scholarly journals The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?

2007 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 389-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristin Voigt
Keyword(s):  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Option Luck

Justice, Luck, and Pairwise Comparisons

2021 ◽  
pp. 163-201
Author(s):  
Gerald Lang
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social System ◽  
Pairwise Comparison ◽  
Pairwise Comparisons ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Complex Theory ◽  
Income Gap ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Structural Aspects ◽  
Option Luck

This chapter extends the anti-anti-luckist programme to political philosophy, and to the doctrine of luck egalitarianism in particular. Luck egalitarianism affirms that unchosen relative inequalities between agents are unjust. It condemns inequalities that are due to ‘brute luck’, and upholds inequalities that are due to ‘option luck’. Though it can be easily enough stated, luck egalitarianism is actually a complex theory with two separate components: egalitarianism and anti-luckism. Standard luck egalitarianism’s commitment to pairwise comparisons makes it vulnerable to what Susan Hurley calls the ‘Boring Problem’. The Boring Problem points out that any two agents in a pairwise comparison are bound to lack control over the relevant income gap between them, because each of them controls, at best, only one side of that comparison. Though Hurley herself is relatively dismissive of the Boring Problem, it is contended here that, when it is properly appreciated, it inflicts huge damage on luck egalitarianism, which needs in turn to be re-organized as a ‘baseline-sensitive’ theory that dispenses with pairwise comparisons. Baseline-sensitive luck egalitarianism makes decent progress on a number of critical fronts, particularly Saul Smilansky’s ‘Paradox of the Baseline’. But even this form of luck egalitarianism is still open to a worry about how it understands the relationship between its egalitarian default and its case for permissible inequalities, and it has less to say than it should about the structural aspects of a social system that generate inequalities.

scholarly journals Luck Egalitarianism: Two Lines of Critique

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-289
Author(s):  
Dmitry Sereda
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Political Thought ◽  
Main Idea ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Her Family ◽  
The Status ◽  
Luck Egalitarians ◽  
Option Luck

This article is devoted to the stream in political philosophy which came to be known as “luck egalitarianism”. Luck egalitarians are concerned with the questions of distributive justice; their main idea is that no person should be worse-off due to factors which they are unable to influence. Luck egalitarians express this idea via the dichotomy of brute and option luck. The goal of the article is to describe two main lines of critique which luck egalitarianism encounters, and to assess which one is the most dangerous for this movement. Some authors criticize luck egalitarianism from a moral standpoint. They believe that it is overly cruel towards those who suffer due to unfortunate but free choices, humiliating towards those whom it deems to be worthy of help, and that it contradicts our moral intuitions concerning the question of what do people who engage in socially necessary, yet risky professions, deserve. Another important problem for this trend of political thought has to do with metaphysical criticism. Luck egalitarians claim that a person is not responsible not only for the status of her family, her gender, ethnicity, etc., but also for her talents and abilities. The question arises; is there anything for what a person can be genuinely responsible for? Thus, luck egalitarianism encounters the problem of determinism and free will. This problem threatens the identity of luck egalitarianism: if free will does not exist or if it cannot be identified, then the key dichotomy of brute and option luck is meaningless. The article demonstrates that it is the criticism of the second kind which currently poses the greatest problem for luck egalitarianism.

CATERING FOR RESPONSIBILITY: BRUTE LUCK, OPTION LUCK, AND THE NEUTRALITY OBJECTION TO LUCK EGALITARIANISM

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (02) ◽  
pp. 259-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Greg Bognar
Keyword(s):  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Brute Luck ◽  
Luck Egalitarians ◽  
Option Luck ◽  
As If

Abstract:The distinction between brute luck and option luck is fundamental for luck egalitarianism. Many luck egalitarians write as if it could be used to specify which outcomes people should be held responsible for. In this paper, I argue that the distinction can’t be used this way. In fact, luck egalitarians tend to rely instead on rough intuitive judgements about individual responsibility. This makes their view vulnerable to what’s known as the neutrality objection. I show that attempts to avoid this objection are unsuccessful. I conclude that until it provides a better account of attributing responsibility, luck egalitarianism remains incomplete.

Fairness and Legitimacy in Justice, And: Does Option Luck Ever Preserve Justice?

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Technical Sense ◽  
Luck Egalitarians ◽  
Option Luck

This chapter defends the claim that what recommends an outcome that was achieved by just steps from a just starting point is not, in the general case, itself (unqualified) justice, but the different virtue of legitimacy, or, more precisely, the property that no one can legitimately complain about it. David Miller has claimed that luck egalitarianism is inconsistent with the principal distinction that Cohen tries to draw in the chapter, because luck egalitarianism says: distribute equally, compensating appropriately for luck-induced deficits, and then whatever arises from people's choices is just. However, this suggests that luck egalitarians should not call whatever arises “just,” but merely “legitimate” (in the technical sense of being something that no one can complain about).

A Critical Study on Dworkin’s Luck Egalitarianism

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-173
Author(s):  
Joo-Hyun KIM ◽  
Hyeon-cheol Kim 
Keyword(s):  
Critical Study ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism

Inheritance and Luck

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Halliday
Keyword(s):  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Mediating Effects ◽  
Inherited Wealth ◽  
Luck Egalitarian

This chapter reviews and criticizes varieties of the luck egalitarian conception of justice. It begins with the ‘naïve’ distinction between choice and circumstance, on which inequalities are permissible insofar as they depend on the former rather than the latter. The bulk of the chapter discusses more sophisticated versions of luck egalitarianism, which either supplement the naïve view with some countervailing principle (e.g. by appeal to personal prerogatives) or by constraining its scope (e.g. by focusing on the mediating effects of institutions). Later parts of the chapter evaluate other contemporary oppositions to inherited wealth grounded in interpretations of reciprocity and a concern about the role of inheritance in enabling freeriding. The chapter ends with a discussion of Ronald Dworkin’s views, which bear a formal resemblance to the position defended in the following two chapters.

Luck Egalitarianism and Relational Egalitarianism: An Internal Tension in Cohen’s Theory of Justice

2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 219-240
Author(s):  
Jiangjin Chen
Keyword(s):  
Social Relationships ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Egalitarian Ethos

AbstractRelational Egalitarianism focuses on the construction of equal social relationships between persons. It strongly opposes luck egalitarianism, which understands equality as a distributive ideal. In Cohen’s theory of justice, luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism simultaneously exist, and Cohen provides arguments corresponding to each. In this paper, we explore the manifestation of tension between these two forms of egalitarianism in his theory. In addition, we also reconstruct some possible solutions provided by Cohen to soften this tension, including the three approaches of market mechanism, egalitarian ethos and value pluralism, and find them to be unsuccessful. This tension is a serious challenge that needs to be addressed in Cohen’s theory of justice.

Cosmopolitan Luck egalitarianism and the greenhouse effect

2005 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 279-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Axel Gosseries
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Greenhouse Gas ◽  
Greenhouse Effect ◽  
Human Activities ◽  
Scientific Community ◽  
Ghg Emissions ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Straightforward Manner ◽  
Global Regime ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Evidence provided by the scientific community strongly suggests that limits should be placed on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This means that states, firms, and individuals will have to face potentially serious burdens if they are to implement these limits. Which principles of justice should guide a global regime aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions originating from human activities, and most notably from CO2 emissions? This is both a crucial and difficult question. Admittedly, perhaps this question is too ambitious, given the uncertainties and complexities characterizing the issue of climate change. Yet, rather than listing them all at this stage, let us address the question in a straightforward manner, introducing some of these complexities as the need arises.

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