Resource Game: Present Bias and Sophisticated Paradigm

Author(s):  
Ling Peng ◽  
Peter E. Kloeden
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Anujit Chakraborty
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Reiff ◽  
Hengchen Dai ◽  
John Beshears ◽  
Katherine L. Milkman ◽  
Shlomo benartzi
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorgo T.G. Goossens ◽  
Bas J.M. Werker

Author(s):  
Holger Herz ◽  
Martin Huber ◽  
Tjaša Maillard-Bjedov ◽  
Svitlana Tyahlo

Abstract Differences in patience across language groups have recently received increased attention in the literature. We provide evidence on this issue by measuring time preferences of French and German speakers from a bilingual municipality in Switzerland where institutions are shared and socioeconomic conditions are very similar across the two language groups. We find that French speakers are significantly more impatient than German speakers, and differences are particularly pronounced when payments in the present are involved. Estimates of preference parameters of a quasi-hyperbolic discounting model suggest significant differences in both present bias (β) and the long-run discount factor (δ) across language groups.


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-231
Author(s):  
MINWOOK KANG ◽  
LEI SANDY YE
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (5) ◽  
pp. 273-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ted O'Donoghue ◽  
Matthew Rabin

While present bias is an old idea, it only took hold in economics following David Laibson's (1994) dissertation. Over the past 20 years, research has led to a much better theoretical understanding of present bias, when and how to apply it, and which ancillary assumptions are appropriate in different contexts. Empirical analyses have demonstrated how present bias can improve our understanding of behavior in various economic field contexts. Nonetheless, there is still much to learn. In this paper, we give our assessment of some lessons learned, and to be learned.


2018 ◽  
Vol 108 (12) ◽  
pp. 3778-3813 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Casaburi ◽  
Jack Willis

The gains from insurance arise from the transfer of income across states. Yet, by requiring that the premium be paid up front, standard insurance products also transfer income across time. We show that this intertemporal transfer can help explain low insurance demand, especially among the poor, and in a randomized control trial in Kenya we test a crop insurance product which removes it. The product is interlinked with a contract farming scheme: as with other inputs, the buyer of the crop offers the insurance and deducts the premium from farmer revenues at harvest time. The take-up rate for pay-at-harvest insurance is 72 percent, compared to 5 percent for the standard pay-up-front contract, and the difference is largest among poorer farmers. Additional experiments and outcomes provide evidence on the role of liquidity constraints, present bias, and counterparty risk, and find that enabling farmers to commit to pay the premium just 1 month later increases demand by 21 percentage points. (JEL G22, I32, O13, O16, Q12, Q14)


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taisuke Imai ◽  
Tom Rutter ◽  
Colin Camerer

We examine 220 estimates of the present-bias parameter from 28 articles using the Convex Time Budget protocol. The literature shows that people are on average present biased, but the estimates exhibit substantial heterogeneity across studies. There is evidence of modest selective reporting in the direction of overreporting present-bias. The primary source of the heterogeneity is the type of reward, either monetary or non-monetary reward, but the effect is weakened after correcting for potential selective reporting. In the studies using the monetary reward, the delay until the issue of the reward associated with the "current" time period is shown to influence the estimates of present bias parameter.


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