit for Vietnamese. This is due to business characteristics from a very long time ago in Viet Nam. The bargaining behavior is not so hard to recognize in shopping. Even now, a large part of foreign tourists is familiar with the bargaining culture. This study aimed to discover bargaining behavior, the factors affecting such a behavior in buying fashionable clothing of the consumers in Ho Chi Minh City, and to consider whether the differences in bargaining behavior exist among different groups of gender, age, and income. The research was conducted using mixed methods concluding qualitative research (in-depth interview and focus group) and quantitative one (survey). The results showed that Attitude towards bargaining, Perceived behavioral control, Interest in bargaining affect Consumer’s bargaining behavior when buying fashionable clothes. Results were validated in Ho Chi Minh City context, and some conclusions were also presented.