Semantic Relativism and Logical Implication

Erkenntnis ◽

10.1007/s10670-020-00337-x ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Leonid Tarasov

Keyword(s):

Possible Worlds ◽

Ways Of Knowing ◽

Semantic Theory ◽

Propositional Content ◽

Subject Knowledge ◽

Logical Implication ◽

Knowledge Attributions ◽

Basic Features ◽

Semantic Relativism ◽

Philosophical Questions

AbstractSemantic relativism is the view that the truth-value of some types of statements can vary depending on factors besides possible worlds and times, without any change in their propositional content. It has grown increasingly popular as a semantic theory of several types of statements, including statements that attribute knowledge of a proposition to a subject (knowledge attributions). The ways of knowing claim is the view that perception logically implies knowledge. In my “Semantic Relativism and Ways of Knowing” (2019) I argued that a relativist semantics for knowledge attributions is incompatible with the ways of knowing claim. I suggested that this incompatibility depends on some basic features of the logic of relativist semantics, and therefore can be shown to generalise beyond the discussion of knowledge attributions to semantic relativism more broadly. Here I make this generalisation. I demonstrate that for any proposition p expressed by a statement that does not have a relativist semantics, and for any proposition q expressed by a statement that does have a relativist semantics, p fails to logically imply q. I explain why this happens, discuss some of its philosophical consequences, and consider a way to modify relativist semantics to avoid it. I conclude that semantic relativism raises interesting philosophical questions that have gone largely unnoticed in discussions of this view until now.

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Remembering the Past of Another

Canadian Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.1080/00455091.1973.10716062 ◽

1973 ◽

Vol 2 (4) ◽

pp. 523-532

Author(s):

Roland Puccetti

Keyword(s):

Nineteenth Century ◽

Personal Identity ◽

Possible Worlds ◽

Recent Literature ◽

Heart Transplants ◽

The Past ◽

Physical Universe ◽

Sydney Shoemaker ◽

Universal Truth ◽

Basic Features

There has been a tendency in recent literature on personal identity to treat puzzle cases as unfair intrusions upon the discussion, like proposing to play chess without the Queen. Thus Terence Penelhum speaks of ‘imaginary worlds’ where our normal criteria do not hold and Sydney Shoemaker refers approvingly to G. C. Nerlich's dictum that it is a universal truth of our world, and not of ‘all possible worlds', that only by being identical with a witness to past events can one have the knowledge of them we have in memory.I would agree that where puzzle cases involve changing basic features of our physical universe, e.g. in having people's bodies go out of existence in one place and reappear in another, as recently envisaged by J. M. Shorter, there is some point in talking of ‘imaginary’ or ‘possible’ worlds. But where puzzle cases propose no such basic changes but ground the discussion in physiological possibilities, however unfeasible technologically, this seems an arbitrarily harsh description. It would be like Nineteenth Century philosophers saying talk of flying machines and heart transplants belongs, not to another age merely, but to other worlds.

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Literary Justice: The Participatory Ethics of Early Modern Possible Worlds

Teaching Social Justice Through Shakespeare ◽

10.3366/edinburgh/9781474455589.003.0017 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 174-184

Author(s):

Debapriya Sarkar

Keyword(s):

Early Modern ◽

Possible Worlds ◽

Ways Of Knowing ◽

Early Modern Literature ◽

Positive Change ◽

Modern Literature ◽

Ethical Relation ◽

Ubiquitous Presence ◽

Do So

Where early modern writers traffic in imaginative inventions, they often do so with the aim of effecting positive change. In this chapter, Debapriya Sarkar puts pressure on the ethical relation between literature’s celebration of possible worlds and the pedagogical value of such imagined realms for the reader—and, by extension, for the student of early modern literature and culture. She shows how we might tap into the ubiquitous presence of imaginary worlds in early modern literature; these “golden” worlds of the imagination simultaneously practice and theorize ways of knowing and being in the actual world. What Sarkar calls “participatory readerly ethics” reveals “the radical potential of poiesis” to help us transform what is into what might be.

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YouTube-based accent challenge narratives: Web 2.0 as a context for studying the social value of accent

International Journal of the Sociology of Language ◽

10.1515/ijsl-2017-0058 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 2018 (250) ◽

pp. 137-163 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Betsy Rymes ◽

Andrea Leone-Pizzighella

Keyword(s):

Web 2.0 ◽

Possible Worlds ◽

Ways Of Knowing ◽

Participatory Culture ◽

Social Value ◽

The Internet ◽

Information Analysis ◽

The Social ◽

Collaborative Construction ◽

Youtube Videos

AbstractThis article illustrates how, in a Web 2.0 environment, narrative ways of knowing circulate and disseminate indexical value associated with performances of accent. We compare the information-storing and -sharing functions of Web 1.0 and Web 2.0, making an analogy between these two conceptualizations of the Internet and Jerome Bruner’s two different modes of knowing in his (1986) bookActual minds, possible worlds: logico-scientific and narrative. Just as analyses of Web 2.0 discourse highlight collaborative construction, dissemination, and uptake of information, analysis of narrative illuminates the accrual of sociocultural meaning in collaboratively constructed stories. We use discourse and narrative analytic methods to investigate the social indexicality of “accent” in a corpus of Philadelphia Accent Challenge YouTube videos (and the associated comment sections), and we illustrate how indexical value accrues via the snowballing of reflexive metacommentary in the form of narratives about these accent performances. We argue that discourse in Web 2.0 affords narrative ways of recirculating certain emblematic features of accent. This perspective on analyzing YouTube video-based accent data illuminates the value of YouTube accent performances as a source of linguistic anthropological and narrative insight, and narrative modes of knowing as a means of circulating language ideological discourse via Internet-based participatory culture.

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Philosophical Issues from Kripke’s ‘Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic’

Principia an international journal of epistemology ◽

10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n1p01 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 20 (1) ◽

pp. 01

Author(s):

John Divers

Keyword(s):

Modal Logic ◽

Possible Worlds ◽

Ontological Commitment ◽

Semantic Theory ◽

Kripke Semantics ◽

Crucial Importance ◽

Possible Worlds Semantics ◽

Philosophical Discussion ◽

Modal Space ◽

Clear Conception

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n1p1In ‘Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic’, Kripke articulates his project in the discourse of “possible worlds”. There has been much philosophical discussion of whether endorsement of the Kripke semantics brings ontological commitment to possible worlds. However, that discussion is less than satisfactory because it has been conducted without the necessary investigation of the surrounding philosophical issues that are raised by the Kripke semantics. My aim in this paper is to map out the surrounding territory and to commence that investigation. Among the surrounding issues, and my attitudes to them, are these: (1) the potential of the standard distinction between pure and impure versions of the semantic theory has been under-exploited; (2) there has been under-estimation of what is achieved by the pure semantic theory alone; (3) there is a methodological imperative to co-ordinate a clear conception of the purposes of the impure theory with an equally clear conception of the content the theory; (4) there is a need to support by argument claims about how such a semantic theory, even in an impure state, can fund explanations in the theory of meaning and metaphysics; (5) greater attention needs to be paid to the crucial advance that Kripke makes on the precursors of possible-worlds semantics proper (e.g. Carnap 1947) in clearly distinguishing variation across the worlds within a model of modal space from variation across such models and, finally, (6) the normative nature of the concept of applicability, of the pure semantic theory, is both of crucial importance and largely ignored.

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Some Reflections on Quantified Epistemic Logic

Canadian Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.1080/00455091.1972.10716041 ◽

1972 ◽

Vol 2 (2) ◽

pp. 233-247

Author(s):

Robert C. Coburn

Keyword(s):

Epistemic Logic ◽

Possible Worlds ◽

Logical Implication ◽

Logical Consistency ◽

Logical Equivalence ◽

Philosophical Importance ◽

The Way

In Knowledge and Belief Jaakko Hintikka presents a fairly detailed system of epistemic logic and tries to show its philosophical importance by bringing it to bear upon such problems as what goes wrong in saying “It’s raining, but I don’t believe it.” In setting up the system, Hintikka presents a way of symbolizing certain locutions containing expressions like ‘knows that’, ‘know who’, and ‘believes that’; he introduces certain notions which are analogous to the standard logical concepts consistency, validity, entailment (or logical implication), and logical equivalence; and he sets up (in effect) certain criteria which determine when these analogues of consistency, validity, etc. apply to epistemic and doxastic sentences and schemata-i.e., to sentences and schemata which contain, in their symbolic renditions, one or more of the so-called epistemic operators: ‘K’, ‘B’, ‘P’, and ‘C’. (⌈Ka⌉ is “the formal counterpart” of the words ⌈a knows that⌉; ⌈Ba⌉ is the counterpart of ⌈a believes that⌉; ⌈Pa⌉ is the counterpart of ⌈it is possible, for all that a knows, that⌉; and ⌈Ca⌉ is the counterpart of ⌈it is compatible with everything a believes that⌉ [p. 10].) The analogue of logical consistency which Hintikka introduces is called “defensibility.” Intuitively, a sentence is defensible provided that it is true in at least one of the “most knowledgeable of possible worlds” (p. 36)-i.e., provided it is true in at least one of the possible worlds which have the feature that each inhabitant which is capable of knowing and/or believing things (a) knows all the logical consequences of every proposition it knows and (b) believes all the logical consequences of every proposition it believes. The remaining notions are defined by reference to defensibility in just the way validity, entailment, and logical equivalence are often defined by reference to consistency. Thus self-sustenance, the epistemic analogue of validity, is defined thus:

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Natural Philosophy

10.1093/oso/9780190678739.001.0001 ◽

2019 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Paul Thagard

Keyword(s):

Social Sciences ◽

Social Interactions ◽

Possible Worlds ◽

Natural Philosophy ◽

Social Contexts ◽

Comprehensive Treatment ◽

Cognitive Sciences ◽

The Arts ◽

Human Brains ◽

Philosophical Questions

Philosophy is the attempt to answer general questions about the nature of knowledge, reality, and values. Natural philosophy draws heavily on the sciences and finds no room for supernatural entities such as souls, gods, and possible worlds. Paul Thagard develops interconnected theories of knowledge, reality, morality, justice, meaning, and the arts. He uses new theories of brain mechanisms and social interactions to forge original accounts of the traditional branches of philosophy, including epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics. Rather than reducing the humanities to the sciences, this book displays fertile interconnections that show that philosophical questions and artistic practices can be much better understood by considering how human brains operate and interact in social contexts. The sciences and the humanities are interdependent, because both the natural and social sciences cannot avoid questions about methods and values that are primarily the province of philosophy. Rather than diminish philosophy, the goal of this book is to show its importance for diverse human enterprises, including science, politics, the arts, and everyday life. Natural philosophy draws on the sciences to dramatically increase understanding of fundamental issues concerning mind, meaning, and morality. This book belongs to a trio that includes Brain–Mind: From Neurons to Consciousness and Creativity and Mind–Society: From Brains to Social Sciences and Professions. They can be read independently, but together they make up a Treatise on Mind and Society that provides a unified and comprehensive treatment of the cognitive sciences, social sciences, professions, and humanities.

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Semantic relativism and ways of knowing

Synthese ◽

10.1007/s11229-017-1572-z ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 196 (5) ◽

pp. 2089-2109 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Leonid Tarasov

Keyword(s):

Ways Of Knowing ◽

Semantic Relativism

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The self and schizophrenia: a cognitive approach

Swiss Journal of Psychology ◽

10.1024//1421-0185.62.1.45 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 62 (1) ◽

pp. 45-51 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Marek Nieznanski

Keyword(s):

Normal Subjects ◽

Control Group ◽

Cognitive Approach ◽

Schizophrenic Patients ◽

Self Schema ◽

Persons With Schizophrenia ◽

Basic Features ◽

Trait Words ◽

Patients Experience ◽

Normal Controls

The aim of the study was to explore the basic features of self-schema in persons with schizophrenia. Thirty two schizophrenic patients and 32 normal controls were asked to select personality trait words from a check-list that described themselves, themselves as they were five years ago, and what most people are like. Compared with the control group, participants from the experimental group chose significantly more adjectives that were common to descriptions of self and others, and significantly less that were common to self and past-self descriptions. These results suggest that schizophrenic patients experience their personality as changing over time much more than do healthy subjects. Moreover, their self-representation seems to be less differentiated from others-representation and less clearly defined than in normal subjects.

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